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 FOREWORD
John Avery, M.A., Dip. Crim.
Commissioner of Police, N.S. W.
Member of Advisory Committee, Institute of Criminology
The issues canvassed in the ‘Policing Public Order’ Seminar are timely in the light
ofthe recent overseas experience with public disorder both at public gatherings and in
a limited number of communities.
Frank Brennan’s historical analysis of the Queensland positions allows us to see
the difficulties which can arise when limits are placed on the citizen’s rights to free
association and protest. As pointed out by Father Brennan, a policy of consultation
and co-operation is by far a more effective tool than confrontation.
The main concern of Frank Brennan seems to be summed up in his belief that
public order maintenance is more difficult for police: when a government uses a police
force in an order situation for its own political ends, when consultation fails or does not
take place, and when the courts are perceived as failing to exercise their customary
rigour on public order cases brought before them.
Mark Findlay’s analysis ofthe Bathurst Motorcycle Races and the confrontation
between police and cyclists contributes in the best academic tradition, a vigorous
appraisal of what actually happens in this type of situation.
Mr Findlay, like Lord Scarman, makes a significant contribution from first hand
research by raising major public policy issues. Firstly, the use of public disorder
situations to secure political support for expanded police resources dedicated to
disorder situations; and secondly, the issue of special courts established to deal with
persons charged as a result of this conflict.
The findings and recommendations of Mr Findlay’s report are of great interest to
the New South Wales Police and I believe that the comments made will not only assist
in this specific situation but in a more general sense in our policies and practices in
policing public order.
Dr Wardlaw’s analysis seeks to argue that a balance must be sought between
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ styles of policing, and that police discretion must be exercised after
open and informed public debate. He, as I, believes that the police must protect and
preserve individuals‘ rights and freedom.
The N.S.W. Police are committed to involving the community in those aspects of
policing which directly impact on the quality ofcommunity life. We recognise that the
people of this State give us their money and their authority, the more valuable being
their authority. By pursuing a model ofcommunity based policing through consultation
and negotiation, we believe that this authority will be best exercised.
I wish to thank the Institute of Criminology, Sydney University Law School, for
its continuing commitment to raising publicly issues of significant merit. It is only
through open and free discussion that critical public issues can be raised and resolved.
 AVOIDING TOO MUCH ORDER WITH TOO LITTLE LAW
Frank Brennan, S. J.
Theological College, Parkville, Victoria
The Queensland Street March Ban — A Government Experiment in Repression.
As you know, in Queensland we have been relatively free of the public disorder
which has in recent times reached considerable magnitude in certain other parts
ofthe world. I do not think that it has always been appreciatedjust how fortunate
we have been in this country that public order has been maintained without
violent clashes between conﬂicting groups or between dissident groups and
lawful authority.l
So wrote the Premier of Queensland, Mr Johannes Bjelke—Petersen on 23 April
1969. Twelve years later the Governor of Queensland said:2
We, in this country today, can be grateful that our predecessors, the colonisers of
this land, brought with them and instituted the pracitces of English Law. For it is
a dynamic system.
It can, and must, and will evolve to solve and meet the changes in social,
industrial and international relationships taking place in the world today.
‘Law and Order’ is one of today’s important political issues. There is a
danger, however that we try to achieve too much order with too little law, by
bypassing the processes we have inherited from those eight centuries of
experience and hard fought battles against tyranny. The people of Queensland
look to the law to defend their rights.
Something had changed.
In September 1977, the Premier had proclaimed: “The day of political street
march is over. Anybody who holds a street march, spontaneous or otherwise, will
know they’re acting illegally . . . Don‘t bother applying for a march permit. You won’t
get one. That‘s Government policy now.”3 This proclamation was echoed by the acting
police commissioner, and was police policy until April 1978. Brisbane police
prohibited most political street marches until August 1979.
Government supporters claimed that the political street march was a recent
phenomenon staged for the benefit of modern news media. They said there was no
common law right to demonstrate, and police had no choice but to implement the law
in its full rigour. They claimed the Queensland system for regulating public meetings
and processions was no different in principle and in substance from that adopted in any
other state of Australia.
Civil liberties advocates said the new government policy high-lighted the defect in
public order machinery which required the obtaining of police permission for a
political demonstration on a street or footpath. They claimed the inalienable right to
demonstrate against government policies was the hallmark of constitutional dem-
ocracies, and they urged police to avoid a needless polarization of the community.
The police refused to confer with the demonstration organizers and adopted the
tactic of all-out confrontation at demonstrations, which resulted in 1,972 arrests. Since
1897, there has been a legal requirement in Queensland that written permission be
obtained for the holding of any procession or public meeting upon a road. The only
legislative change made by the Queensland Parliament to the Traﬂic Act covering such
permits in 1977 was the abolition ofthe right of appeal to a magistrate by an applicant
aggrieved by the refusal of a permit by the Queensland Police.“ This minor change
I. Letter ofJ. Bjelke-Petersen to R. Wensley, 23 April 1969.
2. A9c§dress by His Excellency, Governor of Queensland, Opening of Law Courts, Brisbane, 2 September
l l.
3. Courier Mail, 5 September I977.
4. s.57A, inserted in Trafﬁc Act by Trafﬁc Act Amendment Act 1977.
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immediately achieved the Government’s intention to quash all legal attempts by the
Campaign Against Nuclear Power lobby to protest publicly in Brisbane during the
next two years.
The two year march ban did not arise out of threats to the public peace of
dimensions unknown before or after the ban or any different from the minimal threats
in otherjurisdictions of Australia during that time. There is now doubt about the social
costs incurred from that ban including the loss of liberty by almost 2,000 persons who
were detained in custody, alienation and frustration of the citizens who wished to
express concern and moral outrage about the decisions of Government on an
important question (namely the export ofuranium without the guarantee of what they
saw to be adequate safeguards), a further loss of respect and community acceptance of
the Queensland police force, protracted disruption of traffic and business within the
metropolitan area of Brisbane, clogging the Brisbane Magistrates’ Courts for months
on end, and involvement ofthe courts in determination of cases clouded with political
controversy.
Not only did the ban interfere needlessly with the right or liberty of people to
assemble, process and protest publicly; it also threatened law and order rather than
preserving it; it disrupted traffic flow rather than facilitating it. The march ban was not
only morally objectionable; it was stupid.
On 31 October 1977, after the commencement of the ban, Mr Lewis the
Queensland Police Commissioner submitted his first Annual Report for the year
ended 30 June 1977 which stated:5
Public behaviour in the streets, during the year under review has been generally
good throughout the State.
Some organisations have mounted street demonstrations and marches, mainly in
. Brisbane, but these were dealt with by police with firmness and tolerance.
Police permitted all lawful demonstrations to take place, but ensured that they
were under control at all times. There were only isolated cases of minor conﬂict
between police officers and groups of demonstrators in the streets.
Widespread demonstrations which unfortunately followed His Excellency the
Governor-General throughout Australia also were experienced in Queensland.
These demonstrations, however, did not attract the numerical support or
violence which attended other demonstrations outside this State.
Clearly, even the Queensland police were happy with the state of public order in
the streets prior to the Government’s proclaimed ban.
Almost Returning to Common Sense
The march ban was lifted in July 1979; not surprisingly the Annual Report of the
Queensland Police for the year following the lifting of the ban states:6
There was a dramatic change in the number of public demonstrations involving
civil disobedience of the law compared to previous years
Only three incidents of any significance occurred, compared with 35 for the,
previous year. Naturally, the involvement of police was heavily reduced and the
number of people arrested fell from 962 last year to 12 in the year under review.
Eight permits were issued to protest groups for street marches in the metropolitan
area during the year. No serious problems resulted and they were conducted
within the conditions imposed by the District Superintendent of Traffic.
Next year things improved again. The 1981 report states:7
5. Queensland Police, Annual Report I977, p. 12.
6. Queensland Police, Annual Report I980, p. l9.
7. Queensland Police, Annual Report 1981, p. l8.
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There was a continuing marked improvement in public behaviour during the
year.
While it is clear that crime in general is increasing, the general behaviour oflarge
gatherings of people for a variety ofpurposes has shown a definite improvement
over previous years. The level of public demonstrations for various causes has
eased, and those that were held did not require police involvement other than in
normal crowd or traffic control roles.
The visible presence of uniformed police on the streets and at venues where large
‘crowds gather has a calming effect on croWd behaviour and, when this is
complemented by the purposeful campaign which has been pursued over a
number of years to improve the standing of police officers in the public eye, it
ensures support for police officers from an extremely large majority of the
community. ,
As if that was not enough improvement, the 1982 report states:8
There was a continuing marked improvement in public behaviour during the
year.
While it is clear that crime in general is increasing, the general behaviour oflarge
crowds of people gathered for various purposes has shown a deﬁnite improvement
over previous years. The level of public demonstrations in support of differing
causes has eased, and those that were held did not require police involvement
other than normal crowd or traffic control.
The visible presence of uniformed police on the streets and at venues where
crowds gather has a calming effect on crowd behaviour. When this is
complemented by a purposeful campaign which has been pursued in recent years
to improve the standing of police officers in the public eye, the support ofa large
majority of the community for police officers is ensured.
Queensland Police, having abandoned the Government policy of all-out con—
frontation, returned to a policy of consultation and co-operation. During the
Commonwealth Games in 1982, there was some attempt at consultation and co-
operation with demonstration organisers. But the conduct of police was affected by
their political perceptions and speculations about protesters’states of origin. The 1983
Annual Report states:9 ,
There were very few instances of civil disorder during the year and as a result the
need to commit large numbers of police to restoring order was again greatly
reduced.
There was again a reduced number of issues which attracted large public
demonstrations with a potential for disruption and lawlessness. The only real
problems in this area came during the Commonwealth Games when several
rallies were held to support Aboriginal land rights and people from southern
States swelled the ranks of local protestors.
Despite rallies which were held on this theme during the period, on only three
occasions did extremist element succeed in attracting enough support for illegal
marches. Police reaction was prompt'and restrained and all situations were
resolved quickly and with a miniumum of disruption to the community.
After the Games, the politics once again dropped out to protest and its policing in
Brisbane. The 1984 Report claimed success in “the more sympathetic approach by
police officers, to crowd control”:lo
There was a marked improvement in public behaviour during the year, and
therefore there was virtually no need to commit large numbers of police to
maintaining the public peace and good order.
58. Queensland Police, Annual Report I982, p. l8.
9.‘ Queensland Police, Annual Report I982, p. 22.
IO. Queensland Police, Annual Report 1982, p. 20.
 A visible police presence at every major public gathering minimized unruly‘
activities by the minority which can ruin the enjoyment of other patrons. It
appears that the Department’s efforts to improve its community standing
through more positive media and public relations programmes is having a
significant effect. Instances of abuse and unpleasantness towards police ofﬁcers
performing their normal duties are less prevalent today than in years past.
Despite the more sympathetic approach by police officers to crowd control and a
desire to work and play in close harmony with the community, trouble-makers
can be assured that police will take ﬁrm actions where offences are committed
and will continue to protect the interests of the public at large.
More Repression
But then came the SEQEB power dispute in which police were deployed on
another political mission similar to that of 1977-1979. At the behest, or at least in
accordance with the wishes, of government, the police reverted to confrontation tactics
with picketers outside SEQEB premises. Despite the claim in the 1985 Report that
“These incidents . . . were well contained and passed off without any major
commitment of police resources”,ll unnecessary escalation of confrontation and the
loss of ‘law and order’ have resulted from wooden implementation of antiquated
provisions of the Queensland Trafﬁc Act, the exercise of police discretions directed by
or at least coincident with government policy, and the relentless exercise of even wider
police powers accorded by the Electricity (Continuity ofSupply) Act 1985. Under that
Act, a police ofﬁcer can arrest any person whom the officer believes on reasonable
grounds to have done any act or made any omission calculated to annoy or distress any
SEQEB employee at work or on their way to work.'2
The Queensland Government’s handling of the power dispute was criticised in
many quarters, as was the street march ban in 1977-79. Those criticisms received the-
now characteristic treatment of a long entrenched government. For example, after the
Primate of the Anglican Church in Australia, Archbishop Sir John Grindrod, had"
defended the workers’ right to strike, the Premier Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen said “he
refused to believe a church leader would condone the actions of unionists. "'3 When the
Archbishop of Canterbury arrived in Brisbane and expressed public support of the
Primate‘s views, the Premier urged Dr Runcie to “go back to London and try and do
hisjob of filling those seats." He said, “I am staggered when I go to London and attend
church, and I am about the only person there in the great big buildings.“
In support of sacked workers, a group known as the Concerned Christians
conducted prayer vigils at early morning pickets ensuring that they did not impede any
person’s movement, merely singing hymns and standing behind wooden crosses. The
abuse of police power was highlighted by the arrest and subsequent acquittals of some
of these ‘Concerned Christians’. In the joint hearing of charges against 10 Concerned
Christians, the prosecutor showed the scope police were attempting to give to an
offence of acting in a way calculated to annoy or distress another. He submitted to the
magistrate: '5 _
Your worship, . . . not to be ultra-crude, but to use something which I think is
clearly understandable, “if you have the crow of a beak, the feathers of a beak, the
feet of a beak, you can’t be mistaken for a duck.” Now, . . . my primary point is
11. Queensland Police, Annual Report 1985, p. 19.
_12. Electricity (Continuity ofSupply) Act 1985, ss.5, 5A.
13. Courier Mail, 9 April 1985
14. Courier Mail, 17 April 1985.
15. Magistrates Court Transcript of Proceedings, No. 7893 of 1985, Mr Fardon S.M., reproduced in
“Concerned Christians and Their Involvement in the Dispute“, M. McGregor—Lowndes, Trinity
Occasional Papers, Vol. 4, No. 2, Trinity Theological College, Brisbane, pp. 78-79.
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this. The actions of these defendants was in fact encouragement to the other
demonstrators and in the converse, or ancillary to that, it was discouragement to
the SEQEB workers, by their attendance, by their very attendance. Your
Worship, it's not outside reality from the ordinary man test, to put ourselves in
the place of a SEQEB worker at that location at that time, or in the case of a
SEQEB worker, watching the news on that evening. Now your worship can take
judicial notice of the fact that these matters were presented on the news. Now,
either of those SEQEB workers could make a realistic comment to themselves in
these terms, “even the church is against me". ,
Fortunately this submission failed as did the prosecution of many Concerned
Christians. ln eleven such cases, the prosecutors sought orders to review from the
Supreme Court of Queensland. In each case the order nisi was discharged as
it could not be said that the stipendiary magistrate. . . was wrong in concluding. .
. that he was not satisfied that the conduct of any of the respondents was
calculated, that is, intended or designed to harass any employee on account of his
performance or work.'6
Protestors not boasting the appellation ‘Concerned Christian’ have had a harder
time of it in the courts. One convicted picketer, unsuccessful in seeking an order to
review, was in a group separate from the Concerned Christians who where singing
hymns and holding crosses.
- Members of this group were calling out words such as ‘Scab’, ‘Victory to the
E.T.U.‘ and other slogans, but there is no evidence that the appellant was doing
so. . . Members of the group all linked their arms together and started chanting
slogans such as ‘Reinstate the Iinesmen’, ‘Give the sack to Joh’ and ‘Victory to the
E.T. U.‘, although the evidence did not show that all the persons in the group were
chanting such slogans or, in particular, that the appellant was doing so.'7
Nontheless the Supreme Court discharged the order nisi on the basis that there
was evidence to support “the conclusion that the act ofthe appellant was calculated to
harass employees ofthe Board”. '3 Hejust happened to be standing with the wrong mob.
The High Court has granted special leave to appeal in this case. ,
Upholding law and order is one thing, but protecting the sensibilities of power
workers from the prayerful presence of Concerned Christians and even from vocal
government critics is another. As with the street march ban, the concern of the
Queensland police to do the government’s bidding has again resulted in a breakdown
rather than a preservation of law and order.
The Importance of Public Protest
lfconstitutional democracies are to be more than elected dictatorships, they must
maintain legal and protected means for the citizen’s expression of political discontent.
It is facile to claim that the vote, access to a local member, and the availability ofa free
press are sufficient means. There are some political issues that prompt feelings of moral
outrage in the citizenry. The legal and protected means must include means for the
communication of such outrage. The most usual means for such communication are
the public procession and assembly. A person’s physical presence at a place or an event
is the most powerful means of expression for one believing in or committed to 'a
particular cause, a person, or collection of persons. In society, a public gathering of
persons is the most powerful means for expression of solidarity to the group and
I6. Belts & Others v Cribb & Others, Ex Pane Bells, Judgment of Full Court of the Supreme Court of
Queensland, 0.S.C. No. 23 of 1985, 25 October 1985, Judgment of Kelly S.P.J., p. 2. See also Beanie
vKindness. Ex Pane Beanie, 0.S.C. No. 22 of I985.
lg. (lard/Wan v Lunon, Ex Pane 0'Sullivan, 0.S.C. No. 14 of [985, Judgment of Kelly S.P.J., p. 2.
l . l i , p. 6.
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witness to those outside the group. It is to be expected that in relation to important
political issues about which people feel moral outrage or concern, they will want to use
the best and most usual form of expression and communication of that outrage or
concern.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that
the right of the people peacefully to assemble for lawful purposes . . . is, and
always has been, one of the attributes of citizenship under a free government. It
‘derives its source’ . . . ‘from those laws whose authority is acknowledged by
civilised man throughout the world’. It is found wherever civilization exists.'9
It must be assumed that public protest will always be a possibility, and often an
actuality, in a constitutional democracy. Thus the public assembly and political
procession must be accorded recognized places in the constitutional machinery.
This is not to deny the value of the vote, the access to politicians, or the availability
of a free press. The main issues about which people have demonstrated in Australia
recently have been the subject of elections, parliamentary petition, and press coverage.
But large numbers of individuals have wanted to do more in expressing their views.
Usually they have been permitted, and should always be permitted, to do so provided
they have not threatened the public peace or unduly inconvenienced others who might
not feel the same concern or outrage or who might not share the same views. It is not a
Imatter of balancing the right to protest over and against the need to preserve public
order and the smooth flow of traffic. The recent Queensland experience proves
conclusively that there is not an indirect proportionality between two measurable
quantities yielding the simplistic formula that the “inalienable right to protest” results
in a situation of lawlessness and unmitigated disruption to traffic and the lives of
others; while the denial of the right to protest results in complete law and order,
smooth trafﬁc flow and the guarantee that people can go about their lawful business.
The state must make provision for public protest activity respecting such activity
as a right or liberty of the subject while at the same time accommodating the exercise of
this right or liberty within the confines of urbanised living dominated by the motor car,
the market place and high—rise development.
There has to be regulation of public protest, not as censorship or political
oppression but as the regulation of traffic; there has to be protection given to all
citizens from threat of violence and disorder, not in a quest for quietism or elimination
of political differences but so as to preserve the peace without which constitutional
government and civilised living collapse.
Having accepted the place of public protest, it is necessary to make provision for
its achievement under the law.
Accommodating Public Protest
In all Australianjurisdictions there are laws prohibiting breaches of the peace and
like offences whether or not one is a member of a procession or assembly.
Persons who assemble with intent to commit a crime by open force or to carry out
any common purpose in such manner as to give firm and courageous persons in the
vicinity reasonable grounds to apprehend a breach of the peace are members of an
unlawful assembly and that is an offence in all jurisdictions.20 Riot or its equivalent is
also an offence in each jurisdiction.“
I . . .
19. United States v Cruickshank (187§) 92 US. 552.
20. See 5.545C, Crimes Act (N.S.W.); 5.62, Criminal Code (Q'ld); 5.63, Criminal Code (W.A.); 5.74, Criminal
Code (Tas); 5.6, Public Order (Protection ofPersons and Places) Act I971 (C'wlth); common law offence
in Victoria and South Australia. -
21. Sec 5.5, Unlawful Assemblies & Procession: Act 1958 (Vic); $.63, Criminal Code (Q'ld); 5.244, Criminal ,
Law Consolidation Act (S.A.); $.64, Criminal Order (Protection of Persons & Property) Act 197!
(C'wlth); common law offence, N.S.W.
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No jurisdiction except Western Australia has laws generally governing public
meetings held in public places; however most councils do have by-laws governing
public meetings which are held on land controlled by councils. Alljurisdictions have
laws and policies affecting the holding of assemblies on roads.
While some Australian jurisdictions have adopted notification and consultation
systems for policing public protest activity, Queensland has retained a permit system
without provision for appeal to a court in the event of police refusal. The notification
system with provision for ajudicial hearing to determine conflicts when demonstration
organisers and police cannot agree has been adopted successfully in somejurisdictions.
It has worked well in South Australia for 14 years and in New South Wales for the last
7 years. This system encourages police—demonstrator co-operation, it recognizes the
right to protest, and it provides the law’s best machinery for resolving the competing
claims of road users. Above all, it has preserved the peace.
If permit systems are to be maintained, the aggrieved applicant should be assured
a right of appeal to a court.22 Afterall, it was Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen himself defending
the Queensland Traffic Act as it was prior to 1977, who said:23
There is ample right of application to the courts provided in the legislation for
those who feel that the District Superintendent of Traffic has treated them
unfairly.
I would point out that in regulating processions, meetings, etc., the District
Superintendent of Traffic, apart from ensuring the free and orderly movement of
traffic, has also to organise such matters so that groups of persons who hold or
are likely to hold conﬂicting views, whilst being able to freely express those views,
are separated by time or locality.
Recent Queensland experience has demonstrated that police control of political
protest with no provision for judicial review (except prerogrative relief) results in
periodic abuses of power in accordance with government policy. Inevitably, police
independence and integrity have been impugned. Traffic control and the preservation
of the peace can become very political business when demonstrators are protesting
vehemently, though peaceably, against decisions of the government of the day. In
quashing protest so as to maintain the peace, or to protect the rights of others, police
can be seen to be and may become, the agents of government and its protectors during
times of political controversy. Thus independence and integrity are essential if the
public including the protesters are to have any trust in the police who have to perform
the balancing of rights on the day, in the street. In exercising their traffic control
' powers in situations of potential political conﬂict, police may be given and often
require directives from the government of the day. In so far as it is possible, the police
should be spared the image of partisanship and should tread the narrow line between
making political decisions themselves and blindly carrying out controversial govern-
ment decisions.
The Need for Good Faith
Whether or not there be civil supervision of police decisions banning or restricting
public protest, and whether or not there be a procedure stipulated by legislation for
notification or application for permission regarding public protest activities, there
must be consultation and good faith between police and protest organisers. Refusal by
either party to consult jeopardises public peace; as does political conduct by either
party which is calculated to impugn the public standing ofthe other party. Politicians,
senior police, and protest organisers have a duty to provide accurate information to
22. ”ll‘ghgi‘s1course has been adopted recently1n Western Australia1n the Public Meetings and Pracesszons Act
23. Letter of J. Bjelke-Petersen to R. Wensley, 23 April I969.
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each other and the public so that there might be a right balancing of interests. The
“disinformation” disseminated by the Queensland Government in the lead up to the
Commonwealth Games undermined public confidence in the police as well as
protesters’ hopes of a fair go under the gaze of international T.V. crews.
In reply to the second reading'debate on the Commonwealth Games Act in 1982,.
Mr Hinze who was then Queensland Minister for Police thought it necessary to retrace
certain events that had occurred since the legislation was introduced. He referred to
recent years including “allegations that a secret black army has been in training
specifically to provoke violence in Brisbane during the Games.”24 Next day the Premier
made a statement reported in the Australian alleging “that six Aborigines are presently
in Libya undergoing guerilla and terrorist training.”25 Next day, the Leader of the
Opposition asked Mr Hinze if he would table in Parliament the information received
regarding the supposed training of Aborigines in terrorism in Libya. Mr Hinze
declined but indicated that he had been presented with a document by the Police
Commissioner. Being a responsible minister he conveyed the information to the
Premier. He added: “It is his duty as Premier to convey the information which has
international overtones, to the Prime Minister. That was done. As to tabling the
document — if the Premier wishes to do that, he may do so; it is entirely up to him."26
The document was never tabled. '
A question was placed on notice about the matter in the Senate;27 No answer was
received for 6 weeks. The Minister for Foreign Affairs provided the answer: “I am
advised that inquiries conducted by my Department and other relevant authorities
have produced no evidence to verify that Aboriginals are currently undergoing guerilla
or terrorist training in Libya.”28 Next day Senator Baume, the Minister for Aboriginal
Affairs, told the Senate: “I know of no evidence to support the assertions that
Aboriginals are training in Libya. That whole story is quite fanciful. I must say that
those kind of statements will occur; people will say these kind of things from time to
time. It may be that a Premier receives from one source or another information that
may eventually prove to be false.”29
Meanwhile six weeks of disinformation by the highest level of Government had
occurred. The information was seen to be a partialjustification for the Commonwealth
Games Act. This exercise by Government, assisted by a report from the Police
Commissioner did nothing to guarantee preservation of the peace or the peaceful
conduct ofthe Commonwealth Games. The price of such smear campaigns is too high
for the state to pay. They place at risk not only the reputations of those who are
smeared but also the fragile balance which can truly be called ‘law and order’, i.e. social
order under the rule of law.
Keeping Out the Unwelcome, Unsympathetic Protesters
In recent years, the Anzac Day ceremonies in some metropolitan areas have been
marked by conﬂict between groups called Women Against Rape in War and members
of the R.S.L. and police authorities. Many Australians, including members of the
R.S.L. see Anzac Day as
a national day of rememberance for the purpose of commemorating members of,
Australian armed forces and their auxiliary services who served Australia in the
cause of freedom and who suffered death, injury or loss as a result oftheir service
24. I982 QPD 454]; 9 March I982.
'25. The Australian, II March I982.
26. I982 QPD 4667; Il March 1982.
27. I982 CPD (Senate) 692; II March I982.
28. I982 CPD (Senate) I335; 20 April 1982.
29. I982 CPD (Senate) I424; 2l-22 April 1982.
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as members ofthose forces in the course of armed conflicts in which those forces
were engaged.30
Other Australians, including the Women Against Rape in War, see the day as a
' commemoration of all, good and bad, that is associated with war in the hope that the
national consciousness while treasuring those who died for freedom will tolerate the
freedom to express horror about war and all that goes with it.
‘ In the Australian Capital Territory, the Public Assemblies Ordinance became law
prior to the 1982 Anzac Day procession. As well as adopting the notification system for
ordinary processions, this Ordinance also created a new legal beast known as the
“limited participation assembly” which could exist only on designated days, the main
one of which is Anzac Day. The Ordinance allowed the organiser of a procession, for
example the President ofthe R.S.L., to apply to the Police Commissioner to conduct a
limited participation assembly on Anzac Day. The notification then had to be
publicised and other persons or organisations could apply to the Commissioner tojoin
the assembly. Under amendments made to the Ordinance in December 1982, those
applications, if any, were to be forwarded by the Commissioner to the organiser
allowing the organiser to object to any application. At the end of the day, the '
Commissioner was able to allow or object to a limited participation assembly and
could allow or disallow others to join such an assembly. Any person aggrieved by any
of these decisions could then apply to the Supreme Court for review of the decision.
The purpose of the Ordinance was explained by Senator Shirley Walters in these
terms“
We are trying in this place to avoid what happens overseas. Ten years ago there
was never a thought in any Australian’s mind that people would disrupt an Anzac
Day march. Ten years ago thought was never given by any group to daring to
march and upset the Anzac Day traditions. Times have changed. We now have
radical groups which would like to march and upset the traditional Anzac Day
service. I believe that it is the duty and responsibility of government to protect the
right to march of people who fought in wars to protect our country.
The Ordinance was put to the test in the preparations for Anzac Day 1982. After
the R.S.L. notified its intention to hold a limited participation assembly, several
persons applied to the Commissioner on behalf of their organisations to join the
assembly. According to the Police Commissioner, the applicants’
purpose was couched in similar terms to that advised by the Returned Services
League of Australia and the Australian War Memorial, and, as I had no reason
to believe that their presence in the Anzac Day March would be likely to lead to
violence or serious breaches of public disorder or one of the other exceptions
under the Ordinance, then I had no option under the terms of the Ordinance but
to approve their participation. My adherence to the law aroused considerable
controversy and received constant media coverage, despite the fact that those
principally concerned were all very well aware ofthe legal position. As a result of
these pressures, to many it would have seemed easy to have followed the dictates
oftradition and reserve the Anzac Day March for serving members ofthe Armed
Forces and ex—Service men and women. That easy option had not been selected
by the legislature and it was therefore not open to me.32
So the legislation in all its complexity, fairly applied, did not result in the
guaranteed exclusion of those whom the organisers did not wish to have march with
them. In the end, the Police Commissioner organised a round-table conference which
resulted in the persons who wished to join the procession against the wishes of the
30. cl.4., Anzac Day Bill, Senate, No. 56 of 1983.
3!. l982 CPD (Senate) 1380; 2] April I982.
32. Australian Federal Police, Annual Report l98l-2, p.4.
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R.S.L. withdrawing their applications. The cumbersome and amended ordinance was
repealed before Anzac Day 1983.
Senator Austin Lewis then introduced into the Senate a private Member’s Bill.
The Anzac Day Bill sought to achieve directly what the Ordinance could not achieve
indirectly. It omitted the Police Commissioner from the application procedure and
replaced him with the President of the R.S.L. who was to be empowered to grant or
refuse permission to persons or groups of persons to participate in an Anzac Day
observance. An aggrieved applicant would have been able to apply to the Federal
Court for review of the President’s decision. The bill was never passed; neither should it
have been.
The Bill contained a procedure not designed to balance the competing claims of
road-users, nor designed for the proper regulation of traffic nor designed for the
preservation of the peace. All those considerations were to be overridden by a concern
to restrict participation in observance to those approved by the R.S.L. Leaving aside
considerations of the difficulty for police implementing the decision on the day in
determining who is a member of an approved group and who is not, there is a more
fundamental question to be addressed.
As a citizen, I would prefer to witness an Anzac Day observance in which the
participants were only those whose predominant desire was to honour fallen
comrades. If the time has come when there are citizens who, without breaching the
peace and without causing unreasonable obstruction to others, wish to participate in
the Anzac Day observance calling attention to other aspects of war or other aspects of
other things, surely they should be able to exercise that freedom, the freedom for which
those comrades died, but only to the extent that they do not interfere with the good
conduct of the observance. I and many others might find their actions to be
disrespectful, in bad taste, politically naive, or even politically sinister. But tolerance
and freedom demand tolerating the intolerant and granting freedom to those who are
so impelled by their message as to deny even the old and infirm fighters the opportunity
once a year silently, respectfully and single—mindedly to honour their fallen comrades. I
am suggesting that this social problem is not to be overcome by legal prohibition
because such prohibition is practically unworkable and philosophically objectionable.
You cannot legislate for loyalty, respect or love. To attempt to do so is to forfeit the
freedom without which loyalty, love and respect cannot survive.
The behaviour of the “punk-anarchists” at the 1986 Melbourne Palm Sunday
Peace Rally created problems for the Rally organisers similar to those encountered by
the R.S.L. at recent Anzac Day Processions. The peace organisers were powerless to
do anything except to ask the anarchists to respect the peace—loving disposition of the
majority present. You cannot legislate for peace, neither can you exclude citizens from
public activities unless there be grounds for suspecting their commitment to disruption
amounting to breach of the peace. If the law maintains the peace and a balancing of
rights, people in communication can come to accommodate each other and the
community can manifest those virtues which thrive and are at risk in an atmosphere of
freedom. If the spirit of Anzac Day or Palm Sunday has died it cannot be resurrected
by legislation; if it lives, it will continue robustly and undefiled only in that atmosphere
of freedom.
The Limited Right to Protest Publicly and Peacefully, Even if not Quietly and
Quickly
In his Report of the Inquiry into the Red Lion Square Disorder, Lord Scarman
said:33
33. 1975 Cmnd S9l5, para 5.
2l'
Amongst our fundamental human rights there are, without doubt, the rights of
peaceful assembly and public protest and the right to public order and
tranquility. Civilised living collapses — it is obvious — if public protest becomes
violent protest or public order degenerates into the quietism imposed by
successful oppression..But the problem is more complex than a choice between
two extremes — one, a right to protest whenever and wherever you will and the
other, a right to continuous calm upon our streets unrufﬂed by the noise and
obstructive pressure of the protesting procession. A balance has to be struck, a
compromise found that will accommodate the exercise of the right to protest
within a framework of public order which enables ordinary citizens, who are not
' protesting, to go about their business and pleasure without obstruction or
inconvenience.
That balance can no longer be assured without the guarantee ofindividual rights;
and the balance is a prerequisite for peace. The “general democratic right to protest
against unwelcome political decisions”34 must become a juristic right.
Recent Queensland experiments have shown that the executive can become little
less than a god immune from political debate and legal challenge."~Aristotle said: “The
man who is isolated — who is unable to share in the benefits of political association, or
has no need to share because he is already self-sufﬁcient — is not part of the polls and
must therefore be a beast or a god.”35 In Queensland, that isolation has protected the
executive and imperilled the citizenry. Legislative reforms providing the right to
demonstrate, the proper exercise of police discretions, responsible . actions by
demonstrators, and the vigilance of the courts are required to humanize the god and
save the beast. Needless violence, disorder and lack of communication between police
and demonstrators must be avoided so that the thin blue line might be maintained
intact and respected for the time it is needed.
34. Campbell v Samuel: (I980) 23 SASR 389 at 393 (Zelling J).
35. Aristotle, The Politics, 1.2.14 (l253a).
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I think I should start with a couple of disclaimers. I am from Queensland but I am
now based in Victoria, and I may be a little out oftouch with the Queensland situation
now as my book Too Much Order with Too Little law dealt with issues up to and
including 1982. Most of my dealings with lawyers nowadays are more to do with the,
issue of aboriginal land rights. The second disclaimer is that I may now be a little out of
touch with law and order which is obviously becoming an academic discipline as I read
in Mark Findlay’s paper that to some extent to talk of policing public order as anything
but a “pro—active phenomenon”is simplistic and misleading. I must confess that even if
I fell over a pro-active phenomenon I would not be aware that I had done so. There may
be much in my paper which is simplistic and misleading, and for that I apologise. But
confining myself to the Queensland experience I will draw a few conclusions giving a
couple of quotations from the paper and also a couple of other examples.
Yesterday marked the passing of a decade since an event in Queensland which led
to the resignation of the Police Commissioner, Mr Ray Whitrod, and the inevitable
further radical politicisation of the Queensland Police Force making it less equipped to
deal with the law and order situations as we saw during the street march ban from 1977
to ’79; as we saw during the Commonwealth Games in 1982; and as we have seen
recently during the SEQEB power dispute in that state.
The matter can be summed up fairly well by comparing statements made by the
Queensland Premier, Mr Joh Bjelke-Peterson (as he then was), when he first came to
power when he pointed out that in Queensland things had been relatively free and easy
in relation to law and order. Some years later, in fact, the Queensland police said they
had been spared the sorts of problems that arose in New South Wales and Victoria.
On the 29th July, 1976, there was a major demonstration by university students
campaigning against the Federal Government to increase TEAS allowances. That
night on national television there was shown the beating of a woman demonstrator by
an identifiable Queensland police officer who performed the action with a baton. The
Police Commissioner at the time, Mr Whitrod, announced duly that there would be an
investigation. He sent the prescribed memo to the Police Minister, set up the inquiry in
relation to the event, there having been a complaint made by the University Union
Chairman at the time and the then Vice—Chancellor, who happened to be none other
than Sir Zelman Cowan. Two days later the Queensland Cabinet met and announced
that such an inquiry would not be held and that left the Police Commissioner and the
Minister to comply. Within a few months the Police Commissioner resigned. A new
Police Commissioner was appointed, and under the new Police Commissioner, Sir
Terence Lewis (as he then was not), the police officer who had actually performed the
bashing was then promoted. That sort of vignette simply illustrates the politicisation of
the force which has occurred in relation to the implementing oflaw and order and as I
have shown in the paper commencing at page 12 the situation can be summed up by
looking simply at the Police Reports that come out each year.
Prior to the institution of the march ban in September 1977 the new Police
Commissioner, Mr Terence Lewis said; “Public behaviour in the streets, during the
year under review has been generally good throughout the State”, and in the last
paragraph of that quotation; “Widespread demonstrations which unfortunately
followed His Excellency the Governor-General throughout Australia also were
experienced in Queensland. These demonstrations, however, did not attract the
numerical support or violence which attended other demonstrations outside this,
state." So I go on to argue that in relation to the march ban there was no great law and
order problem in Queensland. Even the Queensland police perceived the issue to be
one of far less concern than in southern states at that time. But, because the
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Queensland government had decided that they wanted to ensure that Queensland
would be kept as an available port for the export of uranium come what may, it was
decided that the Campaign Against Nuclear Power would never be issued with permits
for public processions.
At that time the law in Queensland provided that a permit had to be issued for
each procession. If a permit was refused then there was an appeal to a magistrate. The
only legislative change made by the Queensland Parliament in 1977 was the
retrospective abolition ofthe right of an appeal to a magistrate. The only applications
pending at that time were by the Campaign Against Nuclear Power.
Coincidentally that retrospective withdrawal of the right of appeal guaranteed
two things. It guaranteed that in future no permits would be issued. This would require
that police wrongly exercise their discretion, presuming that they had rightly exercised
it before the institution of the ban, and presuming that they had rightly exercised it
after 1979. It also ensured that there would be minimal interference by the courts in the.
abuse of the exercise of that discretion
I have argued that the ban was not only morally objectionable but that it was also
stupid by once again quoting the Annual Police Reports following upon the ban in
1979. You will note on page 12 I quote the 1979 Report that says that once the ban was
lifted there were only three incidents of any significance which had occurred during the
previous year. In 1981 things improved, we are told; “There was a continuing marked
improvement in public behaviour during the year,” we are told that; “The level of
public demonstrations for various causes has eased, and those that were held did not
require police involvement other than in normal crowd or traffic control.” We are
told again in 1982 that; “There was a continuing marked improvemetn in public
behaviour during the year." So you see Queenslanders kept getting better and better at
behaving once the march ban had been lifted and once public protest was once again
permitted. So that Queensland police having abandoned the government policy of all
out confrontation did in time return to a policy of consultation and cooperation.
There was then a temporary aberration during the currency of the
Commonwealth Games but in an indicative Queensland attitude the Queensland
Police Annual Report of 1983 traces that to the state of origin of most the protesters
pointing out that those who were campaigning for land rights were accompanied by
people from southern states to swell the ranks of protesters. Basically when the
southerners stay at home, there is no problem with law and order once the march ban
has been lifted.
The 1984 Report states that; “instances of abuse and unpleasantness towards
police officers performing their normal duties are less prevalent today than in years
past”, and goes on to point out that; “Despite the more sympathetic approach by police
officers to crowd control and the desire to work and play in close harmony with the
community,” there are some problems‘but not in relation to law and order and the
policing of public protest.
From that I conclude that even if you looked simply to the evidence given by the
Queensland police themselves, thereIS nothing1n it for them1n having a street march
ban, there is nothing in it for them in viewing the control of public protest as being
something that requires the stopping of all political protest so as to maintain law and
order.
I then go on and deal with the repression which has occurred with the SEQB
disputes and point out there the courts have become a little more rigorous in the
application of the law than they were during the street march ban. But even the
Queensland Supreme Court I might say, with respect, has still shown some willingness
to simply see the government policy implemented without a rigorous implementation
of the law though in relation to the most recent case where that has arisen the High
Court has recently granted special leave to appeal and we are awaiting thejudgment in
that case.
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I will not address the importance of public protest; I assume that you are all
readily convinced of that and the need for its accommodation. You are more familiar
than I with the benefits of the notification procedure. Queensland has a permit
procedure. I have argued that if you are going to have a permit procedure rather than a
notification procedure, you need an adequate facility for review by the courts given
that there will be abuse of the permit issuing power. 7
I then go on after page 17 and point out that no matter which sort of system you
have there is a need for good faith, particularly by government, in relation to
consultation and in determining applications for processions particularly in highly
charged political circumstances.
I quote one instance there from the Commonwealth Games where Mr Hinze had
purportedly given a Report by Mr Lewis to the Queensland Parliament in the lead up
to the Commonwealth Games saying that there was evidence that six aborigines were
presently in Libya undergoing guerilla and terrorist training. That was given as a
justification for the new Commonwealth Games legislation which was introduced.
Questions were put on notice in the Federal Parliament to the then Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Mr Peacock. Those questions were not answered for six weeks whereupon the
defamation of aborigines had already occurred, and then Mr Peacock answered; “I am
advised that inquiries conducted by my Department and other relevant authorities
produce no evidence to verify that Aboriginals are currently undergoing guerilla or
terrorist training in Libya”. Senator Baume, then Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, said
that the whole story was quite fanciful. This exercise by government assisted by a
Report from the Police Commissioner did nothing to guarantee preservation of the
peace or the peaceful conduct of the Commonwealth Games. The price of such smear
campaigns is too high a price for the state to pay. They place at risk not only the
reputations of those are smeared but also the fragile balance which can truly be called
law and order that is social order under the rule of law.
On page 18 I deal with the problem of trying to accommodate protesters of a
different political complexion from those who have got the running and the focus with
the media. This has arisen with Women Against Rape in War at Anzac Day
processions, and recently with the anarchists in the Palm Sunday procession in
Melbourne. If the law maintains the peace and the balancing of rights, people in
communication can come to accommodate each other and the community can
manifest those virtues which thrive and are at risk in an atmosphere of freedom. I do
not see any place for police determining which political group is to have the running
provided that all political groups who are so involved are committed to preserving the
peace. _ _
By way of conclusion I say that policing public order is made more difficult for
police and less effective from the Queensland experience when any of the following
conditions occur:
1. When government uses the police force in law and order situations for its own
political advantage.
2. When police and the courts fail to distinguish political activism and opposition
to government policy from unlawful activity.
3. When demonstration organisers and police refuse to consult.
4. When government shows no good faith.
5. When government abuses parliamentary privilege and its position to stigmatise
individual citizens.
6. When police are expected or try to discriminate between peaceful protesters
who hold conflicting views even if one group be riding on the coat tails ofothers in the
quest for media attention, and finally
7. When courts fail to bring their customary rigour to the assessment of evidence
and legal arguments given a large number of defendants charged with the same
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offences, arising out of the same event,“ and given government's keenness for
convictions. . i
From the Queensland experience I would say there is still a need for legaslative
reform 'in stateS'such as Queensland; The proper exercise of police discretions,
responsible actions by demonstrators, and the vigilance of the courts. Needless
violence, disorder and lack of communication between police and demonstrators must
be avoided so that the thin blue line might be maintained intact and respected for the
times that it is needed.
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THE CRISIS 0F POLICING PUBLIC DISORDER
Mark Find/cry"
Fellow1n Justice Administration, Mitchell College,
Consultant Criminologist, Bureau of Crime
Statistics & Research
While accepting that incidents ofpublic disorder are not self-evident, unambiguous
empirical realities, this paper will not debate whether this State faces a crisis of public
order, nor will it discuss the socio-political factors responsible for defining and
translating theimage ofsuch a crisis. As the title suggests l am concerned to expose the
radicalization of the policing function which is represented as arising in response to
such a crisis. In short I wish to turn the discussion ofthe public order crisis on its head
by analysing the state‘s response to a stereotypical social “menace". But more than this
the paper will identify the role of “policing forces"' in the construction of and the
justification for this radical response.
The involvement of police agencies at all stages of a public disorder situation
needs to be analysed as a dynamic process. A situation such as a riot is deemed
threatening because ofthe ﬂuid and unpredictable nature of the collective behaviour
which constitutes it. The inﬂuence of police intervention into such collective behaviour
cannot be appreciated in a sectional or static sense. The police so often become the
focus of a riot, and their responses to public hostility directed against them will
essentially effect the development of that hostility against them will essentially effect
the development of that hostility as much as it does the re-establishing of civil order.
In addition, by being responsible for constructing the official account of public
disorder, policing agencies determine for the public what was the reality of the
“menace”, and what should be therefore the appropriate control response in the future.
Bearing this in mind, this paper will concern itself with the police “response“ to
public disorder both within the framework ofthe disorder itself, and more broadly as a
part of the definitional process which follows. The specifics of police practice and its
consequences will primarily be examined against the backdrop of public disorder
which has arisen over the years at the Easter motorcycle races at Bathurst.
The most important aspect ofthe police/ public order equation to be addressed is
that ofthe functional significance of the public order “menace”, for the radicalization
of policing control strategies. This will be examined at two levels; the specific
developments in tactical response policing, special court procedures and emergency
custodial control, and more generally the institutionalization of these unique
responses to a particular threat through increased structural legitimacy and wider
application. In order to adequately understand the latter level it will be necessary to
engage in the following process; to examine the construction, interpretation and
translation of the social menace by various policing agencies, to contrast the
theoretical and functional understanding of the phenomenon, to analyse the role and
function which policing agencies carve out for themselves in order to control this
phenomenon (and the mechanisms which they choose for this purpose), to highlight
the inconsistencies which arise between the definitions ofthe object of control and the
unique control mechanisms, and finally to comment on the expansion of inﬂuence for
such tactical response mechanisms across a wider range of more neutral social order
concerns.
‘ This paper would not have been possible, in its present form, without the invaluable data on charge
patterns, and the discussion regarding the historical development of policing Bathurst. and the special
courts, prepared by Chris Cunneen.
l. For the purposes of this paper “policing" will encompass those activities of the police, the courts and the
custodial services which are directed towards the immediate control of public behaviour.
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As a general rule policing agencies tend to simplify and stereotype a public
disorder social menace. They tend to reduce the nature and complexity ofits existence
and operations into terms which would merit a simple ideological response.
However having so constructed the reality oftheir interests and the form that their
reaction will take, policing agencies seem drawn to compromise the more traditional
aims and objectives of police practice and of the ideology ofjustice as a whole. In so
doing there develops a real potential to distort thejustice “machine” while at the same
time to neutralize and depoliticize the meaning of the public behaviourIn which the
police become involved.
It will now be obvious that I see discussion of policing public order as providing a
particularly appropriate opportunity to comment on the criminal justice process in
transition. In this respect I am interested in the initial alteration of the criminal
sanction, the restructure or re-emphasis of the protections supposedly offered by the
“rule of law“, the fundamental expansion of police and court powers, the status of the
executive in the process of distortion, the relationship between traditional crime
control concers and more marginal notions of state security, and the overreach of the
criminal law.
Without the macro approach to the redefinition of criminal justice which arises
out of the social “menace“/distortion nexus, the ramifications of such institutional
developments as tactical response policing cannot be seen for what they are.
Policing Public Disorder
There is nothing new about collective confrontations between police and sections
of the public. The beginnings of modern policing were intimately linked to the
perceived public order problems ofa bourgeois urban society (Silver, [967: Irving and
Connell, _l980).
They were further connected to the regulation and control ofthe formerly free,
mobile and potentially recalcitrant and disruptive labouring poor who from the
late l8th century (in the UK.) flocked to the cities, often bringing with them a
popular culture, leisure activities, sports, etc. which was wholly antithetical to the
requirements of an urban factory civilization.
(Hogg, l984b; also see Donagrodski, I977).
The history of resistance to the presence and moralizing efforts of the police in a
public space, has, in N.S.W., been more diverse than a class, age or gender struggle. An
examination of larrikanism in the late 19th, early 20th centuries reveals a police
reaction not so much to criminal behaviour but rather to a blatant non observation of
norms of public propriety. In this regard the police have embraced the function of
determining the meaning of order and assimilating its projection into the very fabric of
proper police function, so that a challenge to public order so defined is viewed as a
direct challenge to the police. Disorderly behaviour is interpreted as equating to
disrespect for the police. Naturally then the police accept that they should become the
focus of public resistance within situations of disorder, both in a practical and
symbolic sense. In fact in certain situations they adopt a profile which will necessarily
cause this to come about. Because of this almost inevitable consequence of police
responsibility, to become the focus of public disorder, police reactions to and
interpretations of such disorder are characterised by an urgent commitment to meet
force with force and emerge the victor. The language of police response is militaristic,
the fear of the menace is personally felt and immediately the jetisoning of traditional
“consensual constraints” on police power is unabashed.
An example of this reaction can be seen in the New South Wales Police'News
(April [980), (some twelve months before the establishment of the tactical response
group). An article entitled ‘Police at the Cross Roads’, argued for sweeping changes to
police riot control practice in the following manner; “It is an accepted fact of life that
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police forces throughout the world are becoming a ‘battle force' thrown into hold the
defences against civil insurrection, urban terrorism and industrial anarchy.“ The
article advocated the view of a senior British police ofﬁcer who stated that the only
option for police was to move away from traditional policing towards a “fast
responsive service . . . backed by the resources of modern technology”(See Cunneen,
1985:70).
One would appreciate that the nature and significance of a challenge to police
authority (in the form of public disorder) is therefore cruicial to a policing response to
such a challenge. It has been noted that one of the principal determinants of both how
police exercise their “public order” discretion, and when they choose to resort to force,
is the attitude or demeanour of those who present the challenge toward the police
(Travis, 1983). In circumstances of collective public disorder it is so often not only
police concepts of order which are disrupted, but it is the police agencies who become
the immediate community which is threatened by such disorder. Police authority
becomes the goal to be reafﬁrmed as much as a more general push to re-establish public
order.
The Bathurst Easter Weekend Motor Cycle races may be taken as a unique
example of this phenomenon. There are several large bike race meetings in
different parts of the state of N.S.W. each year. Little or no problems seem to
arise in the policing ofthese other events. It is arguable that what has occurred at
Bathurst in recent years is that the event has become invested with a particular
symbolic significance. It has become a test for both, the bike-riding fraternity (or
a section of it) and the police (but especially the latter) of the legitimacy of the
police presence and public authority at the event. In recent years the public
response and media coverage has consistently dwelt upon the policing of the
event as a test of police strength and tactics regardless of whether or not on the
particular occasion in question there has been any trouble. In a very real sense the
police have chosen to make the event a test of their strength, of their ability to
establish their authority, regardless of the consequences; albeit that the media-
induced aura surrounding the races does place pressure upon them in this
direction. The police presence and displays of strength and toughness that this
symbolic challenge requires, is always likely to engender a corresponding
resistance on the part of some bike-riders. And ofcourse they become every bit as
sensitive and expectant with regard to police behaviour, and what they perceive
as victimisation, as the police are with regard to “bikie” behaviour. It is strongly
arguable that a purely technical — professional response which sees the disorder
as separate from, and unrelated to, the policing of the event and hence as
warranting more police and better technical preparation more equipment, etc
—merely fuels antagonism and ensures the future escalation of conﬂict. (Hogg,
1984b).
Even the nature of the disorderly behaviour (the “doughnuts”, “burn outs", “bull
rings”, incendiary game play, etc,) which has been a precursor to the Saturday evening
“riots” of recent years at Mt Panorama (Bathurst) is so structured as to represent a
symbolic rejection of usual motor traffic regulations, conventional team sport, and
restrained consumption of intoxicants.
Ignoring questions of temporal sequence, both the nature of the disorder and the
policing activities to re-assert authority are inextricably linked in substance and
symbol.
Finally one must consider the factors which predispose police agencies to turn
their attention to certain types of public disorder rather than others. As stated earlier
the police have a tendency to stereotype as a means of categorizing the potentially
dangerous and unpredictable. The nature of their job, peer group solidarity and their
sense of isolation from the community and the rest of thejustice process, contributes to
the formation of attitudes by the police, about law and order, which will indicate how
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such stereotypes are constructed. All this makes for a mutually reinforcing process of
meaning construction through which particular types of public disorder will form the
object of an adverse exercise of police discretion. Moreover the police need to
legitimate their decisions (for themselves and others), particularly decisions to use
force, means that they must see themselves as representing (and acting on) the socio-
consensual “silent majority”view of public order. They will represent their practices as
waged against evil, disruptive and pathological elements in society, seeing themselves
as indeed the “thin blue line” between order and chaos.2 This process of meaning
'construction not only simplifies complex social phenomenon and helps legitimate
police behaviour but it also neutralises the socio-political significance of the public
disturbance, and the reasons for choosing to meet it with a certain sort of police
reaction. The norms being enforced are absolute from the point of view of the
enforcers. In turn aspirations of the disorderly group, when it comes to the use of
certain public space, are not accorded any legitimacy or credence. Even the cohesion of
their common pursuit is disregarded by according responsibility to the “small group of
troublemakers”.
This is a process whereby fundamental and complex particular social issues are
translated into simple “law and order” problems, and the need to deal with the
underlying causes of such issues is ignored in preference for a discussion of
containment through legal and policing strategies rather than tolerance and/ or social
reform (Benyon, 1984) “It is not surprising that this process often culminates in
collective confrontations with the most immediate and visible instrument ofthe policy
of containment, the police themselves” (Hogg, 1984b) and that these confrontations
are so simply constructed as the generic event of riot.
The traditional concept of a riot as an isolated and spontaneous outbreak of
individual and collective pathology warranting a single classification and mode of
interpretation, circumscribes the field of analysis when it comes to a consideration of
police practice (as it does dictate what is considered to be a legitimate policing
response).
If however one examines the peculiar social, political, economic and cultural
perspectives of a “riot” situation, the possibility of realistically reconnecting these with
particular dimensions of a policing response, will be possible.
To illustrate this point I will concentrate the analysis of this section, on the policing
practice which has developed as an attempt to control public behaviour associated
with the Bathurst Easter Motorcycle Races.
Policing Bathurst — A Brief History
The behaviour of youth seen to be in need of control over the Easter weekend at
Bathurst was, prior to the 19605, rarely directed against the police. Perhaps as a result
of this the police response to crowd behaviour was apparently more concerned with
road safety and public sobriety, than macro questions of public order and crowd
control. In saying this one must not dismiss the significant secondary potential of the
laws regulating motor traffic and intoxication, for the control of public behaviour
(Cunneen & Findlay, 1986).
The disturbances at Bathurst themselves were not, prior to this time, represented
by the media nationally and recognised by the police as a significant “problem” of
public order. Concern about this issue was localised and seen as the responsibility of
the council, race organisers, bike riding associations, the local police and business
interests. Was this because the behaviour was less threatening as a broad social
2. Following the [983 Bathurst “riot"the N.S.W. Police News congratulated those police who held the thin
blue line during the Battle of Bathurst". (N.S.W. Police News April, I983 p. 3, 5)
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menace? As I shall suggest later in this paper if one looks at certain years in the ’505 and
the ’605 the arrest figures, estimates of property damage, etc, would not necessarily
support this conclusion. Chris Cunneen’s detailed analyses of the history of the
Bathurst “riots” clearly indicates that the nature of the media response and police
reaction to these examples of public disorder are more likely to be inﬂuenced by certain
social and political sensibilities which prevailed at the time, than they will be by the
particular reality of the event (Cunneen, 1986).
In the 19505 the highways in and out of Bathurst and certain roads within the city
itself were patrolled by officers of the N.S.W. Public Safety Bureau. In 1956 police
were first stationed on Mount Panorama itself to control motor traffic behaviour. It
was evident that displays of riding techniques by members of the crowd, would invite
police attention (NSW Motorcyclist, 16/3/5626).
In the later part of the 19505 it was usual for around 40 police to be on duty at
Bathurst over the Easter weekend, Half of these would have been reinforcements from
Sydney and about a dozen were from the Public Safety Bureau. Although the general
perception amongst the bike riding community of police harrassment ofmotorcyclists
may have existed during the 19505, there is no evidence to suggest that Bathurst had
taken on its present symbolic status as a theatre for motorcyclist / police confrontation.
During the early 19605 there developed a new dimension to the Easter disorder at
Bathurst, in the form of violent clashes between youthful spectators and the police.
This pattern of violence was to become institutionalised during this decade and as
Cunneen observes “dimensions of the pattern revolve around the conﬂict over public
space, resistance and aggression towards police and the participation of young
working class men”(Cunneen, 1986). It is also the first time that the media or the police
refer to the behaviour as a “riot”.
The pattern of public disorder at Bathurst during the 605 was fairly sporadic,
spontaneous and town centred. For example:
The trouble in 1960 started around 7.30pm on the Saturday night as hundreds of
youths congregated around the end of the park opposite the hotel. Some were
throwing firecrackers at traffic and passers-by. Two police attempted to arrest
two ofthe youths but were surrounded by scores of other youths, some ofwhom
began throwing firecrackers at the police. The original two apprehended slipped
away. Police reinforcements arrived, some ferried by taxi from the police station.
Beyond the immediate crowd of three hundred youths, police estimated several
hundred more onlookers were attracted to the disturbance. The crowd was
dispersed by a total of twenty police. The disturbance lasted approximately half
an hour an (1 reached its peak when those arrested were placed in the police truck.
Ten arrests were made. These included eighteen, twenty and twenty-two year old
labourers, an eighteen year old panelbeater, an eighteen year old clerk, a nineteen
year old railway porter, a twenty year old fitter and twenty year old electrician.
None ofthe defendents appeared at the later court hearing and all forfeited their
5 pound bail. (Cunneen 1986).
The 605 also saw the development of the “troublemakers” hypothesis which
complemented the standard policy tactics of stereotyping and neutralization. The
stereotype allows police to tailor their response so as tojustify selective policing in such
a way as to reduce the criticism that such techniques are in fact evidence of
discrimination. In addition it neutralises as invalid or subversive the justification
presented by those involved in civil disorder. In fact it can magnify the significance of
the opposition as a by-product and therefore further legitimise the potential of the
police to it. Finally attributing the organisation and perpetuation of the conflict to
“ringleaders” shifts responsibility for it away from the formal control agencies, on to
the few ringleaders.
The controlling agencies then are viewed as either victims of mob reaction, or
neutral enforcers of a consensus notion oflaw and order. Stereotyping therefore is not
 31
only significant for the interpretation of collective behaviour, but also effects the
control strategies devised in response to it.
In the years which followed the confrontation in 1960 police methods were more
concentrated, co-ordinated and aggressive (see section on Arrests) and this may have
accounted to some extent for the apparent calm. Even so anti police feeling was not
dissipated. The police took to intensive patrolling by uniformed and plain clothes
officers, breaking up groups of youths in the main streets, parks, and outside certain
hotels within the town. The foot and vehicle patrols were augmented by the
introduction of two way radio co—ordination. Although the total number of police on
duty in Bathurst over these weekends, was similar to 1960, their deployment in
saturation style patrols around the town was new.
Attempts by police to disperse crowds of young spectators, as a part of the order
maintenance strategy was bound to conﬂict with certain central characteristics of the
whole Bathurst Easter Weekend leisure event, which were recognised as attractive to a
significant proportion of visitors. The Saturday afternoon and evening congregation
of young people in the town (as was then the practice) was as much a part ofthe leisure
activity in going to Bathurst, as watching the races. Associated with this was the
consumption of liquor in public view, and the presentation and admiration of
motorbike machinery and riding prowess. However the activities of young people in
groups without what the police saw as apparent reason was deemed by the police to be
threatening in its potential to become disorderly. What ensued in these years (as has
been the case more recently on the mountain itself) was a colonisation, contestation
and negotiation over what was acceptable public behaviour and who should have
access to certain public space.
Both the press and the police were sensitised by events of disorder interstate and
overseas in 1964; so much so that it was the first time that the national media in
Australia picked up on the youth “problem” at Bathurst. It was the hostile crowd
which congregated outside the Bathurst Police Station on the Saturday night and the
rumoured vandalising of the city’s parks and gardens which formed the basis of the
“moral panic” reporting which ensued. By this time the police/biker conﬂict could be
represented as traditional. The stereotype rioter was also well established. Yet the
actual “law and order” contest that year does not seem to merit the abnormally
“dangerous” representation it received. There was a record number of Visitors to the
town. There was some media comment about the extent of alcohol consumption. The
congregation of youths yelling abuse outside the police station had occurred before.
When the police emerged to make two arrests, many of the youths dispersed. Police
vehicles that had been out on patrol were called back to the station. Then a big sweep
was made through Bathurst streets and parks where another 35 persons were arrested.
Even the nature of the charges and the type of person charged were not greatly
dissimilar to previous years.
Yet the response to the disturbances of 1964 and 1965 were consistent with the law
and order (crisis policing) themes promoted by the state within the wider political
framework at the time, and the pressure over the decline in police strength.
The [964 riot had been so particularised through association that it is not
surprising that 1965 was reported as more of the same. Yet once again when one
analyses the petty vandalism, outlandish game play and open shows of disrespect for
police, there seems little to single out the events of this year as what the Sun called a
“vandal orgy” (l9/4/65) what the Mirror quoted one police officer as saying “It was
total war” (l9/4/65).
It is not surprising to discover that following the “trouble”, in the two previous
years, the police presence in 1966 during the Easter weekend in Bathurst was almost
double that on duty in I964. Of greater significance was the presence of 21 division
amongst these police. 21 division was a police mobile unit established to deal with
investigating and controlling a variety of public disturbances which usually centred on
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hotels, and were as a consequence, drink related. It was also seen as a training ground
for detective investigation practice.
It seems somewhat more than co-incidence that the arrest figures for that year
were over three times that of the previous year, and where information was available,
officers of 21 division were responsible for two thirds of those arrests.
The involvement of 21 division in crowd control at Bathurst was to be significant.
In fact for the period 1961-1984 of known cases 21 division officers arrested 85% of
persons who appeared before the court for offences related to the Easter weekend.3
When one examines the data on offence location, 1966 was also an interesting year,
from a policing point of view. This was the last year when almost all arrests were made
in the town area. Also it is a year which saw a diversification of offence location.
For the remainder of the decade arrest figures remained high when compared to
previous years, although despite a notablejump in police manpower in 1969, the arrest
rates slowly declined. Despite reports of anti police activity there was no further
reporting of “riots" at Bathurst until 1972. Yet even in that year arrest figures did not
increase significantly. By 1974 police levels were remaining fairly constant and the
arrest rate had dropped below the pre 1960 figure.
Perhaps the most notable change in offence patterns during the 1960/70
transition was the change in offence location. This becomes important when one
appreciates that the recent focus for confrontation has been the police compound on
Mount Panorama. In 1967 over 50% of arrests were made on the Mount, whereas in.
the previous years the figure was less than 3% and by far the majority of arrests were
made around the town centre. Although the relative percentages fluctuated during the
705, by the end of the decade, the Mount had clearly established itself as the arena for
conflict. Why this shift occurred and why police strategies altered in terms oflocation
will be discussed later. At this stage however it is worth recognising that after the
aggressive policing by 21 division in the parks and hotels in Bathurst township in 1966
(where 94% of individuals were arrested) it seems that the campers chose to confine
their drinking and carousing the following year to the Mountain. It was at this location
in 1967 that more than halfthe recorded arrests were made in that year. It appears that
these arrests were effected primarily by officers of 21 division. It was not until the end
ofthe 60s that a field control unit (caravan) established a 24 hour police presence on the
mountain over the Easter Weekend. In the early years of its operation it was manned
by a sergeant and two general duties constables.
Following the Easter clash in 1976 the Sydney press carried reports of how 20
officers at the mobile police station (on Mount Panorama) prepared for the worst
when “beseiged by more than 200 screaming, club wielding bikies” (Mirror 20/4/ 76).
The riot in Reid Park was said to involve 30 police officers trading punches with over
100 “troublemakers” and the' Western Advocate quoted police sources as saying that it
was the “wildest incident ever witnessed” since the introduction of the races to the
Mount some forty years previous. (Western Advocate 19/4/ 76). Correspondingly the
arrest figures were almost twice that for the previous year (which in turn were three
times higher than 1974).
In 1975 and 1.976 the Drug Squad had a presence at the race meeting but were not
very active in terms of arrests. In 1978 and 1980 they raised their profile as did 21
division in 1979, which was their last year of operation at the races.
Nineteen seventy seven saw the initial push by police for an upgrading of facilities
on Mount Panorama which would be conducive to more effective policing. The
suggestion at this time was for the provision of lights in the camping area, which was
3. This percentage may be somewhat inﬂated due to the large number of arrests where the identityofthe
arresting officer’s division is unknown. It would be fair to presume that a Significant proportion of
unknowns would be general duties police.
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seen as having the potential to reduce the amount of violence after dark (Western
Advorale 12/4/77).
Random firearms and weapons checks were carried out by police during the
Easter Weekend of I978. The police presence was the highest on record (392) even
outstripping the “saturation” numbers of I986. (S. M. H. 24/3/78). The media made
much ofthe “arsenal of weapons" recovered by police as a result of these checks (Sun
.Herald 26/3/78).
The concept of a “compound“ on the mountain was a reality in 1979 when the
,mobile police unit was enclosed by wire fencing. By 1980 the permanent police station
on the Mount was operational. From this time on, the conflict/arrest pattern was
clearly located on the Mount and around the compound. From 1981 the “riot each
alternate year” pattern seemed evident with the origins, nature, focus and development
of the conflict becoming fairly predictable. Only the size of the compound, and the
technology of police control strategies seemed to expand.
 
Three Case Studies of “policing the Spectacle”
From I984—86 a detailed observation study of the evolution of violence at the
Bathurst bike races, was carried out by a team from the Centre for Studies in Justice‘.
As part of this research, police planning, strategies, operational objectives,
. behaviour and their construction of meanings were noted and recorded. A fortunate
co-incidence was the fact that each ofthe three years provided respective examples ofa
“non riot" situation without major intervention, a “riot” situation with intervention
and a “non riot“ situation with saturation intervention. As a precursor to a general
discussion of policing strategies it would be useful to describe in summary the
involvement of the police on Easter Saturday in each of these three years.
(i) 1984. Some 230 police officers were barracked at St Stanislaus College and
these were supported by .70 highway patrol policemen. Over eightv officers
Were trained to serve as part ofthe Tactical Response Group (See later section
on the TRG for a fuller discussion of their operation pp 40-44 and 51—52.)
From mid afternoon there were no more than halfadozen uniformed general
duties police at the opened gates ofthe police compound. By 5.00 p.m. on the
approach road to the right and left of the police compound bike riders were
engaged in “burn outs”, “doughnuts”, “drag races” and other public shows of
riding skill.
At around 7.00 p.m. in the evening several small groups of uniformed general
duties officers (in 3’s and 4’s) were standing in the area between the compound
gates and the toilet block. The bike riders and spectators were now forming
into rings, to engage in cock fighting, incendiary games and the usual bike
riding displays. It had started to rain by 7.30 p.m. The crowd of spectators
outside the compound had grown to about 200 people. The police strength
had reached about two dozen officers, who were also outside the compound.
As the crowd grew and encircled the northern and southern fences of the
compound the police returned to the gate area and inside the fence.
At 8.00 p.m. the crowd‘s attention was drawn to the burnt out shell of a
motorbike which was dragged up to the front of the compound. Certain
members ofthe crowd shouted anti police slogans and attempted to encourage
‘some collective activity against the compound. The police moved out into the
crowd to arrest a young man who appeared to attempt to climb onto the roof
of the toilet block, carrying a can of beer. After further chanting the bike
“shell" was removed. -
4. For a detailed account of the methods employed and ﬁndings of the study see, Cunneen (e! la!) (1986)
Working Papers on the Violence at the Bathurst Bike Races" unpublish’ed
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A short time later more than a dozen small groups of uniformed police
re-emerged into the area between the gates of the compound and the toilet
block. They engaged in (or were engaged in) conversation with spectators who
appeared to be in varying states of inebriation. The conversations seemed to
quieten some of the pre-existing tension, and were friendly and amicable, if
rather colourful at times. By 8.30 pm. the police presence had increased to
more than two dozen officers outside the fence and perhaps more than 20
inside the compound perimeter.
It took more than an hour after recommencement of the “conversation
strategy“ for the first “burning toilet rolls" to be thrown into the compound.
However these appeared to have been as the result of an “overthrow“ from a
nearby biker “game".
Around 10.00 pm. a number of burning toilet rolls were thrown into the
compound and several bottles and beer cans were hurled at the fence. One of
these hit a police officer on the head. However the police response was
restrained and they simply moved forward another dozen officers into the
crowd.
For the rest of the evening the small group intervention style of policing
prevailed. Despite the occasional outbursts of abuse against the police and
localised examples of missile throwing, the crowd response to this police
intervention was positive and involved.
The groundwork for a productive dialogue between the crowd and the police
was established earlier that afternoon by strategies such as the superintendent
in charge of the operation and other senior officers walking throughout the
camping area and discussing intended cordial relations with the spectators.
On such occasions the superintendent indicated that random breath-testing
checks would not be mounted on the approach road to the mountain on the
Saturday evening provided that bike riders‘ behaviour on such roads was not
obviously at variance with motor traffic regulations.
The policing operation, unlike previous years rested on a conscious attempt at
constructive communication between the police and the bikers. To facilitate
this the appearance and profile of the police on the mountain deliberately
concentrated on the “normal” (eg.) the use of uniformed general duties police
offices, the removal of the TRG from public view on the mountain, and the
minimal use of R.B.T. patrols on the approach road to the mountain.
1985 Police strength this year was slightly larger than the previous year.
Both on Friday and early Saturday the police had established checkpoints
ostensibly under the R.B.T. programme, at which they were also checking on
identification and in certain instances were carrying out random searches of
luggage.
The police briefing prior to the Easter weekend had been (as was the casein
1984) a low key affair at which the emphasis was on non—intervention.
However the prominent role of the area superintendent and the superintendent
in charge of the TRG may have been taken as indicating a firmness of resolve
as a “second string” approach.
The official view-point as expounded by the superintendent and other senior
officers was that the policing programme would be low key and in effect things
would go well. When one asked the same question of police at a lower rank
level or from a speciﬁc squad such as the TRG it was their view that there was a
high potential for violence that evening, because of a number of different
factors. It is also worth noting that while we had clear evidence that a variety
of highway patrol vehicles had been set up to stop and check licenses, the
official police line was that this practice was not taking place and no senior
officer knew where or how or who was carrying out these checks. This seemed
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extraordinary when one realised that such random checking was going on in a
number of different localities around Bathurst.
The crowd in the afternoon and early evening of Easter Saturday seemed to be
different from that in 1984. There appeared to be a greater number of.
“weekend bikers“ and town people on the mountain, and a large number of
spectators appeared to be more obviously effected by intoxicants at an earlier
stage of the afternoon.
At 6.30 pm. l spoke to senior officers at the compound and gained the
impression that things would be quiet that evening. The numbers around the
police compound in terms of spectators were no more than a hundred at this
stage. Police officers were mainly in the compound and there were no more
than about 10 or l5 by the wire mesh gate. The senior officers indicated that
the police would not take any interest in incidents such as bike burnings. As we
stood there talkingin fact, a bike was burnt to the west ofthe compound and it
seemed to attract no police interest.
The amount of bike rider activity such as “doughnuts”, “burnouts, wheel
stands‘, etc., was more noticeable at this time of the evening than it was the
year previous.
The evening was clear, the moon was full and there was no sign of rain.
Between 6.00 and 8.00 pm. a random breath testing station was observed in
operation on the approach to the mountain.
The crowd around the compound gate had grown to about 600 by 6.00 pm. At
about 7.30 pm. there commenced a sporadic barrage of missiles and
incendiary torches thrown toward the compound fense and into the compound.
Arrests had been made and the gates had been closed.
Just after 8.00 pm. a man who entered the compound and attempted to
damage a police vehicle was arrested. A senior officer who was mingling with
_the crowd was struck by a brick. The police then announced a warning for the
crowd to disperse.
The TRG were called out and assumed a garrison defence position around the
compound, at 8.08 pm, and soon became the focus for attack by the crowd.
They were stoned with bottles, cans, rocks, bricks and petrol bombs. The
crowd outside the compound was divided into groups of several hundred
individuals (many affected by intoxieants) who taunted and attacked the TRG
phalanx on three fronts. Behind this “ring” was a congregation of over 1,000
spectators who sat viewing the event (eating and drinking) just outside the
range of the TRG onslaughts
'The TRG operated in the same “snatch and grab” arrest manoeuvre which
they had carried out in 1982. They apprehended members of the crowdin a
very vigorous manner. I later noted certain targeting being organised by police
observers within the compound as well as a practice of suspect selection
activated by sergeants inside the TRG phalanx.
The police attacks were responded to by the crowd with further examples of
violence. Discrete occurrences such as the attack on police vehicles, the
torching and destruction of a television news team’s car and the attempted
burning of the toilet block provided further foci of aggression and evidenced
further attempts by the crowd to secure their ground The police had little if
any power to prevent such destruction. They seemed pre occupied with
defending the compound perimeter.
Around about 9.45 pm. for some reason the spotlights outside the police
compound were cut and the police on the western side made a significant
attempt to secure a large amount of ground around the compound. This
appeared to be in response to the call to disperse made five or ten minutes
earlier, by the officer in charge. '
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 At 10.20 p.m. the TRG formed a very tight ﬂank and went to the east ofthe
compound in order to provide cover for certain ambulance paramedics who
were called out to treat an injured biker. It appeared that the injury to the
biker was sustained during one ofthe riot charges. While this protection move
was on the TRG took the opportunity to divert attention and press further
into the bikers‘ lines than they had on any previous occasions.
From about [0.l5 through till ”.50 p.m. l was able to spend time in the
compound. The officer in charge made several particularly brave single sorties
out into the crowd which was at the front of. the police compound, in an
attempt to establish some dialogue and pacify someofthe “rioters”. But by this
time, the violence was too widespread for such individual pacification to be
effective.
By the time I arrived at the station the TRG was showing signs of weariness as
well as carrying a significant number of injuries. There appeared to be more
than 20 injuries to TRG officers some of them quite debilitating. The TRG
seemed to be ill—equipped and the equipment that they did have was in short
supply at this stage due to damage. The numbers were depleted to such a stage
that the TRG groups had to be supplemented by general duties officers
dressed in whatever riot equipment they could find. In terms ofTRG practice
it was obvious that they were targeting those individuals whom they
considered to be troublemakers. While TRG numbers appeared to be
consistent from the outside, when one is inside the compound it was apparent
that single TRG officers came back to the compound in dribs and drabs either
to recuperate, to re-equip or to be patched up. They would then be reinforced
by other rested TRG officers. This allowed the senior officers in the
compound he felt constrained to take the decision to call up the TRG. He and
practice and new targets the TRG should concentrate on.
It is interesting to compare the separate accounts oftwo senior officers in the
compound, regarding the generation ofthe conﬂict. One said that by 7 o‘clock
the police in the compound were aware that there would be some sort of
trouble. They were willing to tolerate the damage being done in front of the
police compound, as well as the rock throwing and abuse. However when a
significant barrage of bottles and burning missiles were thrown into the
compound he felt constrained to take the decision to call up the TRG. He and
two other senior officers had gone out into the crowd between 7 and 8.00 p.m.
and attempted to mollify them. This had not been a success. It would appear
from this officer‘s demeanour that he was extremely disappointed that the
TRG were called at all. He felt personally disappointed that the “softly softly"
approach wich he had advocated so far had failed. However, the safety of his
men and what he considered to be safety of those members of the public who
did not wish to be involved in the violence was being compromised and
therefore he had no alternative but to call up the TRG. He did seem to indicate
however that the police action in his view had not been a success.
It appears that the TRG when called out spent no time in going to the front of
the compound and setting up for the attack. While I was there this officer was
called by the police public relations ofﬁcer to deliver to him the official
account ofthe event. He seemed confused and uncertain about the best way to
represent what he considered to be a failure in his attempt to avoid violence
through “soft” policing. The account settled on appeared to be based on the
assumption that whilst the police operation was the same as last year the
nature of the crowd was significantly different.
I spoke to another senior officer, who gave a somewhat “hard nosed” account
of what had gone on. He indicated that the police had given every opportunity
 37
for the bikers to settle down and they had refused to come into line. He felt
that his men took more than an acceptable level of violence and that in the
future such passive approaches would not be acceptable to him. In fact he said
that if there was any violence on the following night the police would tolerate
no acts of unruly behaviour. He also indicated that in relation to all other
offences such as driving without helmets and other motor traffic offences, etc.
the police on Sunday would crack down to the limit of the law. Both senior
officers had been willing to be parties to the soft police approach at the early
stage ofthe evening but it is interesting to compare the differences in attitudes
to the consequences of the failure of that approach. The latter, for example
seemed to be in no way disappointed but rather frustrated that the police had
not been able to take control at earlier times.
(iii) 1986 Following the disturbance the previous Easter the Bathurst City Council
enacted an ordinance designed to restrict the transport and consumption of
alcohol within certain areas of Mt Panorama. As a result the Council
mounted check points on the approach roads to the mountain where assisted
by the TRG vehicle and property searches were carried out. The mountain was
entirely the policing domain of the TRG. Patrols of TRG officers were
deployed throughout the camping area. The number of campers was down
significantly on that of the previous year. Large areas of the camping ground
were unoccupied.
The alcohol ban provided the opportunity for the TRG to arrest anyone in
possession of alcohol on Good Friday. This clearly had an intimidatory
inﬂuence on the spectators and radically changed the atmosphere in the
camping ground, from that which prevailed in previous years.
Police patrols of between two and six officers constantly moved through the
area, checking on tents and asking questions. This was the pattern day and
night.
There was a notable exodus of bikers, from the mountain area throughout
Friday and Saturday. The police were referred to by some as “the Gestapo”
andjokes were passed about the fact that “people were not on the mountain to
have a good time, after all”.
On Saturday evening there were only small groups of riders congregated in
and around some of the hotels in the town. There was no large congregation
around the police compound on the mountain. Due to the vastly extended “no
go” alcohol free area around the compound which was fenced from the
Bathurst Light Car Club Kiosk in the south, the toilet block in the west, and
completely around the observation mound in the north. any gathering close to
the police station itself was impossible.
The police felt safe not to expend their energies protecting the compound and
concentrated their activities on the rest of the camping area. The foot patrols
continued while around 20 TRG officers remained in the shadows around the
Castrol tower.
The main area of confrontation as it developed on Saturday night was located
on a traditional spot for bullrings about midway between the entrance of
McPhillamy Park and the compound.
The TRG in a group of 30-35 broke up bullrings on at least two occasions.
There was a great deal of hostility evidenced by the crowd towards the police
-—~ particularly when they broke up the bullrings. It is worth noting that the
bullrings were away from the compound, were not hostile to police in
themselves and were typical of the traditional games played by bikers at such
race meetings. The police interest in these bullrings rested in their potential to
form a focus for further unruly collective behaviour, as well as the threat that
such games posed to the safety of surrounding campers.
 On one occasion a bullring surrounding a game ofshoulder fights (cock fights)
was dispersed by a large number of TRG, moving en masse into the centre of
the ring and then dispersing the crowd outwards. The TRG then moved into
the shadows amidst a great deal of hostility. However because of their
numbers and the relative thinness of the crowd further confrontation by the
crowd did not eventuate.
The TRG were equipped as they had been at the check points —— long batons,
military garb, no shields and no helmets.
No bullrings formed after about 9.30 p.m. The TRG continued to patrol in
large numbers through the camping area and amongst the tents. About 10.30 a
search of a camp site was observed. The police with torches searched
belongings and vehicles but found nothing. The youths later congratulated
themselves on hiding the ‘stash’ of marihuana so well.
Comment on Police Strategies
In microcosm the three policy exercises referred to above cover the gamut of
police strategies employed since the mid 505, for controlling public behaviour in
Bathurst, over the Easter weekend. The selection of any such strategies can also be
analysed if one looks at the historical development of policing the Bathurst event.
These strategies could generally be categorised under three headings (although
there have been occasions where certain combinations of these approaches have been
attempted.)
l. The non interventionist 0r "soft”policing option: In 1974 the inspector in
charge of the Bathurst operation described the police decision to allow rival
bike gangs to “control the mountain” for a time, and allow these groups to
eventually quieten down by themselves “We had about 100 police on standby
but did not call on them for fear of inflaming the situation further” ( Western
Advocate, 12/4/1977).
This approach rests on the recognition that police intervention can re-direct
the focus of public disorder and increase its voilent potential.
The characteristics of the approach are as follows.
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
V)
to establish the appearance of normality wherever and for as long as possible.
This may be achieved by low visibility policing, using uniformed general
duties police officers, and by keeping the riot police'and paraphernalia out of
sight;
giving the appearance of reasonable concessions in order to allow some scope
for the leisure activities to evolve (eg. limited use ofR.BT. patrols). The hope
is that this will win the concession of fair play from the other side,
to endeavour to establish constant dialogue between the police .and the
spectators. The assumption is that if you can keep them talking, and establish
some form of rapport, then it is unlikely that violence will be readily directed ‘
towards a “friendly” police officer”;
to exercise discretion not to enforce minor traffic and public order in-
fringements. This will overcome the accusation of police harrassment;
to retain in reserve some sort of strike force if the conciliatory approach
breaks down.
2. Garrison or Limited Interventionist Policing
When the non interventionist approach breaks down, as it was said to at Bathurst
in 1985, then a symbolic show of force is usually the first resort police strategy.
The features of this police option are:
i) a concentrated public show of potential police power;
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ii) the specific and localised use of police force;
iii) clear evidence of police power to “hold their ground”;
iv) a response to violence with larger degrees of violence through high technology
policing;
v) the liberal application of the criminal sanction;
vi) a “mopping up" programme where all infringements of Acts, Regulations and
Ordinances are policed;
3. Saturation Policing
The earliest example of this approach at Bathurst was the introduction of
multiple foot patrols in the Bathurst township in the sixties. With the arrival of
specialised unit policing, areas such as the hotels and the parks could be
constantly effected by a police presence. However, it was the “swamp”(Scarman,
1982) style of policing in operation at Bathurst in 1986 which provides the most
extreme example of saturation policing of the event so far.
This police option relies on;
i) the commitment of relatively large numbers of police officers in full shifts over
a 24 hour period; ' '
ii) the total control of “trouble spots”, by police patrols;
iii) the exercise of stop search and seizure powers (both regular, and those created
for the purpose);
iv) the practice of identity checking and “moving on”, to break up potential
crowd behaviour;
v) the full enforcement approach regarding infringements of all Acts, Regulations
and Ordinances relevant to crowd control and public order;
vi) pro-active endeavours to neutralise previous foci for collective disturbances,
eg. physical alteration to compound site to somewhat overcome need for
garrison methods.
The interesting consequence of this third police strategy is the way in which it
effects the nature of the event, and the community being policed. There can be no.
doubt that the greater the commitment to saturation policing, the more likely is the
consequence that the police will maintain a notion of public order. But at what cost to
the object of the police exercise?
In the case ofthe Bathurst weekend the whole nature ofthe use ofpublic space was
constrained. The carnival atmosphere ofthe Friday and Saturday nights on the mount
(which has been a feature of the campsite whether riots have intervened or not) was
absent.
The control of alcohol consumption through the use of arrest powers not only had
the effect of restricting unruly behaviour, but also brought more people within the
purview of the criminal justice process. Both despite, and as a consequence of the
saturation policing exercisethere were 106 arrests made over the weekend, and of the
153 charges laid, by far the greatest majority were for breaches ofthe Council’s alcohol
restriction ordinance, which was created speciﬁcally to assist in policing the event.
Relations between the police and the bike riding community were not advanced
by this type of policing strategy. The searching of tents and vehicles, the constant police
patrols throughout the campsite, the police action to break up collective game play, the
frequent arrests for minor offences, all contributed to a distinct escalation in anti-
police feeling. The increased encroachment of the police compound into the camping
area was symbolic ofthe intrusive police presence into camp life on the mount over the
weekend. Even entry and departure decisions which essentially effect the makeup of
the community on the mount, were to some extent dictated by the police.
And the associated interests which inﬂuence the perpetuation of the event are
fundamentally effected by this police strategy. Gate takings were down by almost half
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that of previous year. The adverse inﬂuence on the Auto Cycle Union of N.S.W.
(A.C.U.) which co-organises the race, is obvious. The Bathurst Chamber of Commerce
could not afford to ignore the fact that the takings of local petrol station and hotel
proprietors was reduced on last year’s trade by up to 50% ( Western Advocate, 2/4/ 86).
Yet the various motorcycle riders’ association, the City Council and local commercial
concerns have, and continue to abrogate their responsibilities to take back some
control over the policing of their respective interests. It is interesting that the only
major grouping involved in the Bathurst control equation, which benefitted from the
saturation exercise was the police. The TRG were in a complete “win” situation. In the
eventuality that the violence was restrained, the TRG would take the credit. Even if
violence had occurred the TRG could have argued for even greater artillery and powers
to increase their presence in following years.
Having brieﬂy examined the nature of certain police strategies, it is necessary to
make some observation concerning the process of choice as to which will be
appropriate for the expected circumstances of the event.
Police strategies are primarily constrained by physical resources and public
expectations. Obviously1n the year or years that follow the occurrence of a major
disturbance the Stateis more willing to invest in police hardware and manpower, and
the local community will be sensitised to the need for a more significant police presence
during all aspects to the Easter Weekend.
In so saying one should not overlook the internal police dynamics which effect the
choice of police strategy. Such a choice cannot be viewed as logically arising as a
consequence of external pressure. The various conﬂicting interests that comprise the
police operation from inception to review, will play an essential role1n formulating
police strategy.
Reﬂect on this scenario: There is a commitment from senior police officers in
charge of the Bathurst operation, to a non interventionist style of policing. As a
consequence of this they instruct that police patrolling of the town be inconspicuous,
R.B.T. and check point road blocks be limited, selective and not act as an excuse for
search and seizure exercises, that dialogue be established betwen the police and the
spectators at all levels, and that the “riot squad” be held out of sight in reserve.
Naturally enough the officers in charge of the Highway Patrol and riot squad units do
not agree with this approach. On the Saturday evening the crowd outside the police
compound becomes boisterous and there is some confusion at command level as to
whether to call up the riot squad. Before a “riot” erupts the riot squad arrives and
established a garrison policing position. A riot develops and the following day the
official police response emphasises the need for a saturation style police strategy in
future years.
It is clear that the organisational structure of a police force will inﬂuence the
strategies selected to police public order and vice versa. In the following section I will
examine one example of where and pressure to introduce a certain police strategy has
lead to organisational changes within the force which in turn have greatly inﬂuenced
future strategies on crowd control.
Organisational Specialisation in Policing Public Order.
The Tactical Response Group was established officially on May, 1982. The
reason given for the formation was the confrontation between police and
spectators at Bathurst Motor Cycle Races in April 1981, during which 130 people
were arrested. The media depicted the ‘riot’ as caused by a large ‘mob of bikies’
suffering from ‘booze and boredom’. An editorial in the Sydney Morning Herald
was quick to draw wider implications. It spoke of an ‘undercurrent’ offrustration
relieved by spasmodic violence which afﬂicts some oftoday’s ‘young and not-so-
young’. Other examples cited were ‘rioting’ at the Stage Door Tavern the
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previous year and ‘rowdy scenes’ at Cricket Test Matches. The police and courts
alone could not ‘corribat this phenomenon’. However, the more immediate
response was to establish a police riot squad. The ‘riot’ had occurred on Saturday
night, April 18. By the morning edition of the daily papers on Wednesday April
22 the formation of the TRG was announced. As the Herald blandly stated
‘Police Plan Riot Squad in Wake of Bathurst’. The people of N.S.W. were given
the clear impression that the police had moved very rapidly to establish the new
squad directly because of the ‘riot’.
Two important points need to be made concerning this sequence of events. Prior
to this announcement in April 1981 at least three groups had previously carried
the title ‘riot squad’. The 21 Mobile Division had been known as the ‘Flying
Squad’ and the ‘Riot Squad’. The specialist group SWOS (Special Weapons and
Operations Squad) was originally known as the ‘Riot Squad’ and later the
‘Emergency Squad’. Thirdly the Police Rescue Squad had certainly acted as a
riot squad on many occasions. Furthermore then Police Minister Crabtree
admitted in a press release one week after the April 1981 ‘riot’ that plans for the
TRG had been underway for months (Telegraph 27/4/ 81). The illusion that the
TRG was formed in response to Bathurst was clearly fabricated. (Cunneen,
1985:74).
The creation of the TRG was an event which was not publicly debated nor was it
even argued at the level of community accountability.
‘ The establishment of the Tactical Response Group within the N.S.W. Police
Force, its mode of deployment since its creation and the general aura (largely
induced by the popular media) surrounding it arguably heralds the arrival of an
entirely new style ofpolicing in N.S.W. By dint of the privileged and independent
power exercised by the police in respect of law enforcement policy, and without
so much as a sideways glance from the parliament let alone an informed public
debate, the people of N.S.W. have had imposed upon them changes in law
enforcement arrangements that will prove in time to be far more signiﬁcant that
those recent reforms to the Criminal law (the repeal of the Summary Offences
Act, for example), whose (sic) passage aroused such din and clatter in this State.
(Hogg l984a;49).
When the TRG took shape, public statements from Senior Police Officers
indicated that a very broad function was envisaged for it. For example, Assistant
Commissioner Ross stated in 1981 that the TRG might be responsible for:
The policing of Corrective Services establishments during industrial disputes,
acting as response team to large crowd control situations, riots, demonstrations,
disasters, saturation patrol, other serious matters; supportive element to the
S.W.O.S. in an emergency hostage/seige situation, including the containment
and maintenance of controlled perimeters; and such areas as may be deemed
advisable in view of their specialised training (NSW Police News Feb. 1982;48).
In 1982 the then Superintendent of the TRG described his men as an “elite squad
trained in unarmed combat, back on the streets to fight hooliganism, rape and bag
snatching”. In terms of the TRG’s potential as a rapid deployment force he continued:
The new idea is to have the TRG ready as a support group to go to any trouble
area . . . The TRG will be ready to spring up anywhere and they will be like
mushrooms. Ifthere are any trouble makers they will opt out of the area because
it will suddenly be flooded with police. (Sun Herald 18/4/82).
One of the most common criticisms raised against the formation of such
specialised riot control squads in that they may originally be justified as a radical
response to a specific and limited social threat, but their operational involvements
develop quickly to incorporate many of the more usual general duties of police work.
This certainly has been the case with the TRG. Since inception it has not only policed
the Bathurst bike races, it has evicted trade unionists from an occupied building,
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broken up an alleged disturbance at a juvenile remand centre, regularly patrolled the
streets of certain of Sydney’s Western Suburbs, been involved in policing certain
demonstrations during Anzac Day celebrations, patrolled large sporting events, and
was responsible for the arrest and shotgun wounding of an unarmed 16 year old youth
who had absconded from custody (Hogg l984a;49).
When the TRG became fully operational on May 1, 1982 the squad had emerged
as an integrated group numbering several hundred men, designed to carry out wide
ranging activities within the N.S.W. Police Force. Equipment available in May 1982
included riot helmets; gas masks; ballistic helmets; selection of batons; shields; bullet-
proof vests; groin, shin and arm protectors; U.S. made 870 type shotguns; (Cunneen
1985).
Some criticism has been made of police tactical units on the grounds that they
may introduce a ‘heavier’element into policing. The fear has been expressed that
because these units exist, with their emphasis on being prepared for violence and
their access to special equipment (such as helmets, shields, long batons, chemical
munitions), they will be deployed in situations in which more conventional police
units have been used in the past and will introduce a more confrontationist
element into the situation. This, it is claimed, leads to greater violence and more
injuries than would occur with use of ‘normal’policing methods. Others see the
introduction of tactical units as the thin edge of the wedge for the creation of a
paramilitary police force.
While some of these issues have often been raised in a largely ideological context
by those who oppose police generally, they do nevertheless expose some genuine
problems which police have seldom been willing to acknowledge publicly. There
is certainly a seeming contradiction, in terms of philosophy, training, and tactics,
in having units trained extensively in riot control and associated skills and also
being expected to carry out community policing duties. The possibility must be
honestly addressed of a preparation for violence and training in aggressive
techniques having a spillover effect such that members oftactical units approach
their normal policing in a more aggressive manner than is desirable. (Wardlaw:
1986; 232-3).
There can be no doubt that by creating such specialised squads there is also
created a risk of alienation on several levels. Firstly some sections of the community,
particularly those who become the objects of TRG policing, will be further removed
from the image of consensus social control. Next there is the reality of alienating the
TRG (and more importantly the responsibility for public order policing) from the
main stream operational concerns of general duties policing.
The structure of the TRG seems designed to ensure that a sense of independence
and elitism develops. It is almost like a police force, within a police force. It has
executive, administrative, operational and training elements, as well as divisional
structure to provide 66 teams to complement the District organisation of policing in
this State (see Wardlaw 1986 236-7, for greater detail on TRG organisation).
The TRG has grown from an initial strength of 40 to a present operational
strength of 264. This is a remarkable 600% increase over its four years of operation.
From 1982 to 1983 its “tasking” rating increased tenfold. (Wardlaw 1986, 238), yet the
only events policed by the TRG which actually resulted in acts of violence were the
Bathurst Motor Cycle races, and the Anzac Day demonstration.
In spite of the belief that public disorder is now more frequent or more
violent than in the past, it is still a relatively rare occurrence in
Australasia. This frequency creates major problems for police admin-
istrators. Police are severely criticised when they seem to be unable to
effectively control a violent crowd. They are accused either of over-
reaction, thus making the confrontation worse than it need have been,
or of being insufficiently organised or equipped to handle public
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disorder. There are criticisms of lack of discipline in the face of
provocation and of having overly authoritarian attitudes. Many of the
proposed solutions involve the provision of specialisted training and the
formation of units with a speciﬁcally public order role.
Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to justify, for example, the
 
maintenance of a dedicatedriot control unit, when that unit may be‘Used "
only rarely, if at all, on riot control duties. But if a riot does eventuate,
and police either fail to contain it or over-react because of inadequate
planning and training for, and discipline in, these situations, they are the
target of considerable criticism. The solution attempted in some forces
has been to create multi-role units which combine some elements of
‘public order duties with such other specialised areas as armed offender.
operations, protective security, and in some cases, search and rescue.
Other forces have created more specialised but part-time squads.
(Wardlaw 1986, 231).
Perhaps the most important ramification arising out of the establishment
of riot squat “fire brigade” policing, is the implied admission that relations
between the normal civil policing agencies and certain sections of the public
have deteriorated to such an extent so as to necessitate such a paramilitary
response to the problems of social control. Once established these squads
prove to be self perpetuating. They also evidence a clear acceptance by the
police, to take on board an ever expanding commitment to their original
operational goal as “moral prefects” and the controllers of the “underclass”
(Silver 1976). Their response so often takes place outside the arena of public
debate.
This is in large part because the police are usually assumed to be a
dependent variable in discussions of public order and crime — called
upon to react in defence of the interests of the community wherever
disorder and criminality are apparent and occasionally invited to offer
professional and authoritative guidance in relation to such problems.
This ignores the critical role played by the police in the definition of
events — ofwhat is crime, who is criminal, what constitutes disorderliness.
One of the most important features of the TRG is the frequency with
which they are likely to confront such situations — as a mobile force
they, by their very nature, are not required to construct localised
relationships or networks but to be ready to respond to situations
judged in advance to be problematic and as likely to warrant special
tactics and usually force. Sensitised to the likely need to resort to force
wherever they are called upon to act, such squads are also equipped with
the weaponry and technology which permits, and perhaps even
encourages, them to do so. The shotgun shooting of the absconding
juvenile referred to earlier may be one such example. This organisation
necessarily places far greater emphasis (even than is the case elsewhere in
the police force) upon internal co-operation, interdependence and co—
ordinated action rather than reliance upon information and co-
operation from members of the public. This engenders insularity, elitism
and a readiness (and, in part, a necessity) to confront situations in much
more black and white terms —— targeting groups and individuals as
‘enemies’.
Lacking a continuing relationship with any local community such
squads can afford to have less concern for the consequences of their
interventions. .
All of these dimensions of the TRG combine to heighten the likelihood
that their routine definition of situations and mode of intervention will
 be organised around force. In this respect, the operational aspects of
policing are inseperably linked to the ways in which different situations
are defined for the purposes of police intervention. The creation of
special squads for the exercise of force in ‘extreme’ circumstances can
become self—fulfilling and self-perpetuating. The Bathurst bike races are
a case in point. (Hogg, 1984az50-51).
The Application of the Criminal Sanction in Controlling Public Order.
As I have argued previously (Cunneen and Findlay, 1986) the charging pattern
which arises out of the policing of public order is a useful indicator of how police
agencies perceive their function and interpret the behaviour against which their control
actions are directed. The application of the criminal sanction to collective behaviour in
turn will have a contra influence on concepts and procedures central to the operation
of criminaljustice. This will be examined in the next section. Suffice to say at this stage
that the application of individual criminal responsibility to collective behaviour, rests
on individual identification of offenders who, while being proved to possess personal
guilt, will be punished to a great degree as representative of the collective endeavour
,which was the environment which determined their behaviour. The offences with
which they are charged will either rely on the collective behaviour and common
purpose for their individual definition (eg. affray) or will be aggravated by the fact that
they contributed to the collective threat. While the crowd cannot stand in the dock, its
spectre compounds the determination of criminal responsibility.
The following are some variables which may influence the nature, frequency and
.trends of charge patterns at Bathurst;
the type of collective behaviour
the symbolic representation of such behaviour, past present and future
the variety and scope of public order legislation
the various specialised squads represented in the police contingent
the size of the police contingent and
. the police strategy employed
' If we accept Cunneen’s assertion that the history of youth disorder at Bathurst
indicates little change in the overall pattern of the crowd behaviour at Bathurst
. (excluding ofcourse crowd size) then the other variables take on greater significance in
explaining charge patterns.
The police are central to the charging process. They interpret the behaviour and
select the appropriate offence categories. They exercise discretion as to whether they
charge or not. They may negotiate or bargain charges. They usually settle the
immediate consequences of the charge, such as bail. It is the selective emphasis of
policing, effected as it is by political and community expectations which must dictate
the types of charges laid after each Easter Weekend.
The level and pattern of charges will be a measure of police activity in a formal
sense. As such they do not indicate anything about the significant level ofdiscretionary
control activity outside the charge process. A measure of charges can only be seen as a
comment on crowd behaviour insofar as it indicates the fact that the police have
interpreted the actions of participants as constituting a criminal offence.
In order to analyse the significance of the “police” related variables and the
manner in which the police have chosen to define certain crowd behaviour, I have
examined the nature and frequency of charges layed over the Easter Weekend at
Bathurst, for the period 1960- 19865. Certain hypotheses can be tested as a result of this
endeavour.
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5. This of course does not include the charges which were dealt with by thejustices who held special sittings
at the Bathurst Police Station. The source of our charge data is court records and no such records were
kept of the police station hearings.
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l The greater the police contingent at Bathurst, the greater will be the number of
charges layed.
This is not difficult to test. When one compares the numbers of people arrested
with the total number of police on duty (the sources of this data being press
reporting) the correlation is interestingly, not constant. For example in the later
part ofthe sixties there seems to be no clear relationship between police numbers
and arrest totals eg. the largest number of arrests over that period was in l967
when the fewest number of police were on duty. The same lack ofcorrespondence
appears selectively in the 705 and 805. In 1978 police strength was 392, over twice,
that of the previous year, and yet the number of persons arrested fell by 20.
During the early 805 when police strength remained fairly constant, arrest ﬁgures
fluctuated over a range of 20—l67.
Despite the inadequacies of the Bathurst court records for providing charge
data,6 charges may in fact give a better measure of total police activity. Even on
this level a correlation could not be established. True it is that the smallest
number of charges arose out of the period l96l—65 when the smallest number of
police officers were present. However the highest number ofcharges arose out of
the period l966-l970. When compared with l980-84 when police strength was
l,SlO, the police total for the earlier period was 362.
This assumption does not stand. Perhaps the police might argue that this lends
support to the notion that a greater police presence will deter breaches of public
order. The difficulty with this line ofargument is that the years between 1980 and
I984 when police numbers remained relatively constant, the arrest and charge
figures varied enormously. I can only conclude that absolute police strength is
not a significant influence on charge patterns. Bearing this in mind it could be
argued that arrest and charge rates are not the most useful measures of police
activity in crowd control. After all they only shout the level at which the formal
criminal sanction is activated as a control mechanism.
 
2. Trends in charge pattern are inﬂuenced by the introduction of specialised police
division into the policing exercise.
lf we take the period that 2] division was active in policing Bathurst we have by
far the highest total charge period (eg. 1966-1979). Their first five years of
operation was the highest in terms of relative charge rates (more than two and a
half times that of the previous five years). True there was an almost doubling of
police strength in the latter part ofthe 605 but as we said in the previous part that
should perhaps work against an increase in charges.
Of more interest is the immediate effect that the introduction of2l division had
an arrest and charge patterns. In their first year at Bathurst the arrest rate more
than trebled from the previous year. The nature of the charges altered as well.
From l965-l967 charges related to public drunkenness (dealt with in petty
sessions) went from l8 to Ill and went from percentage figure of total charges
from 37% to 77%. conversely offensive manner charges dropped in absolute
terms. and in percentage terms from 25% to 7%. Language offences remained
Significant throughout the 21 division period right up until their last year at
Bathurst (which corresponded with the year that the Summary Offences Act was
repealed); Another interesting feature of the first few years that 21 division
helped police at Bathurst. is the shift in location of offences. Prior to [966 by far
6. Accurate charge totals for the Bathurst C.P.S. were difficult to guarantee. with charges being remanded
to other dates. other courts. and even certain charges not being heard in petty sessions. Also intoxicated
persons detainees after I980 may not appear as charged persons even though they were the objects of
significant police activity.
the greatest proportion ofcharges arose out ofincidents in the town. In 1967 the
incidents were equally divided between the town and the mountain and except
for the odd year from then on the mountain developed into focus for charge
related behaviour the mountain almost always was the arena for conﬂict in “riot“
years following 1972.
Perhaps a more obvious correlation is that the occurrence of smoke/ possession
Indian hemp charges corresponded with the year that the drug squad attended
the races (this was not the case in the last three years when drug charges were laid
by the police officers other than the drug squad, but not to the extend of the “drug
squad years”).
Even though we have only referred to two divisions (squads) here (squads which
may be viewed as unique in an operational sense) and it is perhaps too early to
make a definitive comment on the inﬂuence ofthe TRG, the obvious inﬂuence of
‘21 division on charge rates would lend support to this second hypothesis.
 
3. Changes in policing strategies will inﬂuence charge patterns.
If one returns to my earlier discussion of police strategies and looks for the years
where such strategies were obviously applied, it becomes possible to analyse their
inﬂuence on charge patterns.
1977 and .1984 were years when non-intervention, soft policing options were
tried. For both years the charge rates were very low (although in I977 the press
unaccountably reported a high arrest rate of 138 persons). One might say that
this was perhaps a fortunate coincidence that these were years where riots did not
occur and that was due to crowd behaviour rather than police strategy. On the
data we have I am not able to debate such a question of temporal sequence.
1966, 1967, 1976 and 1985 were examples of years of garrison interventionist
policing (even though police indicated that in its early stage 1985 was non
interventionist). Except for 1976 the charge rates were high (although the arrest
rate for 1976 was one ofthe highest on record). There seems to be little significant
trends in charge pattern except for the occurrence of the more serious offensive
behaviour charges and explosive charges in 1966, the resist arrest charges each
' year, the assault police and malicious injuries charges in 19.76, and the
extraordinary use of the common law riot and affray charges in I986.
1978 and 1980 were perhaps the best examples of saturation policing of the
Bathurst event. Both years were not represented as occasions of riot by the police
and although 100 arrests were recorded for both years, the charges were related
to the ingestion of intoxicants or breaching the local council ordinance
concerning the transport of alcohol onto the mountain.
Because one might be accused of being biased in the selection of those years in
which particular police strategies were attempted7, and because what confines a
police strategy might be viewed as contentious, I am wary to take a definitive
position of this hypothesis. Suffice to say that certain police strategies appear to
inﬂuence crowd behaviour (and vice versa). Also some instances where police
strategies have been overtly and vigorously pursued, appear to show certain
unique results as regards charge rates and trends.
Perhaps the most obvious example of a particular police strategy at Bathurst was
the construction and almost annual expansion of the police compound on the
mountain. One would expect that such a move either reﬂected an earlier shift of
the centre of conﬂict from the town to the mountain, or an effort by the police to
remove the trouble if it occurred, away from the town.
 
7. l have made this choice based on press reporting, ofﬁcial police statements, and police manpower figures.
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In I967 there was a pronounced increase in the proportion of charges made on
the mountain. Between that year and I973 the percentage of mountain charges
were less substantial but still more significant than for the period prior to I967.
For the years between I973 and I977 there appeared to be a trend developing
wherein the mountain had become the principal arena for conflict and the
Saturday night “troubles“ in the camping area were somewhat institutionalised.
However, during the two years prior to the establishment of the compound. this
trend seemed to reverse.
The police presence on the mountain was increased in I979. An increase in
“mountain originated" charges also occurred that year. It is important also to
realise that this was the last year that 2l division attended the races. In addition
the “offensive behaviour“type charges and those associated with violence such as
“assault police" were proportionally high, as they had been in I975, I976 and
I977 (those years when the trend to violent conﬂicts on the mountain became
established).
Following the commencement of operations from the police compound in I980,
the year X location ofoffence frequencies confirm that the mountain is the focus
ofconflict (eg. in I983, 93.3% ofcharges preferred over the weekend arose from
behaviour on the mountain).
In terms of total charges laid, for the ten years prior to the establishment ofthe
compound. I98 charges rose from mountain based behaviour. Since then for the
six Easters of its operation, the police compound has been the centre for the
processing of over 900 charges.
Despite the clear evidence that the compound has provided a focus for the
conﬂict in terms ofthe number of charges arising from behaviour in its vacinity,
police strategies eminating from the compound may have inﬂuenced the nature
ofcrowd behaviour. Particularly in the two worst riot years since I980 ( I983 and
I985). those charges relating to violent behaviour (eg. resist arrest. assault police,
malicious injury) were far more notable in the charge breakdown than on
previous years.
4. Tim! Charge Patterns are Inﬂuenced by Available Legislation.
This is perhaps the least contentious of the hypotheses so far. It is simple to
observe the shift in the use of certain charges immediately following the
amendment of certain public order legislation. '
The use of the offence of public drunkenness has always been the standard
recourse for police in controlling public behaviour in Bathurst. Such offences are
even more significant than what would appear from the court records as it would
have been these types ofcharges which would have been dealt with by thejustice
at the police station.
The [mark-med Pt'rSUIM‘ AN commenced operation in April I980. As one might
expect with the “decriminalisation” of public drunkenness no such charges
would appear on court record following that date. (In fact no such charges.
accept when associated with motor traffic law. appeared following I976). One
should not assume that the prohibition of public drunkenness in one form or
another was no longer potent in the controlling ofpublic behaviour. In I980 and
I98'l a total of 9l people were detained in custody (at a proclaimed place)
overnight under the provisions ofthe new Act. In addition to the Council’s recent
ordinance prohibiting the transport and consumption of alcohol on the
mountain provided the basis for by far the majority of arrests in I986. Finally.
particularly on those years when a riot is not in evidence. “d rink—d riving"charges
make up a large proportion of the charge total (eg. 82‘? in I982).
 The controversial Summary Offences Act 1972, was repealed in 1979. This meant
the end ofcharges such as indecent language, indecent and offensive manner, etc.
This Act was replaced by the Offences in Public Places Act. For a variety of well
publicised reasons the police have a great disaffection for this piece of legislation
and therefore despite certain occasions where 5.5 was employed as the principal
charge at Bathurst (eg. 198]) the police did so reluctantly, and criticised the
adequacy of such a charge, to control such behaviour. Following the amendment
to 5.5, in 1984, which brought the offence more into line with police preference,
there were 106 charges under the new 5.5.
.An interesting side line on the issue of available offences, is the constant clamour
(that there is a need for tougher legislation) which arises from senior police
sources, and the Police Association, following a riot at Bathurst, that there is a
need for tougher legislation. In fact the Premier responded to such pressure in
1983 and 1985 by foreshadowing the possible introduction of a new “Riot Act".
Undeterred by the fact that no such legislative initiative eventuated, the police
utilised the old common law offences of riot and affray (each carrying the
possibility of substantial terms of imprisonment) on 95 occasions in 1985. In
conjunction with the attempted murder charges laid that year it would seem
strange indeed for the police to argue that they require increased legislated power
in order to effectively deal with the Bathurst crowd threat. .
Police charge patterns do reflect the variety of offence options available to them.
5. Those years where thepress reported the occurrence ofa riot, were similar in terms
of the arrest and charge patterns evidenced.
This is perhaps the most complicated of the hypotheses so far presented. If we
take the period from 1970 through until 1986, of those years reported as being
riotous, the arrest rates for those years were higher than that of the year
immediately prior to it. However, this rate must be viewed against the fact that in
1973, 1975, 1977 and 1978 a hundred or more arrests were made and no riot was
reported.
As for the charge patterns, each riot year appears to be unique. In 1985 there were
a very large number of riot and offensive behaviour charges laid. I983
saw mainly traffic related charges. In 1981 over 72% of charges were for
serious alarm and serious affronts (S.A.S.A.) 1980 saw a fairly even spread of
charges with motor traffic offences again predominating. Offensive behaviour
type charges made up of almost halfthe charges for 1976, and 1972 saw a similar
trend except for the inclusion of 17% of charges relating to public drunkenness.
Therefore it appears that factors such as the offence categories available, the
police divisions present at Bathurst, the location of the crowd, etc may all
influence the charge pattern to differing degrees, during each riot year.
The Special Courts
With the level of arrests and charges at Bathurst over the Easter weekend almost
trebling in the mid-sixties, it comes as no surprise that a system of special courts was
established to enable the processing of offenders with a minimum of delay. The use of
Special Courts at Bathurst began during Easter 1966 the year which arrests totalled [76
persons. During the previous Easter some 55 arrests were made and with the Court of
Petty Sessions not next scheduled to sit until 10 days after the event, this delay was
considered to be unacceptable.
The 1966 special court sittings were organised for Easter Saturday and the
following Tuesday. It was not simply co-i-ncidental that these extraordinary judicial
arrangements co-incided with new policing strategies centering around the involvement
of 21 division in the policing of Bathurst. The Saturday morning hearings dealt with
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those persons arrested on the Friday and who had been unable to arrange bail. Even
with these cases out of the way, the Tuesday hearings set something of a judicial
processing record: cases against 156 individuals were heard in five hours and fifty
minutes.
From 1970 onwards special courts became a regular feature of the judicial
policing arrangements for the Easter weekend at Bathurst. While viewed officially as
simply a bureaucratic expediency to overcome the sheer volume of arrests at Bathurst,
the issue of special courts illuminates the manner in which the state can move to deal
with civil disturbances which may overtax its normal procedures.
The courts held after 1970 consisted of two types. Firstly those presided over by a
justice of the peace which were held at the police station on one of or all of the following
days: Good Friday, Easter Saturday, and Easter Sunday. Secondly a special sitting of
the Court of Petty Sessions was held either on the Easter Monday or the following
Tuesday. Of particular interest were the courts held by thejustices of peace. These were
referred to as ‘remand’ courts or ‘bail’ courts. They were held in the police station under
conditions hardly conducive to due process. While one function of the court was to
determine bail, thejustice also heard and determined cases. In particular the charge of
drunkenness was dealt with at special courts. For instance for 1970 at least 33 cases of
drunkenness were disposed of by thejustice ofthe peace. To give some idea of how this
freed up the process dealing with offenders, it can be noted that of the 142 charges in
the police charge book for the Friday to Monday period, only 45 individuals appeared
before the Court of Petty Sessions on the Tuesday. Of those 45 individuals 24
had been held in custody. The almost 100 charges remaining had either been dealt with
or remanded to other dates by the justice. Thus the special courts became a necessary
adjunct to the efficient functioning of Petty Sessions sittings.
The popular view ofthe specialjustice‘s courts in Bathurst was one of benevolent
expediency. The Sydney Morning Herald (1 /4/72) wrote that the courts were
“arranged so that people from distant centres need not return to Bathurst at a later
date. In the case of those who cannot raise bail, it will mean that the congestion of the
local police cells will be avoided.” After arrest and charging the sergeant of police sets
bail. However if the offender cannot meet bail he or she is kept in custody until the next
available court hearing. The police after setting bail cannot review bail conditions,
determine the case or remand the case to a later sitting of the regular court. Until the
introduction ofthe BailAct in 1980 it was usual in the case of non—appearance of minor
public order offenders to forfeit bail and treat the amount as a fine for the offence. In the
cases at Bathurst those who were unable to meet bail were usually detained in Bathurst
Gaol until court appearance. In some years they were the only defendants in court to
answer charges, the others choosing non-appearance and forfeiture of bail money as an
easier and (considering their potential loss of wages) a less expensive solution. For
instance, in 1966 only 9 adults were present in the Court of Petty Sessions on the
Tuesday after Easter although there were cases listed against 156 individuals. The nine
that appeared had been unable to meet bail and so were held in custody over the
weekend. Thus until the implementation of the Bail Act, the special courts presided
over by justices were most unlikely to allow individuals out of custody on their own
undertaking. Inability to meet bail meant Easter in gaol.
The justices were essential for hearing and determining drunkenness charges.
These charges often formed a huge proportion ofthe weekend’s total. The bail/ fine for
the offence was $1 — anyone unable to meet this would have no doubt faced other
charges under the Vagrancy Act. The large proportion of people charged for the
offence of drunkenness was demonstrated during Easter 1976. There were over 250
.arrests and 300 charges laid during the weekend. Special courts were held on the Good
Friday, Easter Saturday and Easter Monday. One hundred and fifty of the charges,
that is 50% of charges dealt with were for drunkenness. The other charges were
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remanded to the Tuesday sitting of the Court of Petty Sessions where a further 154
cases were heard.
The operation of special courts heard byjustices of the peace were necessary for
the smooth functioning of the judicial system when placed under strain. Offenders
could be processed and dealt with quickly and effectively. Minor offences, particularly
drunkenness, could be heard and determined; those charged with other offences and
unable to meet bail could be remanded in custody; the few, if any, who pleaded not
guilty could be remanded to a later court sitting; and the rest could be set down for the
next hearing of Petty Sessions. Giventhe volume of police work and court proceedings
generated over Easter the necessity for efficiency was paramount. As the example of
Easter 1976 showed, 250 arrests in one weekend had to be dealt with, and, according to
police occurrence records, up to 84 prisoners in police cells at any one time needed
processing.
After the introduction ofthe BaiIAct in N.S.W. in 1980 the function of the special
courts changed slightly. The spirit behind the BailAct was to reaffirm a presumtpion in
favour of bail for all offences except armed hold-up or other violent robberies, and to
move away from monetary bail which was seen to discriminate against the poor.
(Stubbs, 198424, 6). The Bail Act allowed for unconditional bail and for bail on
non-financial conditions. The Act also created in 5.51 the offence offailing to appear in
court in accordance with a bail undertaking. Thus the old system of failing to appear
and forfeiture of recognizance as a way for the defendant to deal with his or her case
was no longer and option. Failure to appear in court to answer a charge became an
offence in itself.
Despite the perceived liberal-progressive sentiments underlying the introduction
ofthe BailAct, the practice has often meant increased contact with the criminaljustice
system. The Bail Act for example prevented individuals from “legally” having their
cases determined in their absence. The option of non-appearance was particularly
useful for working class offenders who lived some distance from Bathurst, irrespective
of whether they may have committed the minor summary offence as charged or not.
The special courts have continued to function over the Easter weekend. With the
almost institutionalised pattern of“riots”the arrest rates have remained high and thus
the necessity for the courts have continued. Generally those charged with PCA
offences or serious alarm and affront under the Oﬂences in Public Places Act and have
been unable to meet bail conditions set by the police have their bail reviewed by the
Justice ofthe Peace and are usually released on their own undertaking. However as the
seriousness of the charges has increased to the use of indictable offences like common
law riot, the numbers held in custody are still high. After the 1985 confrontation and
the arrest of 164 individuals, thirty individuals were still in custody when they appeared
in court on the Tuesday morning either being refused bail or unable to meet the
conditions.
The incentive to plead ‘guilty’ to minor charges arising out of the Bathurst
weekend, has always been apparent. An example of this arose in a case involving a 21
year old boilermaker charged with indecent language (Summary Offences Act
[N.S.W.], 1970, 5.9) and consuming intoxicating liquor in a public park (Local Council
by—Law). The defendant and four others had been drinking beer in King’s Parade Park
in Bathurst at 11 am. on Good Friday morning. According to police evidence when
arrested he said, “What are you fucking taking me for, I haven’t done nothing”, within
the hearing of women and children. Before the magistrate the defendant stated, “We
didn’t know we were breaking the law when we took beer into the park”. Concerning
the language charge he stated, “I didn’t say that and there were no women and children
around. I can’t afford to please ‘not guilty’.” The Bench replied, “It is not for you to
plead ‘guilty’ if you say that you didn’t say that.” The defendant replied to the
magistrate, “I will still plead ‘guilty’. I can’t get here again if I plead ‘not guilty’.”
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As part of the overall arrangements for the control of Bathurst, special courts
have continued to play a fundamental role. This is despite various legislation which
would have apparently rendered a “bail” court superfluous. As discussed above the
introduction of the Bail Act did not do away with the need for the courts — although
on the surface the prime function of the court was to review bail conditions and the
function of the Bail Act was to make bail more accessible. Nor have the numbers of
those held in custody over the weekend altered radically, although there was to be a
presumption in favour of bail. Like the special courts, the prime function of the Bail
Act has been to speed up the processing ofthose involved in the criminaljustice system.
Both police and magistrates see this as the main advantage. As one police officer put it:
“Unconditional bail is good — it lets you put PCAs and shoplifters through like
sausages.” (Stubbs, 1984232). With the introduction of the Intoxicated Persons Act
and the repeal of the offence of drunkenness (Summary Offences Act [N.S.W.] 1970,
5.6) in 1980 the determining of those charges was no longer carried jout by thejustices
in special courts. However individuals are still detained under the provisions for
‘protective’ custody in the new Act. In 1980 thirty-four people were detained in custody
overnight under the Intoxicated Persons Act. In 1981 the number was fifty-seven. Thus
the particular control practices remained much the same irrespective of changes in
legislation.
In the broader view the use of the courts presided over by ajustice of the peace is
illustrative of the operation available to the state when dealing with larger scale social
order disturbances. It demonstrates the type of strain put on thejudicial system and the
remedies available when dealing with collective behaviour rather than individual
criminal activity. The pressure of dealing effectively with collective behaviour in the
criminaljustice system puts a premium on efficiency. Thejustices were able to act as an
initial sorting device, a type of pre-processing before the cases reached the magistrates.
This then enabled the magistrates to deal with “mammoth” sittings or “marathon”
sittings where hundreds of charges are listed for the one hearing. It is also noteworthy
that thejustices are not required to keep records oftheir special courts which were and
are usually held in Bathurst Police Station. With the development of policing
arrangements for Bathurst, the special courts formed a necessary bridge between the
introduction of large scale policing operations and the work they generated and the
more normal summary procedures of the judiciary.
The Institutionalisation of “Riot Policing Strategies
As mentioned earlier in this paper, the establishment of the Tactical Response
Group was integrally associated with attempts to maintain public order at the Bathurst
Bike Race. One police officer who has been with the TRG since its inception, expressed
the view that in fact it was the “riot” following the closure of the Stage Door Tavern in
1981 which was the precipitating event for the TRG’s creation. Whatever the event
there can be no doubt that the TRG (as with the Special Patrol Group in Britain) was
an institutional policing response to public disorder. More speciﬁcally the TRG were
originally conceived of as a purpose trained anti riot police squad.
If one examines the structure and operation of the TRG today, this singularity of
operational purpose seems to have been discarded. In May of this year the TRG were
assigned to insure the personal protection of Prince Phillip while he was within the
jurisdiction. And this is not the first time the TRG has had responsibility for such
protective duties. In June the TRG assisted the Special Weapons and Operations
Squad (SWOS) in the detection and recapture of escaped convict Aubrey Burke. As a
result of their now rather interdependent operational activities it has been noted that
the TRG and SWOS should be merged.
Within the metropolitan area of Sydney the TRG is now called on to assist in the
breaking of all major domestic siege situations. This involves a significant manpower
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commitment from the 98 full time TRG officers in an area which had previously been
the domain of general duties police.
More interesting still was the tour of duty done by certain permanent officers of
the TRG (and some of the 300 TRG trained divisional officers) to the Orana region of
Western N.S.W. between the 9th-llth November 1985. On the Saturday night the
TRG carried out a street patrol of the country town of Wellington, in which they
effected certain arrests. In a letter from the Mayor of Dubbo to the Premier Neville
Wran (dated 11th November, 1985) the observation was made that “Recently the
members of the TRG were in the City (of Dubbo) and their presence had a marked
effect on the behaviour of people in the street”. Perhaps not co—incidently the use of the
TRG was discussed at a meeting in Dubbo on 12th November where the Premier met
with the local National Party member,‘a prominent ex—police officer and representatives
ofconcerned citizen groups. The meeting was called to inform the government of local
concern about a “wave of violent crime” which was said to be challenging the good
order of the Orana region. On a somewhat smaller scale the TRG’s street presence in
these towns might be seen as similar to the incursion of the SPG on to the streets of
Brixton just prior to the riots there in the summer of 1981.
Lord Scarman in his report on the Brixton disorders (1982, 4.75-4.80) was clearly
critical of the tactic of introducing into a local community, riot police as a pro active
attempt to diffuse the threat of public disorder. He saw this as a serious mistake which
challenged the authority and effectiveness of local “beat” policemen, and had the
potential tojeopardise accountability consultation and community policing strategies
(See Benyon 1984, ch.8). This is particularly dangerous where certain crime and public
order fears are associated with local racial tensions; tensions which police from outside
the region may either not appreciate nor have to work beside.
The rapid expansion of police units which are trained as a paramilitary control
force, with a “third force” perspective, has the potential to significantly re-direct the
operational objectives of civil policing in situations well outside crisis challenges to
public order. As with the SPG in Britain the TRG may be seen as coming of age as the
principal police response to social “menaces” so diverse as vandalism, domestic
disputes, racial unrest, industrial disputation, etc. (See Rollo, 1980). In anticipation of
a growing need for such a third force, to control a greater diversity of civil unrest, the
TRG and their strategies have been strengthened.
As the control function of the police is emphasised, so such operations as TRG
policing, born out of limited “specific” instances of social disorder, become more
widely institutionalised. The TRG is a clear example ofthe trend to ward specialisation
and centralisation of police operational functions. When combined with a reduction in
formalised accountability and a concentration on pre-emptive policing, even the
ideology of community based police responses to public disorder is clearly under
challenge.
In addition the move toward professional elitism in policing, so obviously
represented by the concept oftactical response policing, must diminish the significance
of the general duties police officer when it comes to his/her responsibility to ensure
civil order within his/ her locality.
The inappropriate situation develops where such tactical response forces become
responsible for (as Scarman forewarns) the preservation rather than the restoration of
public order. I
Conclusion
There is no doubt that the maintenance of civil order has always been a primary
operational objective for organised policing agencies. However it is the way in which
this concern is translated into policing strategies which has significantly altered in
recent years.
 l
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Riot policing is initiallyjustified as a rational response to a unique social menace.
This was the case with the arguments in support ofincreasing the TRG involvement in
crowd control at the Bathurst Bike race meetings. But the TRG has grown in numbers,
in policing profile and in the nature of its control responsibilities. With its growth has
arisen a more visible challenge to the ideology of community based police responses to
public disorder. The “Peel image“ of a non co‘ercive civil police force ensuring public
tranquility through a community condoned and unobtrusive police surveillance
clearly has no place in tactical response police strategies.
The more that units like the TRG are deployed as the natural response to almost
any‘ perceived or actual challenge to public order, the less realistic and potent will be
the ideology at'the base of community policing If the “third force” control strategy is
institutionalised despite its distortion of such an ideology then the public‘5 perception
of civil policing must be revised.
Where ideology counts for little more than a device for state or police legitimacy,
the formal legal rules and procedures which are said to regulate the states control
process in a democratic sense cannot provide what Thompson (19772267) refers to as “a
medium within which other social conflicts (can be) fought out".
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Mark Findlay
l have to ask your indulgence in relation to this paper as you will note as you read
through it that it is quite long and in some parts a little unwieldly. The reason for that is
that it comes out ofsome three years of observations which were carried out by myself
and a number of other individuals centered at Mitchell College in Bathurst of the
Bathurst motorcycle race weekend and the confrontations between police and the
crowd on the Saturday night. To some extent the paper concentrates on collective
conﬂict in relation to those events and also tries to draw a wider brush across the
questions ofpolicing strategy in relation to public order. It is necessary I think to have
a paper somewhat larger than normal because there are certain arguments which rest
on our understanding of at least the historical development ofthe conﬂict at Bathurst,
and to some extent that historical development is not easy to understand or to
establish in the way that it haslbeen reported in the past. As I say at the start of this
paper, this paper will not debate whether the state faces a crisis in public order. I think
that is a separate debate and one which perhaps will be taken up in questions.
As the title suggests I am concerned to expose the radicalisation of policing
functions which is represented as arising in response to such a crisis. In short I wish to
turn the discussion of public order crisis rather on its head by analysing the state’s
response to stereotypical social menace. But more than this I also want to identify the
role of policing forces in the construction and justification of this radical response.
Policing agencies determine for the public what was the reality of the menace,
particularly in the case of Bathurst, and what should be the ramifications for the nature
of public order and policing that public order in the future.
The involvement of police agencies at all stages of a public disorder situation
needs to be analysed as a dynamic process. Police so often become the focus ofthe riot
themselves and their responses to public hostility directed against them will essentially
affect the development of that hostility as much as it does the re-establishing of civil
order.
Bearing this in mind the paper does concern itself with the police response to
public disorder, but within the framework ofthe disorder itself and more broadly as a
part of the definitional process which follows. '
The specifics of police practice and its consequences will primarily be examined
against the backdrop of public disorder which has arisen over the years at the Easter
motorcycle races at Bathurst. It is interesting in fact that we have been able to do these
observations at Bathurst because I do not know of any other situation where
researchers can go to a place with a fair odds on chance that they will see a riot
sometime with the period of the research that is to be carried out. Most riot research
comes out of the good fortune or, whichever way you look at it bad fortune, of
coincidentally being in a situation where a riot occurs. Also a lot of the riot research
that you read, particularly the research that comes out of the riots in Britain in l98l
and the more recent riots, which perhaps has been the most constructive research dOne
on public disorder in that form recently, is constructed outof second hand accounts or
is the product of reflection on newspaper and television coverage ofthe event. We have
had the opportunity to witness situations ofpublic disorder, unique as they may be, in
Bathurst from a first hand experience. I was fortunate enough in l985 to spend a
considerable amount oftime behind the bulky form of Superintendent Freudenstein in
the police compound during the evening of the Saturday night disturbance and was
able through that to get a somewhat unique perspective on a police response to a riot
Situation.
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Now the most important aspect of the police public order equation to be
addressed in this paper is the functional significance ofthe public order menace for the
radicalization of policing control strategies and I want to examine that in two ways.
Firstly, obviously in the specific ways that police respond to a certain type of
public disorder and secondly, the ways these responses are institutionalised into the
ongoing process of policing. I refer later to the evolution of the Tactical Response
Group and to the evolution of the Special Courts in relation to Bathurst, and when I
refer to policing in this paper policing should be seen in the widest sense. It relates to
the elements of criminal justice, the criminal justice process, which have a control
function.
It has been the common practice for policing agencies to simplify and stereotype
what are certain conflict situations, in order to develop a response which seems
achievable and understandable in a public sense. It is very important to remember
when we are discussing policing public order that in fact it is not simply the behaviour
itself but the definition ofthat behaviour which very clearly affects the type of response
that comes about as a result of its occurrence.
In the second section of the paper I talk about policing public order in quite
general terms and I make the point that there is nothing new in the conflicts which exist
between police and the community in a contest for public space. In fact the very
origination ofcertain police forces was based on the need, or the perceived need, ofthe
state to control certain public leisure activities and that was quite clearly the
operational reason for the Peel Police in Britain. I refer on page 27 to the interesting
situation of looking at the history of the development of larrikinism in the 19th and
20th centuries, and it is a good example, in fact, of where this contest for public space
can be perceived by the police not only as a contest for the re-establishing of public
order but also a contest for re—establishing their authority.
lt becomes interesting and it is very clear in the Bathurst situation that the
immediate community under challenge is, in fact, the Police Force itselfor those police
officers who find themselves in a public order situation. They will be required to define
what is good public order to be restored and they will also be required to form, ifyou
like, the buffer between the forces that they consider to be challenging public order and
the wider community which they consider that they represent or they protect. One of
the great arguments that the police put forward for the establishment and the existence
ofthe police compound at Bathurst is that without it the “Hill”area or the “Mountain”
area could not properly be policed. In fact, in l985 the experience was that the police
were so constrained or confined in the position within whch they could operate, that
they could not assure the public order or the public safety of individuals very much out
of the spotlight range of the lights that were shone on the compound. So even
justifications for certain strategies such as those have to be seen to be impossible in the
practical situation that you would address them within the conﬂict being observed.
On page 28 I introduced the first aspects of the Bathurst situation and make the
point that if one ignores questions of temporal sequence like “Who caused that?",
“What behaviour leads to what?" it is important to remember that one set of
behaviours will necessarily affect the other, so that the debate can be quite unhelpful if
one bogs down in asking “Who starts the riot?” and therefore who is responsible for it.
One has to see the situation evolving as rapidly as it does in the Bathurst riot situation.
The question is not really “Who starts the conflict?" but “How does the conflict
develop?” and “How are the police and the crowd dynamically involved with each
other‘s behaviour?”
Finally I say on page 28 that one must consider the factors that predispose police
agencies to turn their attention to certain types of public order rather than others and
one must look at that fairly critically. It becomes very clear that as you look at the
historical development of the Bathurst conflict that the police have a symbolic
investment in maintaining a certain level ofcontrol on the mountain and that has a lot
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clear choice and a massive financial investment in maintaining order at what is rather
an insigniﬁcant sporting event. The choice in maintaining control in Bathurst does not
simply turn on the control of the behaviour of a crowd at a motor cycle race, or the
protection of those individuals who are watching it, but it has a far more significant
symbolic relevance, and therefore the choice of policingBathurst and how Bathurst is
policed is affected by that symbolic importance.
I will not take you through the historical section which starts on page 29 because
in fact it would take up far too much time but I would simply refer to a couple of brief
matters which you should be clear about when you are looking at the question of police
strategies. Ifyou look at the start ofthe section you will see that I refer to prior to the
1960’s there were disorderly situations in Bathurst but these disorderly situations were
not, in fact, directed against the police specifically, nor were they situations which the
media seemed to concentrate on and make much of. Yet it would be wrong to presume
that prior to the ‘60‘s in Bathurst there was no problem. In fact some of the oral
historical accounts that we have received from police and from motor cyclists, or
rather motor cycle enthusiasts who have gone to the mountain year in and year out,
would argue that in fact some of the disturbances in the ‘50‘s were as active and as
energetic as perhaps are the ones that we have confronted more recently. But the
exercise of policing was quite a distinctly different one.
In the early ‘60’s new dimensions in the conflict arose. The violent clashes
appeared to be between the police and crowds ofyoung people and these developed as
a contest over public space: it was in public parks, it was outside pubs, it was in
camping areas. In the ‘60‘s the pattern of public disorder was fairly sporadic,
spontaneous and town centered, and this developed into a distinctly different
operation in the ”70‘s and the ’80’s.
The development of the “trouble-maker" hypothesis meant that the ‘60‘s police
strategies became more concentrated and aggressive. There were more organised street
patrols, there was crowd dispersal, there was organised regulation of liquor
consumption and the like. 1964 is a turning point and 1 would like you to be very clear
on that date. I964, in fact, was the time the national press started talking about the
“problem." at Bathurst; taking an interest in the riots, taking an interest in the crowd
control, in fact talking about “riots“ for the first time; and ifyour memory is as long as
mine you will recall that Easter ’64 was a period where there were significant clashes
between youth groups and the police in parts of Great Britain and parts ofthe United
States. It was the reﬂection ofa certain climate at the time, and the policing that was
carried out in the ”60’s around that period was very much consistent with the law and .
order mentality of the law and order projection which was coming from state
politicians.
In 1966 the police numbers were greatly increased, special squads were introduced
such as 21 Division and the whole conﬂict had taken on a very clear symbolic
significance. By 1974 police levels were remaining fairly constant while the arrest rates
had dropped right down below the pre-l960 figure.
In 1976 itself, however, the press reported a massive riot, made much of it and
talked about the mobile caravan on the mountain being besieged by 200 crazed bikers.
This was the start of the sort of centralization ofthe conﬂict on the mountain and in
1978 we had the appearance ofthe random fire arms checks. This went on to develop in
the early 1980’s with the creation of the police compound.
The paper would have gone on to discuss, in fact, three case studies of policing the
spectacle in 1984, ’85 and ’86. 1984 is included. Unfortunately ’85 and ‘86 were not.*
There were some reservations expressed about whether a discussion of those matters
might in fact affect certain committals and trials that are underway, or will be
underway, in response to arrests made at that time and therefore I was persuaded to
remove those sections. The unfortunate consequence of having to do this is that it
‘ These sections have now been included (see pages 34-38) Ed.
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to do with the historical conflict that has developed there. Obviously the police make a '
unbalances the paper a little so you will have to take on trust what I say later on about
policing strategies, and, believe me, that it is based on solid empirical observational
evidence. Secondly, it to some extent detracts from the debate, and the debate about
what actually happened at that time is one, that you will find if you look back on the
media reporting, that is very unbalanced, distorted and biased. Fortunately the debate
is slowly coming around to a more considered discussion of what happens, and the
debate I would presume will be advanced by the matters that are raised in the trials that
are to come.
So the three case studies would have appeared there. They in fact are to some
extent summarised when I get on to commenting about policing strategies. There are
three policing strategies that I would like to refer to — they are referred to on pages 38
and following, and they are the three policing strategies which were in fact effected in
1984, ‘85 and ’86. 1984 was the non-interventionist or “soft” policing option and I go
through what elements of that option are on page 38. The second is garrison or
limited interventionist policing which is quite clearly the sort of policing that occurred
in the riot in ’85, the type ofpolicing in which the TRG take a major role, and the third
is the saturation type of policing which was carried out in ’86, and as Scarman says in
his report “Saturation policing will ultimately always have the effect of controlling
public disorder if you have enough police to do the saturation policing”. There is the
interesting element of such strategies to which I refer on page 39, concerning the way
in which they affect the nature of the event itself. If, in fact, you police the event to such
an extent as it was in 1986 the very nature of the crowd behaviour, which has been
traditional at Bath-urst for so many years on the Friday and Saturday night quite
distinctly changed because of the high profile involvement of the police. It was more
orderly but it was also very, very different in terms ofthe types of behaviour that were
engaged in.
I refer on page 40 to the issue of “community policing” where there are elements
within the event itself which have a very strong vested interest in the successful
operation and running of that event, and who have up until now abrogated their
responsibilities in relation to that policing. The local community, in terms of the
Chamber of Commerce or the Council, quite clearly have been happy to abrogate their
responsibilities to the police, and the Motor Cycle Unions to some extent did the same
although there have been attempts more recently to establish some liaison between the
police and these organisations.
The policing of that event quite clearly is a policing strategy or situation which is
kept in the hands of the formal policing agencies. That is becoming more and more a
singular event which is policed by the police.
On page 40 I talk about what constrains police strategies or the creation
of police
strategies. It is obvious that the physical resources constrain them as do the internal
strategies which exist in the Police Force itself, and it is interesting if you had the
opportunity to read the materials which describe 1985, to see the dynamics of how the
pressures coming from various elements within the policing organisation at Bathurst
very much affected the nature of the policing, and of how the event panned out on the
Saturday night.
On page 40 I talk about organisational specialization in policing public order
and basically it is a discussion of the development ofthe TRG. Iwill not go into that in
detail, and I should say that ifit appears that I am singling out the TRG for criticism it
is just thzit, in fact, they represent quite clearly a good example of the matters that I
wanted tp raise later in the paper concerning “institutionalization”. I shall say nothing
of that section except to say that it discusses the development of the TRG from a very
specific’brganisation which had quite clear operational goals and was limited to the
reestablishment of public order, to an organisation which is now quite pro—active and is
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involved in its own conceptual sense in order maintenance. If you look back at what
Scarman says about this sort of development in relation to the special patrol group in
Britain he says it is an adverse development. He would argue that specialised tactical
response type groups are groups to respond to a speciﬁc crisis. If one accords to the
view that community policing is the right way to be going, such groups have no role in
relation to order maintenance in a pro-active sense. I go through a discussioon of the
criticisms about the development of the TRG. The fact that there was not great public
debate about that development is noted. I think you can look through these matters
yourselves and consider the value or otherwise the various arguments for the existence
of that sort of unit.
I would like very brieﬂy to touch on the matters raised on page 44. This is where
the empirical information was useful to us. It was interesting to look at features which
affect the development of a police strategy and then certain hypotheses about the way
police strategies will be influenced by certain of these elements. I go through the types
‘of matters which will affect the selection of a police strategy on page 44 and then I
look at certain hypotheses which are pretty broad and to some extent quite difficult to
establish but they are the hypotheses that arise out of most of the debate that you find
coming out of the discussion of why Bathurst occurred. Does Bathurst occur because
there are too few police?: Does it occur because there are too many police? Does it occur
because of the type of police that we have? Does it occur because of the nature of the
crowd? the charges that are laid? It is due to planning? Is it not due to planning? Even
down to things like, is it due to the presence of the full moon, or the presence of fine
weather?
The sad thing is that there has been very little empirical evidence up until this
study that we have been involved in on which the police have been able to practically
base strategies for crowd control. In fact, many of their strategies have been based on
myth and misinformation. A good example of this is basing a strategy on planning as
was the case in the late ”70’s. The police believed that in fact the riot occurred because
people brought up weapons and whatever to the mountain and in fact prepared
themselves for that sort of activity, and therefore the police set up road blocks as part
of their strategy and in 1978 they collected a haul ofweapons which was duly displayed
to the press. In fact, the majority of weapons were the sort ofthings that you would find
most motor cyclists would carry around with them on a sort of three day event like
that. There was however a collection of firearms which was confiscated. We found out
later through certain enquiries that most of the firearms were taken from people who
were out on shooting parties without licences for those weapons, and, in fact, these
individuals had nothing to do with the race whatsoever. Our observations indicated
quite clearly to us that there was no planning at all. That is not to take away from the
fact that the weaponry used against the police in 1985 was quite significant, and it quite
clearly was, but in a camping area such as that with a lot of motor cycles around, a lot
of empty cans and bottes and whatever, it does not take much cunning to be able to
develop certain sorts of weapons which are quite signiﬁcant.
I‘will brieﬂy run through those hypotheses and you can look at them yourselves.
Firstly, there is the hypothesis that morepolice would reduce the amount of violence
which occurred. Assuming that change rates are any indication ofcrowd violence, it is
worth noting that there are periods where policing numbers remained constant and
there were variations in charge and arrest rates over these periods. I use charge and
arrest rates as an indication of police activity. They are a clumsy monitor of that but
they were the best we had. Secondly, the trends in chargepatterns are inﬂuencedby the
introduction ofspecialisedpolice divisions intopolicing exercises. That is quite clearly
the case if you look at what 21 division and the Drug Squad did over the periods that
they were there. Thirdly, changes in policing strategies will inﬂuence charge patterns.
That is quite a difficult one. It would appear that certain changes in police strategy will
affect certain types of crowd behaviour. The clearest example of that is the major
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policing strategy in Bathurst now — the establishment of the compound. Obviously
the establishment of the compound has had a very distinct inﬂuence over the nature of
Saturday night activities in Bathurst in terms of public disorder. No longer is the public
disorder carried out in the streets and the parks at Bathurst, it is carried out about 50
metres around the police compound and the nature ofthat and the focus ofthat sort of
event is obviously affected by that simple strategy.
The fourth thing is that charge patterns are inﬂuenced by available legislation.
That quite clearly is the case. There was a useful and interesting example in 1982 when
the police were making a great deal of noise about lacking powers in relation to
controlling the crowd. The Premier promised the introduction of new riot legislation,
and in fact I think it was someone quite wily either in the police prosecuting section or
the Attorney—General’s Department who put the police on to the existence of the old
common law “affray” and “riot” charges which were vigorously used in 1985 and have
resulted in the basis of the two most serious trials which were recently aborted at
Darlinghurst.
Question number five is were those years where thepress reported the occurrence
ofa riot similar in terms ofthe arrest and charge evidence. To some extent that was the ‘
case. However there were examples of years where there were a significant amount of
arrests carried out and there was no media reporting of “riots”. There is a whole new‘
debate and a massive amount of information that we have on the media’s involvement
in the creation of the idea of the riot, but, in fact, we have found that it has been
extraordinary that some years where there was no riot we are talking about riots. One
year the local press talked about “defiling the begonias" in the begonia house in
Bathurst which was an example of an outrageous event apparently and a real assault
on community pride. That was about the worst thing that happened but that was
considered to be a riot year, and then some years later when there was some really
serious damage carried out there was no riot reported. I think it has a lot to do with
which wire service they read or who writes the official report, or how many reporters
you have there, or if all the reporters stay in Sydney and write if off what they imagined
happened or what they get rung through to them from Bathurst base.
I will not go into a discussion ofthe Special Courts. All I would like to say that in
the broad view the use of the courts presided over by the Justice of the Peace is
illustrative of the options available to the State when dealing with larger scale social
order problems. It demonstrates the type of strains put on thejudicial system and the
remedy made available when dealing with collective behaviour rather than individual
criminal activity. The pressure of dealing effectively with collective behaviour in
criminaljustice system puts a premium on efficiency, and if you saw the amount,just
the physical turnover of trials and matters dealt with, in the magistrates courts in
Bathurst in the ’70’s and ’80’s you would have to give credit to the magistrate’s stamina
or the magistrate’s ability to process massive numbers of charges as he did. We give
some figures earlier on the extraordinary numbers that are processed but within the
control framework selected obviously there is no alternative. If there is a massive
amount of arrests carried out over that weekend then the court system has to be
adjusted in some way to be able to process them quickly.
My conclusion is very simply this: I do not attack the necessity for the existence of
tactical response type policing for certain public order situations. I think that is
another debate entirely but what I am interested in is the fact that tactical response type
groups such as the TRG, and SPG have a self-generating potential. They in fact might
be set up for very specific problems of public disorder and they generate through their
own existence and through the concerns that are expressed around the development of
certain public order situations, a momentum whereby they find themselves policing a
quite extraordinary collection of other situations. I could refer you to that example
that is on page 52 which relates to the TRGs involvement in the Orana crime crisis or
the crime concern which was much discussed in 1985. It is interesting to see how the
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TRG appeared at a time prior to certain meetings which were carried out between the
local council and the Premier and it was almost as iftheir presence in the areaju
stified
the discussion of a crisis, where obviously the evidence was not there.
If we are going to be in a situation where we have’ a belief in the general notion
of
community based policing and yet we set up special squads such as the TRG, by
so
doing we admit that a certain level of consensus has broken down past the
normal
levels of policing practice. We find that we have one problem on our hands the solut
ion
for which seems to generate a new and more widely applied policing strate
gy, one
which becomes very much self-fulfilling and self-generating to a point where we
do not
really have the opportunity to continually analyse certain matters prior t
o their
institutionalization. As Thompson says and I quote from the last page of the pa
per
collective conflict is no longer seen as “a medium within which other social conﬂi
cts
(can be) fought out” (page 53). That environment is not allowed and not pe
rmitted
because of the concentration on tactical response policing. Can we on the one h
and
acknowledge the ideology of community based policing and see along with it the
rapid —
development of this sort of specialised centralised elite tactical response type p
olicing
to questions of social order?
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STRUCTURING THE POLICE FORCE TO DEAL WITH PUBLIC DISORDER
Dr Grant Wardlaw
Senior Criminologist, Australian Institute of Criminology
The quality of policing is the litmus test of a political system’s character: the
ultimate critism of a regime is to label it a police state. And the litmus test of
quality ofa police force is its handling of crowds and riots: the brutality or civility
with which public order is maintained reﬂects the success or failure of the myriad
daily encounters between citizenry and police.1
The development in recent years of tactical units in Australian police forces,
largely in response to a perceived need to be able to cope better with instances of public
disorder, has largely gone undebated but could have a major influence on the style of
policing in this country. The emergence of units specialising in riot control methods
raises a number of issues. Does it signify, as some claim, a convergence between
European—style policing, which has always been overtly and explicitly an instrument of
state policy, and British-style policing, which is claimed to be based on the concepts of
consent, impartiality and the independence of the office of constable? Does the
emergence of specialised public order formations in Australia presage the the eventual
creation of a paramilitary “third force” which would stand between the police and the
armed forces? Indeed, do the scale and incidence of public order problems suggest the
need for such a force? There seem to be many countries which provide models. In fact
only the Federal Republic of Germany possesses a true “third force” — the Federal
Border Guard — which is neither part of the police nor the armed forces, but is an
independent force under the control of the Federal Minister of the Interior. It is a
para—military organisation, structured on military lines, with sophisticated weaponry;
Its members live in barracks, are trained (amongst other things, such as counter-
terrorism) in crowd control techniques and can be used by the Lander (State) police
forces as a police reserve.
The Lander police forces have riot control units which are typical of the European
organisations commonly referred to as “third forces”. Each force has a. riot section
called the Bereitschaftspolizei through which all police recruits pass and spend their
first two years of service. It is important to note however that these units, and those
such as the French Republican Safety Companies (CRS), the Belgian Gendarmerie
riot formations and the Japanese Kidotai are integral parts ofpolice organisations,
albeit on a scale and style quite alien to Australian policing.
Nevertheless the existence of units such as the Tactical Response Group (TRG) in
New South Wales, the Special Tasks and Rescue (STAR) Force in South Australia,
and similar units other forces, have raised fears that police in Australia have
introduced a “harder” element into policing public order which is reminiscent of
European-style policing (complete with images of the excesses of the CRS in
controlling crowds in (France) and which undermines traditional forms of policing.
Such debate as there has been on this issue has been polarised unecessarilly by the
analysis of public order problems in an excessively ideological manner.
The tone of much criticism of public order policing methods in Australia implies
that the police are indulging in a conspiracy to prop up a failing capitalist state by the
introduction by stealth of paramilitary structures whose real intention is to be used to
subjugate those who will surely become disaffected as the contradictions ofcapitalism
become more apparent. It seems to deny that the state has a duty to protect public
1. Robert Reiner, “Forces of Disorder: How the Police Control ‘Riots’,“ New Society. 1980, 10
April, v.52, no. 914, p.5l.
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order, assuming instead that the causes of disorder are always to be found in the
economic or social policies of the ruling elite and that attempts to maintain order are
little more than the attempts of the elite to maintain their position of privilege in an
essentially unjust system. By arguing that concepts such as the consent to be policed
under attack, critics overlook the fact that policing by consent has never meant
policing with complete acquiescence. Arguments that the police are becoming too
militaristic are often couched in terms which indicate that “heavy” elements of policing
strategy can never have any legitimacy. There seems little effort on the part of critics to
suggest how police should behave when confronted by angry mobs.
For their part, the police are generally extremely unwilling to discusss the
possibility that their philosophy of public order policing may contribute to the
problems they claim to face. It is easy to sympathise with the anxieties of front-line
police who have little time for the argument that unprotected, unarmed police act as a
calming inﬂuence on a crowd. It is hard to sustain such a View if one is under attack
from a petrol-bomb throwing individuals. As one publication has pointed out, “to
carry this argument (that unprotected, unarmed police should always be used to police
disorder because they will gain most public sympathy and support) to its logical
extreme, it would be even better to have masses ofinjured officers, while a few atractive
policewomen being killed would have the maximum effect”.2 It is harder to understand
why police are so rigid in believing that their particular version of hard policing is the
only real option open to them. On the whole, they tend to take a single-minded and
unimaginative approach to public order problems which does produce solutions which
may have undesirable consequences both for the outcome of public order con-
frontations and for the nature and style of policing generally. But I believe that these
negative effects are a result of a failure of analysis and public debate far more than they
are a result of a conspiracy to introduce a repressive element into policing as the
servant of the ruling government.
Finding the Balance in Public Order Policing
The analysis of how best to structure the police to deal with the public order
depends, then, in my view, on recognising both that there does have to be a response to
disorder and that the response may act to exacerbate the situation. In other words,
both the police and their critics are partially correct. Clearly, the police cannot refuse to
intervene in public order situations and must therefore develop policy and procedures
to deal with them. On the other hand, some ways of conceptualising the problems may
produce approaches which not only fail to control disorder, but also change the nature
of policing generally in undesirable ways. ‘
One commentator who recognises the two—sided nature of public order is Robert
Reiner. he notes that:
The paradox of policing is that while the ultimate police resource is legitimate
force, policing is more successful the less it has to be resorted to. But minimal
force does not mean no force. How far force is necessary is only partly a function
of police skill in defusing potentially violent confrontations. It also depends on
the amount of violence offered against police.3
As Reiner goes on to point out there are many potential situations in which a
“non-militaristic” response (meaning a response characterised by the non-use of police
intelligence resources, a low-level of training in crowd-control tactics, lack of central
2. Kenneth Sloan, Public Order and the Police (Police Review Publishing Company, London,
nd), p.22.
3. Robert Reiner, ‘15 Britain Turning Into a Police State?', New Society, 1984, 2 August, v. 69, no.
I 128, p.54.
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coordination and control, and absence of offensive, and possibly defensive equipment)
may in fact raise the level of injury and damage that ensues.4 In some situations, if the
police do not turn out in protective equipment their own levels of injury may be
unacceptably high. In addition, having officers confront demonstrators without the
advantage of having had training in public order duties, without adequate intelligence,
and without proper command and control is likely to increase the probability of police
'violence as discipline breaks down, as control is lost, and as inexperience and, often,
fear take their toll. It follows that if violence needs to be used by the police —- and I
believe that we must accept that it sometimes does need to be — it must be used
lawfully, competently and efficiently. For this to occur, police need training and
organisation for public order duties. We cannot yearn for some halcyon period during
which a mass of smiling constables linked arms and charmed crowds out of any violent
intent. These days never existed and neither did a period during which policing was
characterised only by “soft” methods. Indeed, as Lord Scarman argued in his report on
the Brixton disorders in London in 198 l , “policing is. . . too complex ajob to be viewed
in terms of simplistic dichotomy between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ policing”.5 It is not that
“hard” policing styles are inappropriate that is important. They clearly have a place.
The real issue is that of the balance between “hard” and “soft” styles -—~ and who
decides what that balance shall be.
The question of finding the appropriate balance, both generally and with
reference to particular situations, is in many ways the most important issue facing
contemporary police. It is intertwined with a number of other questions some of which
need public debate and others of which need a more technical assessment. A
fundamental issue is that of reconciling contending rights in public order situations. To
even begin this difficult task means setting out some basic assumptions about the
permissible limits of, for example, protest, publicly debating them, and ensuring that
they are given prominence in police training and operational philosophies. At a recent
seminar on the rights of peaceful protest held in Canberra under the auspices of the
Human Rights Commission I suggested that something along the following lines might
be a possible set of such assumptions.
Firstly, I held it as axiomatic that a democratic society must provide its citizens
meaningful opportunities for the expression of political points of view. To be
meaningful, the right to free speech must include the right to organise and assemble for
the purpose of expressing either verbally or symbolically dissident opinions. We must
also recognise, however, that the essence of democracy is balanced and that the right to
protest is not an absolute or paramount one in the sense that it cannot be assigned
antecedent value over all other rights.
The goal of peace and social order claims an important place in a democratic state
as does the protection of the rights ofthose against whom a protest is made. It follows,
then, that right to protest does not extend to the point where any political message or
any tactic of protest is tolerable. The actual boundaries, of course, are difficult to
define and are the subject of some contention, but in principle some limitations on free
speech and protest are not inconsistent with democratic forms. Thus, in some
circumstances, the punishment of direct verbal incitement to commit illegal acts can be
seen as a legitimate response of the state rather than attack on free speech. Protest
4. One of the difﬁcultis of sensible discussion about methods of public order policing is the
imprecision with which works such as “militaristic” or “paramilitary" are used. Clearly the
dichotomy between different styles of policing is not clear or obvious as the words themselves
might at first suggest. Thus, for example, extensive planning and training, command and control
arrangements, and deployment of large numbers of police personnel are said to be features of a
paramilitary style. They are also features of traditional policing arrangements, as are tactics such
as cordoning, wedge formations, etc. The major difference seems to be in the level of protective
equipment and weaponry which “modern" public order units possess.
5. Lord Scarman, The Brixton Disorders, [0-12 April 1981 (HMSO, London, 1981), p.88.
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which involves violence or massive disruption of community life justifies the civil
authorities in taking counter action. Such action can, of course, be repressive or
constitute an over-reaction, but the mere fact of taking action does not itself indicate
the emergence of an intolerant state.
Finally, of course, the state has a responsibility to protect the rights of those
against whom protest is directed, especially if the objective of the protest is to disrupt
assemblies of that group and to prevent its members from expressing their views. Once
again, the essence is balance and the police, in particular, have a difficult but vital
function to perform in ensuring as much as possible that each group has the
opportunity to express its views. But the responsibility lies not only with them but with
those who would protest. I always ﬁnd it ironic and rather sad that groups which
frequently argue loudly for free speech are often in the forefront ofthose whose tactics
are aimed at preventing speakers with whose views they are at extreme odds from
addressing public meetings. I regard it as entirely legitimate to protest outside the
venue and to engage the speaker in debate. But it is inconsistent with the right of allto
free speech to prevent access to the venue to those who wish to attend or to prevent the
speaker from putting his or her point of View.
These considerations are summed up nicely by Lewis and Corsi who remind us
that: '
. . . in a very real sense, the rights of dissidents, their opponents, and the general
public are always interdependent and potentially in opposition. Because of this,
sole concentration on any one (or any one combination) of these values
conceivably negates the remaining rights. For example, the most efficient and
effective procedure (at least in the short run) for preserving public peace might be
the prohibition of all forms of dissident activity. Conversely, dissidents may
justify any form of behaviour because of its alleged contribution to the
achievement of a morally higher goal. Ultimately, however, these rights cannot
be defined in isolation because each derive theirjustification from the context in
which they occur and that context always includes the rights of other groups.6
Although accepting principles such as the above should inﬂuence the style and
outcome of police behaviour to some extent, there are still a number of more technical
questions which need attention. For example, how can standards of police conduct be
maintained in the heated, fluid, ambiguous and sometimes dangerous circumstances
which may often characterise public order situations? Whilst adequate mechanisms for
accountability and the promotion of professionalism within the police service
undoubtedly play a part, perhaps the greatest contribution can be made by extensive
training and proper command and control systems. These, in turn, have been amongst
the major justifications for the formation of specialised public order units trained
especially to deal with crowds and rehearsed in responding to a sophisticated system of
command. In turn again, these are some of the facets of contemporary public order
policing which are the subject of some criticism. It seems to me, though, that these are
perfectly reasonable, indeed desirable, developments. The problem lies, then, not in
extensive training, the development of police intelligence systems, and the evolution of
more centralised command and control, but rather in the content of training, the limits
placed on intelligence gathering and the extent to which public order methods ﬂow
over into more general policing.
The logically fundamental problem in assessing public order structures and tech-
niques is that of accountability. Who decides on these things and how? In Australia, the
decisions have been made almost entirely by police, without public debate, without
6. Ralph G. Lewis and Jerome R. Corsi, “Government Responses to Protest and Disorder”, in E. C.
W219: and J. H. Reiman (eds), The Police in Society (Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass, l975),
P- - .
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legislative guidance and usually in an atmosphere of crisis following some particular
incident. It is this crisis reaction, usually operating in the context of sensationalistic
media coverage of public order problems which has produced the deficiencies I would
see in current structures. This is particularly so because media treatments are
excessively simplistic, tending not only to exaggerate the extent or importance of
violence and destruction, but also to scapegoat particular groups (usually socially
marginal or minority ones). The result is a natural tendency towards simple solutions
which tend, in the main, to be those involving “hard” policing methods. There is little
evidence that police (or for that matter politicians or the general public) give much
thought to whether or not the situations are more complex or the solutions employed
are potentially counter-productive.
Nevertheless, it is important to understand that the actual impetus for the
formation of tactical units is both real and imagined increases in violence — not a
conspiracy of oppression. There is no sense in condemning police for being heavy-
handed on the basis of an argument which assumes that police have deliberately set out
to exert a harder line in political and industrial contexts. This ignores the level of
opposition and violence offered against the police. Police can easily respond to
criticisms that they are developing too paramilitary a style by claiming that they never
wanted riot gear and paramilitary formations, but that this was forced upon them by
the rising level of violence with which they are confronted at demonstrations, sporting
events and industrial disputes. The extent to which these things have actually worsened
— and who is to blame — is ofcourse a matter ofsome dispute, but often the police use
it as a device to deflect attention from and deny legitimacy to claims that tactical units
(whatever thejustification for their formation) can in fact be misused in practice —that
their tactics can be, and sometimes are, used inappropriately, in an inﬂammatory
manner and, indeed, brutally. The typical reaction to such claims is to issue bland
assurances that all is well and to question the motivations, politics or intelligence of the
critic. Alternatively, the problem is conceptualised as being simply a technical one
which, by definition, only police have the knowledge and expertise to analyse and
come up with solutions too.
We ought not, however, let police decide on structures for public order
maintenance in isolation. We need much more informed debate on the nature of public
order problems in Australia and of the structures and techniques which should be
available to confront them. As I have argued elsewhere,7 much more consideration
needs to be given to such questions as whether or not full-time, specialised public order
units are necessary in Australia. The danger is very real that having such units in a
country with relatively low levels of serious disorder will lead to their employment in
situations which do not warrant a highly technological approach to order control.
There is a very real sense in which once police forces possess such full-time units they
have to employ them to justify their continued existence. This is not to say that some
form of public order unit should not exist. As I said at the outset, we must recognise the
reality that police will face, from time-to-time, situations of public disorder which
necessitate their deployment with protective equipment and, on occasion, with the
technology to break up a violent crowd intent on doing damage or breaking the law in a
non-trivial manner. But the frequency of such confrontations will be rare in Australia
for the foreseeable future. To deal with such incidents police need a trained reserve, but
it should be part-time. Futhermore, general duties police should be given more training
in the basic constabulary methods of crowd control in the hope that more
confrontationist techniques can be held in reserve and employed on fewer occasions.
7. Grant Wardlaw, “Police Tactical Units" in B. Swanton, G. Hannigan and T. Psaila (eds), Police
Source Book 2 (Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, l986).
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Recent experience in Brixton hasshown the value in" this' basic approach;" The
Chief Inspector responsible for organising public order operations in this tense area of
London argues that it is important not to have “split-level“ policing where specialised
response units are the major resource to be utilised to deal with public order situations. ,
First. he argues that bringing in outside units produces moretension and tilic‘nationin
an already difficult situation. particularly ifthe units are deployed prior to any serious
disorder occurring. Second. it is believed that anonymity in a crowd is a major factor
inﬂuencing whether or not riotous behaviour will emerge. The only way to ensure that
anonymity is not possible (and to identify outsiders who may in some small number of
instances stir up trouble) is to have local police who know the community take the
primary responsibility for public order control. The Brixton scheme stresses the need
for being able to move from “normal“to “high tension“ policing very rapidly. with the
intention being for local officers to positively occupy a trouble spot. Any rein-
forcements from outside are initially to be used on stationduties. thus releasing. local. ,
people for street duties. It is only ifmajordisorder involving'violence o‘r'destruction of
property occurs that outside help will be deployed on the streets. and only after a full
and careful briefing. Such an approach, together with a reinvigorated neighbourhood
policing scheme and new forms of community consultation seem to be paying
dividends in an area which was the focus of some of the worst disturbances in l98|.
At least part ofthe motivation for increased attention to public order matters in
Australian police forces seems to have been to learn lessons from their British
counterparts, so that they don‘t find themselves similarly unprepared for outbreaks of
serious disorder as was the case in Britain in 1981'. We ought then. to'pay particular
attention to the lessons learnt about the friction caused. by deploying riot-trained
special units on saturation policing tasks aimed at general crime. Such tactics are
generally accepted as having contributed to at least some ofthe friction which eventually
resultedin the riots. They have appeal to both policeand politicians who want to feel .
that somethingpositive‘ is being doneto“clean up‘a problemIn a particular area.
However, such tactics may not always be as successful as they sometimes appear to be.
There is a tendency for the criminal behaviour merely to be displaced to environing
locations. Of more importance, however. is the fact the specialised units tend to adopt
more aggressive styles than general police. One ofthe lessons ofthe British experience
is that in such situations, if disorder occurs, police may not be merely victims of
disorder(for example, because they represent authority) but rather at'liW'[)(lrlit'ipanlS
because of their own behaviour. Furthermore deployment ofsuch units on ordinary
police duties can act to undermine the efficacy of the new community policing
initiatives. In Australia the use of tactical units as street patrol forces seems to be
increasing both as a way ofemploying the units to keep them busy and, interestingly, as
a means ofgiving them “ordinary“policing responsibilities in an effort toprevenl them
from becoming too aggressive. It is a development I consider to be generally
undesirable and should be subject to much greater scrutiny and debate.
Politicisation of the Police
A development which is ofprimary importance in structuring police forces to deal
with public order15 theincreasing political role played by police.The difficulty with an
overt political role, especially as represented by police statements viewing themselves
as the “beleagured last line of defence against the destruction of traditional social
values and institutions against attack",9 is that police are seen to deﬁne social problems
 
8. Tony Judge,“Brixton Finds the Answer“, Police. Magazine ofthe Police Federation, I985, v. I8, no.
4, pp. 8-l0
9. Clive Unsworth, “The Riots of l98l: Popular Violence and the Politics of Law and Order“,
Journal ofLaw and Society, I982, v. 9, no. I, p.68.
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and their solutions, and Hot merely act, as they claim, as neutral enforcers ofthe law.
By entering the arena in this way, police may seetn to be (and, indeed, may be) the
front-line in an authoritarian reaction to some situation. The police constantly remind
us that, whatever difficulties may arise over differi'ng ideological interpretations of
public order matters, the law and society do diaw"'som'é: line which they expect the
police to hold. But they find it increasingly difficult to Convince large sections of the
community of their impartiality when they themselves are “actively involved in
formulating official views which are publicly hostile (for example) to the rights of
workers to strike or picket“.'“ It must be understood that a “police"view is not a purely
neutral, “expert" or “technical" one. It is just as political as any other view. Indeed,
many police statements act as part of “an ideological force, mobilizing public opinion
behind a very special and particular set of“l.aw and Order” policies“.'I Much of our
tradition of policing is based on having as far as possible a separation between making
.. and__t_'tt/'ort'i/1,t,r the law and it is a separation we should strive to maintain. As Hall
reminds us, the difficulty for the police is that they": A.
. cannot both constitute a powerful crusading part of the “Law and Order"
lobby and maintain for long the semblance ofsocial and political impartiality.
'l'hc cannot both claim to “police by consent" and be so actively and publicly
involved in constructing public opinion, in shaping consent and producing it, in
its most traditionalist and disciplinary form. '3
Probably nowhere is the police intrusion into the public political arena more
obvious than in debates over public order. and it is precisely here that an undermining
of the notion of impartial enforcement of the, law is most damaging. I believe that
police need to reconsider very carefully their proper role in such debates.
Concepts of Policing
> The notions of consent, independence of constables, impartiality, and account- .
ability are central to much discussion of public order pelicingvand the structures and
principles which should be mobilised to cope with it. Much ofthe use ofthese terms,
however, is confused. subject to partial interpretation and often reﬂective more of
ideology than reality. In deciding on how to police public disorder. however. it is
clearly important to understand how public order duties fit into police work generally
and how they relate to the so-called central features of our system of policing. In this
section ofthe paper, I want to explore these links with reference to an important series
of articles by Dr P.A. Waddington which has appeared in Police. The Magazine ofthe
Police Federation over the past two or three years.
“"Waddington takes as his starting point the now-well-reeognised (by academics, if
not the general public) fact that‘dealing with public disorder and minor crimes with an
element ”of disorder (such as vandalism) is a major part of every police officer’s role.
Although the focus in police work has traditionally been on major crime-fighting, we
know that the reality is quite different. The fact that police themselves have emphasised
the crime-fighting ethos and that many, ifnot most. recruits are attracted to thejob by'
the opportunity to fight crime, has reSulted in an under-emphasis on the public order
role. Thus portrayals of police work seldom mention it (with major exceptions in
books such as those by Joseph Wambaugh).'3 discussions of everyday policing
amongst police on duty focus on other areas.H it does not feature prominently in
 
It): ' Stuart Hall. Drifting Into a Lau- and Order Soriely (The Cobden Trust. London. I980), p. l2.
ll. Ihid. p.l6 ,.
I2.‘ Iht'd. pp. I6-l7. ‘ ‘ : . ‘
l3. See, for example, Joseph Wambaugh, The Blue Knight (Little. Brown and (0.. Boston. I972):
The New Centuriunx (Dell. New York, I979); Lines and Shadows (J. Curley. New York. I985).
l4. See the observations about police conversations on duty in Simon Holdaway. Inside the British
Policy: A Force at Work (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, I983):
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general police training, and it is not assigned high political or internal priority.
Furthermore, because the reality and importance of general public order duties are
given little formal recognition, there is perceived to be a great discontinuity between
minor public order tasks and the problems associated with handling masses of people
which normally fall .under the heading of “public order”.
The reality is, of course, that most police time is spent on minor public order
duties, but that performance is less than optimal because they do not fit in with the
police officer’s view of what constitutes “real” police work and because the emphasis in
training has been in law enforcement, not order maintenance. It is important to
remember, too, that the events themselves are minor only in the sense that they
constitute minor offences. In fact, they can cause more fear, distress or deterioration in
quality of life (particularly amongst vulnerable groups such as the elderly) than do
major crimes which grab the headlines but do not directly affect the lives of so many
individuals.
As noted above, an important part of this situation is that police themselves tend
to downgrade the importance of order maintenance duties. Complaints are often heard
about the undesirability of becoming involved with “social work”. Offenders are not
likely to be major ones, so there is little likelihood of a “good” arrest. But to the
community, the order maintenance role of police is vitally important. If police gave
more recognition and training to this aspect of their work, they might prevent some of
these behaviours from developing into more serious public order problems or provide
the sort of sound background experience relevant to dealing more effectively and less
abrasively (and with less help from dehumanising or alienating technology) with the
more serious forms of disorder.
However, as Waddington notes:
For these tasks to receive the recognition that they deserve, a “philosophy of
policing” needs to be formulated which will challenge the “cops and robbers”
image and receive public endorsement.l5
Waddington argues that this philosophy must go beyond the current generalised
conceptions of community policing or earlier notions ofpolice as a service rather than
force, to recognise that there is no discontinuity between the crime-fighting and service
roles of police. What is needed is a recognition that what is common to all police work
is the exercise of authority. The police are the principal holders of legitimate coercion
in our civil society. It is discretion in the exercise of this authority which prevents the
police from being oppressive.l6 In the British police tradition, discretion is formally
recognised in the doctrine of the independence of the office of constable. But whilst
publicly acknowledged in this form, discretion is not often publicly discussed and is
sometimes publicly denied by police who claim for one reason or another that they-
have no choice but to enforce the law. What is required is a re-assertion of the reality of,
indeed the necessity for, police discretion. This is particularly important in public
order policing where keeping the peace may sometimes require the exercise of the
discretion not to enforce the law strictly. Being able to exercise discretion implies
having sufficient powers to be able to cope with many contingencies. In turn, allowing
the police to have these powers means that we must trust them and it is this context that
discussion of accountability and avenues of satisfactorily resolving complaints about
the abuse or inappropriate use of police powers become central to the debate about
public order policing.
l5. P. A. Waddington, “The ‘Acceptable Face’ of Policing", Police. Magazine ofthe Police
Federation, 1983, V. I6, no. 3, p. 30.
16. Although, on occasion, it is false claims that they are unable to exercise discretion which may
signify an oppressive application of the law.
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Waddington argues'7 that it is what the police are rather than what they do that is
the crucial and unifying element in their role. Put simply we must recognise that the
police are the representatives ofthe authority ofthe state. In our society, that authority
is contained in the law. There is, therefore, a very real sense in which police are right in
claiming, as they often do when they are accused by some section ofthe community of
enforcing the law in a heavy—handed manner, that they are merely the impartial
enforcers of the law. But in order to have moral authority as well as legal authority,
police have to step back from the law and not be involved politically in formulating it.
.To re-e—mphasise what I said earlier, police involvement in making the law undermines
any pretence of impartialityin enforcing it. Thatis why I view with such suspicion the
,increasing political role of police.
The notion of being responsible to the law, rather than directly to government,
carries with it implications for the concept ofconsent upon which our policing15 said to
be based. This concept is one which has been uncritically accepted in discussions of
policing, but which turns out to be fairly ambiguous upon closer examination. Clearly,
policing by consent does not mean policing with the consent of those against whom
police action is taken. From whom, then, is the consent obtained? Those who favour
some form of local accountability would say that consent comes from the local
community and that “acting on their behalf, the police should pay attention to, and be
circumscribed by, the values and norms of that community“ (emphasis added).
However, public order situations clearly expose the unworkable nature of this
arrangement. Often such situations involve one community in conflict with another.
From which should consent be sought? Such a decision puts the police is an unenviable
position. Either they are trapped between competing demands or they end up being
guided by their own values (which often will coincide with those of one side of the
conflict, thus introducing a partisan element).
According to Waddington, “the ‘consent’ that the police must legitimately seek is,
then, not to be found in parochial, but in universal standards of what is acceptable or
unacceptable conduct, such as those expressed in law". '9 For all its imperfections, it is
this recourse to the law which is so important to our way of policing. What it does,
though, is to place a very heavy burden on our elected parliamentary representatives to
avoid passing legislation whichis socially devisive — nevertheless it is on politicians, '
not police, that the burden should rest. It seems that our approach to public order, with
its concentration on criticisms of police actions, is a bit lopsided Much more attention
needs to be paid‘to the contribution ofgovernment policy to public order problems and
to ways of reducing it. As Reiner notes:
The fact is that the police themselves are currently trying to restore their
democratic legitimacy. But their major problem is government policy. “Com-
munity policing“ cannot ﬂourish in the face of policies which relentlessydivide
the community.20
The recourse to the standards ofthe law, however, does mean that in public order
situations, the application of those standards against the behaviour of particular
groups inevitably involves enforcing the law against some peoples’ will and without
their consent. it is here that the importance of discretion and difficulties with
concepts of local accountability and consent become apparent. The exercise of
discretion must be with reference to universal principles, however difficult in practice
this may be. Certainly, discretion should not mean complying with sectional interests.
[7. P. A. Waddington, “Whose Consent?", Police. Magazine ofthe Police Federation, l984, v. 16,
no. lo, p. 30
I8. ibi'd.. p. 28.
I9. ibid..
_20. Reiner, op. cit.. note 3, p. 56.
 70
Much of the recent debate in the United Kingdom over local accountability
(essentially, whether or not Police Authorities should have the power to determine
overall police policy for their areas) has focused on attempts of left-wing dominated
councils and authorities to gain more control over policing and on fears that this would
result in a greater left-wing (and therefore, “bad") influence on police matters. Those
who identify with the left and who think this a good idea should ponder the reverse
situation. Imagine a right-wing authority insisting on a vigorous “law and order“
approach to policing or wanting the police to take a “hard line" against illegal
immigrants. Obviously, either situation would polarise the community, result in either
ineffective or discriminatory policing, and further politicise the police. This form of
accountability will serve eventually to totally undermine the legitimacy of the police.
As Waddington argues cogently:
Discretion should be exercised with reference to universal principles, such as the
need to maintain order and protect civil rights (especially of the innocent and
vulnerable), however much this may offend certain sections of society who may
wish for example, to create mayhem or violate civil rights by intimidating others.
According to such universal principles it may, on some occasions, be decided that
least harm is done by not enforcing the law than by enforcing it. Whilst no one
pretends that such decisions are easy. . . they surely must be considered according
to logically defensible principles rather than current, and local, popularity.“
In the final analysis, except in the sense that the people consent to be policed
when they fail to resist police efforts to direct their behaviour, policing is not by
'consent but by the exercise of legitimate authority. This reality is made obvious in the
control of public order. Waddington is correct in saying that public order occasions
‘make the right to use coercive force (which underlies police authority and remains
latent for much ofthe time) more manifest. This is so particularly in instances of mass
public disorder which attempt “to usurp the ultimate coercion . . . . Mass public
disorder in pursuit of an organised interest is . . . one of the most fundamental .
challenges any state must face. For those of us who believe that liberal Parliamentary
democracy, for all its faults, is the best available system ofgovernment, it is essential
that in such contests it is the agents ofthe state who triumph“.22 The essential question
is not whether or not the police should take action, but now.
Conclusion
I have argued that much of the debate about public order in Australia has been
unproductive because critics of police have often failed to appreciate the practical
difficulties facing police in public order situations and because their ideological
blinkers have led them to the, in my view false, belief that the introduction of a
technological and specialised approach to public order is part of some conspiracy to
prop up a repressive and failing capitalist system. For their part, the police find it easy
to dismiss these claims as the ravings ofthe “loony left” and rather arrogantly go on the
same course without pondering the accuracy oftheir views. The difficulty, as I see it, is
that there is much substance in the claims of the critics that public order control is
moving in some undesirable directions in this country, even if I disagree with some of
their theoretical views. We certainly need much more public debate about the
structures and philosophies of public order. These are not merely technical matters and
are too important to be left to the police alone. Indeed one of the sources of the
limitations or negative impacts of current public order maintenance is that the police ,
have seen it purely as a technical problem to be solved principally with reference to
technology and tactics. Unfortunately, those who engage the police in debate fail too to
2]. Waddington, op. cit., note 17, p. 30.
22. ibid.
7]
move away from these matters. If the debate is going to produce anything really
‘ worthwhile it will have to fOCus first on principles and philosophies of policing. ThisIS
why I see attempts such as Waddingtons to re-analyse concepts of policing as being so
important We can never really satisfactorily resolve theissue of how to police public
order until weresolve theissue of what sort of police this society wants.
Toleave the last Word to Waddington:
It is easier to shrink away from attempting to find solutions to truly difficult
problems and concern oneself with the more obvious manifestations — in other
contexts this would be recognised as “scapegoating”.23
 
23. P. A. Waddington, “Bring on the NUMskulls“, Police. Magazine ofthe Police Federation, 1985, v. 18,
no. 3. p. 40
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DISCUSSION PAPER]
'John Parnell. S.M.
Public order. and the peace are inseparable concepts, and major privileges .ofour
society. The safeguard for each is the law, principally the common law. Hence, the
epithets to explain the two concepts come in the main not from parliament but from
the courts and academics. tranquility, safety, normalcy.
The executive arm ofthe law is a police force a body of constables banded
together under the operational control of a constable/Commissioner (at the direction
ofthe executive) All constables have an individual discretion as to the execution ofthe
law.
The exception is in the area of the peace where the law seems to be that certain
failures to act may be indictable misfeasance. This presents a dilemma for all
constables. Nevertheless there is a clear obligation on the Parliaments to legislate to
resolve this dilemma of the constable. l exempt the Commonwealth from these
remarks because in the Crimes Act 1914 and the 1971 legislation there was some ,,
attempt to resolve the dilemma.
There are two cases which really highlight this dilemma. They are both English
cases. One' involved the situation where the Chief Constable posted his men to watch
the confrontation between bulldozers and environmentalists. The bulldozing authority
attempted to have the courts force the Chief Constable to do something. The courts in ‘
their civil jurisdiction said “No. He has got a discretion and furthermore this isva
self-help society”, and nothing happened. About the same time2 another constable saw
a brawl or a fight going on outside a picture show. passed to the other side of the road
and pressed on. A complaint against him was made to the Director of Public
Prosecutions who indicted him for some old common law misdemeanour and he went
to gaol for two years. These are the two extremes but nevertheless the problem for
constables is in the middle, and the Parliament has just not faced up to its
responsibilities
Two of the writers have expressed concern over a present trend towards
militaristic policing. Whilst it is difficult to see any reversion to community policing in
modern days, nevertheless the concept of our civil police must be preserved.
Thejudiciary, the legal profession and academia-must Share some ofthe blame for
any militaristic trend by their continued references imputing a corporate role to the
actions of individual constables, e.g. “the police case“ “the officerin charge of the
case” etc. All such references could impute a license to centralise and militarise and it is
not surprising that the public forms a false impression ofour concept of civil policing.
Moreover third forces outside our present civil forces are proscribed by the ,
Constitution.
The three bodies above have a duty to take the lead1n ensuring public awareness
in this regard.
I. R v. Chief Constable of Devon & Cornwall Ex parte The Central Electricity Generating Board. “The
Times" 2l/l0/8l. . - , -
2. R v. Dytharn 1979 Crim Law Rev. 666.
. , I :73
DISCUSSION PAPER 2
TOWARDS POLICING A BANANA REPUBLIC:
PRESENT TRENDS AND A SUGGESTED ANTIDOTE
Gill Boehrirtger,
Macquarie University Law School
The fundamental legacy ofthe current Labor Party regimes in Canberra and
‘N.S.W'. 'may one day be seen as having succeeded in transforming this
country into a heavily policed Banana Republic.
Agree —— Disagree — Dont know —- (check one).
Faced With such a question in a survey poll, some members ofthis audience might
simply chuckle, hand back the paper and comment: who is the nut who dreamed that
‘ up? » . . . , . ..
.
Yet current tendencies in the bodypolitic — and economy 4'suggest that We
might consider seriously the historical trajectory of policing in Australia and the
possibilitieswhich are ahead of us After all should Mr Keating’5 dire warning come to
pass, how will an Australian Banana Republic be policed? Events north of N.S.W.
'border, as indicated by Father Brenn’an', do'not suggest that the traditions of the “rule
. ofIavV“ are an iron—clad guarantee ofthe survival ofliberal democracy. India and other
former British .coIOnies are further proof of that. And the experience from other
' traditions (e. g. Germany, Argentina) seemed no stronger bulwark to a slide into
authoritarianism — to maintain‘‘public order” — with economic collapse.
' It is to raise some wider issues and encourage discussion that this paper has been
written. Many of the ideas are developed at greater length "Policing: Practices,
Strategies. Accountability ”.2
The issue of “Policing Public Order“ cannot be divorced from the nature of the
society in which it is debated. Indeed, the kind of policing we have will in significant
measure help to constitute that society 3 As one police scholar of his own profession
has succinctly commented: “Police are part of the politics of social control”.4
Putting aside the question ofthe economy, which no one surely can feel optimistic
about, l believe we are now entering a very dangerous period1n the civil life of this
country. It is an ominous sign that over the past decade “law and order” has come
increasingly to be seen as a vote winner. The latest indication ofthat is Mr Howard’s
recent Deakin lecture 5 Another recent indication is Mr Unsworth’s rapid capitulation
to an irresponsbile Police Association campaign —in particular I refer to the T.V.
advertisements —to “Reinforce the Force". ‘2
From ones own experience here and abroad, and indications from ofﬁcial
statistics, there does not appear to be any substantial basis for the fear of crime which1s
.being whipped up. Levels of street crime ~— or even suite crime -—. and other forms of
‘ public disorder are not particularly high in this country or in N.S.W. specifically. We-
 
I. see pages ”-21, 4
Brown, D. et aI Policing. Practices. Strategies. Accountability Special Issue of the Alternative2.
Criminology Journal. I985.
3. This point is developed brilliantly and comprehensively1n S. Hall et al. Policing the Crisis. Mugging, The
. State and Law and Order (London: MacMilIan, I975).
4. Alderson, J. Policing Freedom. A Commentary on the Dilemmas of Policing in Western Democracy
(Plymouth. McDonald and Evans I979), p.57
5. See a report in the Sydney Morning Herald 25 July I986.
6. See story and illustration1n P Turner “Police ad campaign aims to frighten public into protest" S. M. H.
25.6.86 and see generally, G H Boehringer, “The Force Be With You: Police, Practices, Policies in
N.S.W.“, (I986) I I Legal Service Bulletin. No. 4.
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should not be stampeded into rash policies and practices of policing by media accounts
of “War in the West“,7 “trade union bullyboys“ or “bikie drug gangs“.
No doubt there are social problems, of many kinds, that need policing. And no
doubt some ofthese can be appropriately addressed by the police. And a few may even
need the attention ofpolice with specialist training and equipment for handling public
disorder. But we must keep things in proportion. As one police commentator has
written: ,
The police cannot rely on bigger and better battalions of shock troops, but will
need all the intellectual power they can muster to cope with the challenges
through improvement without expansion and by frequent pro-active police
measures (and not by permanent reaction)“
The problem presented by “policing public order" is that it may become the
dominant focus, it can twist and distort the policing effort, and in due course, break the
tenuous nexus —— which has constantly to be negotiated —— between community and
police. When that occurs, policing cannot be based on a community consensus, on
ideas of mutual accommodation, on a flow of information and support from the
community all of which are necessary for the style of policing we have been, in large
measure, accustomed to.
According to the same police commentator: “It should also be pondered that there
is a correlation between levels of police power and public support for the police. Thus,
where police have swinging powers, public support will be in inverse proportion".°
Policing public order by coercion will act as a general illumination which bathes all else
in its own light. . '
Models of Policing: A Choice Still Remains
There are perhaps two models of policing which can be used to represent the
major choices for policing Australia. The first is community based: the police have a
relatively close relationship with the people; the authority relation is seen to depend
notjust on legal position ofthe police but on their integrity and excellence ofservice;
personal relations are emphasised and much of police information comes to them frOm .
the community; technology (arms, cars, etc.) is de-emphasized and policing is done
individually or in small numbers. Policing is largely overt and unthreatening. it is
highly decentralised. As the police are local and approachable, there is a stream of
direct citizen participation and mutual co—operation in the process of determining
how policing will be effected. A good deal of the police effort is proactive or
preventative, simplyby its presence in and knowledge of the particular community,
and the sympathetic on-going relationship built up with the local people.
A second model is militaristic: the police are relatively withdrawn from the
people; the authority relation is seen as essentially based in law and coercive power;
personal relations are de—emphasized; communications between police (and selected
civilians) replaces general communications with the people; increasingly police
information is police produced (though special programs may be introduced, often by
a new Community Relations Branch — to re-establish citizen communication/as—
.sistance, e.g. Operation Noah, Neighbourhood Watch, etc.'°) Policing is done much
more by special units, often covert, and much more often threateningly. It is highly
centralised due to high capital investment in computer communication technology,
7. See e.g. the coverage of alleged gang war between ethnic groups in Sydney's Western Suburbs, Sun
Herald l3.7.86; S.M.H. l8.7.86
8. Alderson, op. cit., 2l3.
9. ibid, p. 12.
l0. See L. Wilson, “Neighbourhood Watch (I986) ll Legal Service Bulletin 68-7l. See Also B. Dunne,.
“Community Justice Centres: A critical appraisal" (I986) l0 liege/(Service Bulletin I88-l9l. And see
generally for an attempt to theorize such developments, T. Luke, “.Culture and Politics in the Age of
Artiﬁcial Negativity“ (I978) Telos. No. 35, 55-72. '
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cost effectiveness considerations, general bureaucratic tendencies and, perhaps most
important, the shift away from the preventative to a reactive/ﬁrebrigade mode.
By way of summing up, it should be noted that:
Modern democratic policing is based on good communications; there is a
paramount need for effective communication with the public . . . modern
democratic policing is a joint operation between the police and those many
publics. It is not possible to conduct ajoint operation unless both sides of the
' partnership are well informed about each other’s hopes, fears and aspirations.
On the other hand, policing in an authoritarian society depends, not so much on
the type of communication between police and the public which will lead to a
dialogue about policing, but rather on the communication of orders, directions
and coercions. There is no dialogue, only a monologue.‘I
It can hardly be denied that policing in N.S.W. has been moving away from the
traditional community model to the militaristic model. Admittedly there have been
some interstitial attempts by police administrations to slow or modify that trend in
certain respects (e.g. community liaison units) but it has been the dominant tendency.
Unfortunately this provides evidence to support the view that militaristic-policing is an
almost inevitable tendency in our contemporary world of alienated souls, huge
unemployment, massive poverty and social injustice. And as has been suggested, there
is a high probability of “leakage” in style, policy and practice from the proudly
paramilitary mode ofthe special units to general policing. Such a tendency, and such
“leakage“ receives impetus from the very culture ofthe police organisation: “Police are
more comfortable in an authoritarian world."'2 This, ofcourse, can set up a downward
spiral into the very “public disorder“ which acts as a justification for militaristic
policing: people today are increasingly unwilling to put up with police authoritarianism,
at least when applied to them. (As has been argued by at least one eminent policeman,
“some illegal behaviour may be seen as more tolerable than the police behaviour, even
if technically legal, used to prevent it“).'3
Again, in this technological, bureaucratic age of rapid impersonal communication,
the police are no exception to the infatuation with rational administration, “efficiency"
(not to be confused with effectiveness) and the potential oftechnology. This syndrome,
which many of us have been exposed to as employees, operates in the structure of
policing to de-humanize (or in Braverman’s usage, to degrade”) the job. Thus the
workforce operative, or rank-and-file police officer is no longer out there on the beat,
more or less on his/her own, making street-level decisions concerning people with
whom there is an on-going relation and therefore both incentive and human needs
which propel the “police worker" to act humanely towards those with whom he/‘she
comes into contact.'5 '
That the hierarchic, closed and essentially unaccountable bureaucracy of the
modern police institution should increasingly come to reﬂect the paradigmatic model
of bureaucracy — the army — should not surprise. However, knowing what we know
about the generation and implementation ofanti—human policies by such bureaucracies
(e.g. the body count syndrome of Vietnam, chillingly recounted in a recent critique of
the bureaucratic nature of contemporary American culture”) there must be a real
concern about the future not only of public order policing in Australia, but of the
policing of this society generally.
 
ll. Alderxon, op. cit.. p. l00.
12.112121. p. 219.
IS. ibid, p. 4.
l4. See generally H. Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth
Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, I974).
l5. Seethe analysis of the policeman's role using Braverman‘s theory in S. 'Harring, “TheTaylorization of
. Police Work: Policing the l980's“(l98l) Insurgent Sociologist X24, Xl-l, 25-32. ‘
l6. Baritz, L., Backfire: A History ofHow American Culture Led us Into Vietnam and Made Us Fight The
Way We Did (N.Y.: William Morrow, I985).
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Is There a Better Way Forward?
The development of contemporary policing-organisation, policy, practice, has
largely been a matter of internal police decision-making, presumably based on
“expert" advice about what is conceived as, essentially, a technical problem. And no
doubt a good bit ofinformation and advice has been obtained from overseas ~—- Japan,
the USA, West Germany — as well as the traditional source ofinspiration, the U.K.
Much ofthis advice and, so far as one can tell, the models chosen for the modernisation
of policing would seem over-balanced towards the militarist-high technology style of
policing.'7 The imposition of a Police Board on top of the police structure was an
attempt to modernise and rationalise decision-making about police matters, but it
certainly has not opened the process up to any democratic participation by the citizens
of N.S.W.l8 It was essentially an efficiency exercise »— note the appointment of a
former chief business executive.'9 lt owes more to the mal-administration revealed by
the Lusher report20 (and continuing corruption scandals, etc.) than it does to any
principle of open, democratic in-put from those who are being policed (or indeed by
‘ rank and file police officers). '
Surely the present tendency, or drift, into the more comprehensive militarisation
ofpolicing should not be allowed to continue. As numerous commentators have noted",
there has been no public debate about these issues of fundamental importance for the
quality oflife in the Australia ofthe future.” There should now be such a debate. As it .
happens there are some excellent sources for that debate from the ranks of the police
themselves. I call to your attention the published work of two highly respected,
thoughtful and very experienced policemen: John Avery (Commissioner of Police,
N.S.W.) and John Alderson (formerly Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, and
also former Commandant ofthe Police Staff College, Bramshill, England). Each has
written a significant book on policing which helps to point the way forward.22
In their books, Avery and Alderson both argue that there is a need for greater
citizen participation in decision-making about policing. Both, reflecting upon their
long experience in the police, and upon the academic literature concerning policing
round the world (of which there is an huge volume) came to the conclusion that a
significant change must be introduced into the police—community relationship. In their
view, it is essential, if we are to develop appropriate policing in the future, that the voice
of the citizenry be heard and, most important, be taken into account, and that this be
done through formal, open, democratic organisational structures.
While Avery and Alderson differ somewhat in how they envision the process
which they advocate operating, and apparently in thedegree to which citizens should
participate in developing police practices and policies, it is significant that these two
leading authorities on policing a democratic society, writing contemporaneously bUt
independently half a world apart, have come to similar conclusions.
Essentially their argument is that there should be formally organised committees
(Avery: Social Safety Councils; Alderson: Community Police Consultative Groups).
There are various models and a range of experience which can be drawn upon,
l7. See generally C. Cunneen, “A Garrison State: The Police in Arms“ Arena No. 7|, I985, 67-89.
18. A reading oftheir ﬁrst two reports, and the unavailability and drabness ofthem compared to the annual
report of the Police, testiﬁes to this.
l9. In addition, membership is composed ofthe Police Commissioner and a retired senior federal legal ofﬁcer.
.20. Report of the Commission to Inquire into New South Wales Police Administration (Sydney, I98!)
2 l. One ofthe ﬁrst comments on this development is in R. Hogg, “Police: N.S.W. Tactical Response Group“
(l982) 7 Legal Service Bulletin 75-76.
22. Avery, 1., Police: Force or Service? (Sydney, Butterworths, l98l); Alderson, J., op. ('it.; see also
Alderson, 1., “The Case for Community Policing" in D. Cowell et al (eds), Policing the Riots (London:
Junction Books, 1982), p. 135-146.
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particularly in the U.K., and about which a substantial literature has now developed.23
These developments ought to be considered in any consideration of policing our
society in the future whether it is public order or any other kind of policing.
Police Autonomy — Under Threat?
To those who might wish to remind me ofthe dangers of“politicizing” the police,
and of the historic “autonomy” of the police, and therefore the inadvisability or even
constitutional impossibility of any significant citizen participation in the control of
policing, I would briefly make several points. To begin with, the historic “autonomy”
ofthe police is, in some considerable measure, in the eye ofthe beholder. Without here
opening up apolitical argument about the historic role ofthe police whether in policing
public order or otherwise,24 let me say that both the English experience (under their
1964 Police Act) with local authority police committees;25 the South Australia
experience,26, and a substantial literature on the issue, attest to the view that the
traditional notion of police independence from political processes can be significantly
modified without the heavens falling in. Indeed, if we want to involve the citizenry in a
significant way there is no barrier — constitutional or otherwise — to doing 50.27 I can
hear the murmurings, the doubting whispers — “smacks of mob control, vigilantism,
anarchy, totalitarianism”. There are several points to make in response.
First, we are coming close to getting some of that now. For example, in Dubbo
within the last year a local “law-and-order” campaign was whipped up which featured
mass meetings of 2000 or more citizens. A study ofthat campaign has noted that it was
tinged with racism and notable for a media inflammed climate of crisis.28 The
proceedings have been marked by sensationalism, simplistic arguments and demands
for essentially scapegoating “hang and flog ‘em”final solutions. This campaign, it may
be pointed out, has featured prominently a retired senior police officer, a local member
of parliament, and a number of local business entrepreneurs. It has been a successful
campaign in that l) the Premier was forced to go to Dubbo, and 2) police and research
resources have been promised to the community in order to deal with the alleged “crisis
of law-and—order”. Yet there are those in Dubbo who would see the campaign as a
disaster to local social relations and, even, economic conditions. However one judges
the results on balance — is this the kind of citizen participation that we want, and if
not, how do we re-direct the concern, knowledge and enthusiasm oflocal communities
in the future?
Second, though there are always, and obvious, dangers in invoking democratic
procedures, the experience of other countries with liberal democratic traditions does
not indicate that democratizing decision-making about policing necessarily equates
with irresponsible and unproductive intervention in the policing process.
Third, on philosophical grounds, why should we not introduce a modicum of
democratic participation into a sphere of the state which is increasingly so powerful
23. See e.g. Spencer, S. Called to Account (London: NCCL, 1985); Simey, M., “Police Authorities and
Accountability: The Mersey-side Experience“ in Cowell, D., et. al, op. cit. 52-57, and Bundred, S.,
uAccountability and the Metropolitan Police: A Suitable Case for Treatment", idem p. 58-81 ; Jefferson,
T. and Grimshaw, R., “Law, Democracy and Justice: The Question of Police Accountability", idem.
82-!17; and see Brogden, M. and Gill, P., “The Struggle for Democratic Policing in Merseyside” in
Brown et. al. op. cit. 82-97; Fine, 8., and Millar, R. (eds) Policing and Miners’Strike (London: Lawrence
and Wishart, I985) p. 204-216.
24. See generally, Bunyan, T., The History and Practice ofthe Political Police in Britain (London; Julian
Friedman, I976).
25. See e.g. Spencer; Simey; Jefferson and Grimshaw; and Brodgen and Gill, op. cit., note 23.
26. See the brief note in Phillips, R., “A Note on the Relationship Between Police Practice and the Law“ in
Brown, et. a1, op. cit. 70-72.
27. See generally Jefferson, T. and Grimshaw, R., Controlling the Constable: Police Accountability in
England and Wales (London): Frederick Muller, I984).
28. Egastgcw “Law and Order in Dubbo"(unpublished research paper, Macquarie University School ofLaw,
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and potentially fundamentally subversive of the very essence of our society — our
freedom? As the former top policeman in the U.K., Sir Robert Mark (not unknown in
this country, and certainly no friend of anarchy) has commented: “The police in this
country have nothing to lose and everything to gain by offering the fullest possible
account of their activities.”29
Fourth, unless we ensure that policing by consent, community based policing
prevails over militaristic policing, then the consequences will very likely be a massive,
qualitative change in the social relationships of the society in which we live.
I have had the opportunity to study policing in two places where militaristic
policing has been established, Northern Ireland, and the City of Brotherly Love, as we
used to call Philadelphia. There are differences between the two. The former has had
military policing since it emerged out ofthe Partition of Ireland. The latter has drifted
into mitilarized policing since the destruction of its traditional manufacturing base
after World War 11.
Perhaps the Northern Ireland experience is not all that relevant to contemporary
N.S.W. (though the Aborigines might feel differently). But I can assure you that it was
a powerful lesson to be there in the early 19705 and to learn of the alienation of the
people —— which the international mass media informs us still exists — from a Police
Force which was very much just that: armed up‘ with the latest weaponry (and
communications) which they did not hesitate to use. Such was “policing public order”, a
public order which they are still finding it impossible to impose without community
acceptance.
Possibly of more relevance is the policing of Philadelphia.30 Not a Banana
Republic (though roughly a million blacks, largely unemployed and ghettoized might
call up such a notion), it is rather a Rustbucket. Its economy clobbered (except for the
new service, tourist and other glamour industries which have sprung up in the outer,
white suburbs) and so were the people. Chief of Police, a firm believer in militarized
policing, was elected Mayor and in the heady law—and-order days ofthe post-Vietnam
backlash, graced the cover of Time magazine as an examplar of the new conservatism
in politics. Surely he had the answer to “policing public order”? No, he did not, nor
have his successors.
Many of you may remember seeing on TV, in May oflast year, a goodly section of
Philadelphia burning. How come? Because to enforce “public order”, the police used a
helicopter to bomb a barricaded house containing a group of about a dozen
(disorderly) black “radicals”. More than a decade before, this group had come to the
notice of the police — they were mounting public protests against poor conditions in
gaols and for animal rights. Over more than a decade the group was harassed into, I
think it is fair to say, a collective paranoia. Symbolically, each house they occupied,
they immediately barricaded themselves into, and away from the instrusive agents of
the state.
Not only did the police bomb the house (with explosives of a military kind illegally
obtained from the F.B.I.), but they also brought to the scene a number of weapons
“borrowed from private sources”, including heavy machine gunes. So determined were
they (and out of control ofthe Mayor and Chief of Police) that they not only expended
more than 10,000 rounds of ammunition but even ran short at one point.
Dominating the scene, the police were able to control the Fire Department. Tons
of water were used to attempt to dislodge the radicals by forcing them to choose —-
surrender or drown. Prior to the bombing, the water was ordered to be turned off. As a
result of the bombing, a fire started and eventually consumed the neighbourhood.
29. Mark, R., Policing a Perplexed Society (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974), preface.
30. See generally, G. Boehringer “Return of the Hurricane: Reﬂections on the Administration of Criminal
Justice in the USA’:, Australia. Left Review, No. 96 (Spring, 1986).
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Incredibly the water was kept off presumably to allow the fire to make it too hot to stay
in the house. Or was that the reason? Evidence shows that as a number of women and
children tried to ﬂee the burning house, they were deliberately forced back in by
gunfire from police officers stationed in the back alley. All occupants ofthe house save
a woman and a young boy who escaped, perished in the fire. In the ashes, only 3 old
weapons were found '— none automatic, and one old pistol may not even have been
operable due to its rusted condition. Thus, very brieﬂy, was “public order” maintained!
Until the next time? j
Such a scenario is, of course, unthinkable in Australia. It is simply the. working
out of another, unfortunate, American tragedy. And after all, there was a month long
fully public (on public interest T.V.) “gavel” inquiry resulting in the resignation of the
Police Commissioner — who by the way was ex—military, as many of the Philly cops
are. '
But what are we to think when we read of the kind of training and exploits the
S.W.O.S. engages in here in Sydney?31 And isn’t there a kind of eerie parallel in the
developing history of the seemingly omni-present and “gung ho” TRG — consider if
you will the over—kill involved in the recent “drug raid” in which it appears only police
guns were blazing (ironically, at each other).32
Is it not possible that we are even now seeing the constituent elements coming
together which will plunge us into a nightmare of“Mad Max”dimensions only a little
way down the track?
31. See the articles concering a complaint brought by a policewoman against a police sergeant in charge of a
training course exercise, S.M.H. 22-27.7.86.
32. See the articles concerning this incident, S.M.H. 22, 23.7.86.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
\
Gill Boehringer
I must say] am very pleased that the Institute has instituted this debate, if I can put
it that way, and I would certainly agree with Grant Wardlaw (as I usually do when he
comes here) that there has been a lack of significant and informed public debate about
policing. It is unfortunate that the development of modern policing has come to be seen
as largely a technical, in-house discussion amongst the police. I certainly appreciate the
empirical descriptions and comments from Mark Findlay and Frank Brennan because
I think they have raised a number of issues that I do not particularly want to deal with
here, and do not have the time to do so; but they certainly do suggest that there are
some serious problems in the development and control of policing in certain parts of
this country and around certain kinds of behaviours.
I wrote my paper because I wanted to raise some issues, not from the “looney left”
as some people may have expected and, indeed, if I may say to Grant Wardlaw not with
ideological blinkers or indeed even from an ideological position. It seems to me that it
is unfortunate to characterise in that way people who attempt to criticise policing in a
serious manner. It seems clear that one of the things we have to do is the sort of thing
that we have heard from the other speakers, and that is: look at actual policing
strategies and practices and then try to answer the question that you raise about the
balance that we want in policing.
I was very interested in reading today’s Australian newspaper, for on the front
page there is some material that relates to the point I tried to make in that initial
quotation in my paper — which comes from me actually — about policing a “banana
republic”. It does seem that while we are not yet in a crisis of public order the kind of
thinking that Mr Howard is beginning to feature — for example, in his recent Deakin
lecture where he stresses the need for a “law and order” policy and now he and some
others in his opposition shadow cabinet are talking ofconfrontation with the unions -
these remarks suggest that as the economy barely creeps along as it is likely to do for a
few years, we are going to be looking more and more at confrontation and problems of
public order. So I think that it is really an excellent thing thatthe Institute has raised
this issue and I am grateful to the three speakers for coming along and talking about it.
In my brief paper I tried to deal with the issue that has been raised here in part: the
leakage from “heavy” policing into general duties, or “soft” policing. I tried to pose two
models of policing: militaristic as opposed to community based policing. I tried to tie
that up not with an ideological analysis, which I forbear to do at this time, but with a
general critique of modern society. The bureaucratisation of this society, the
infatuation with professionalism, efficiency, technology, rapid communication, the
tendency towards centralisation of authority, all of the things that we see not just
within the police but throughout our society, throughout governments generally: this
is reﬂected in the mode of policing.
Whether it is propping up a capitalist state or protecting a state capitalist regime in
Eastern Europe, that is not the issue. It seems to me that it is very hard to argue that
these tendencies that we are experiencing, some of which have been referred to, are not
re-shaping the police dramatically. And hard to argue that there will not be leakage
from the special units — TRG, SWOS, etc., where they originally appear, into general
policing. Indeed taking together this tendency toward bureaucratization, etc., the
willingness of politicians to win votes through public order confrontation, the very
likelihood of an economic falling apart, the sort of militarized policing and alienation
from the community I refer to in the paper, which I saw in most comprehensive effect in
Northern Ireland, which of course, is different from Australia: and the tragedy of
repressive policing in Philadelphia, which is different from Australia too; nevertheless,
however different we may like to think this society is, it seems to me the arming up, the
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centralisation, the use of all the latest technology, the wide—spread adoption of the
latest high-tech communications, the withdrawing of the police from the community
into their central bunkers in a sense, all of these things have, if you will, a multiplier
effect. These could be a part of our future. Be it in a state capitalist or any other
country, it seems to me these are the dangerous possibilities of our modern mass
society under stress.
O.I(., What do we do? It seems to me that is the important issue. Let me make one
point quite clear here. I accept that there are lots of reasons why we should be
sympathetic to the individual police. I am interested in occupational, workers’ health
and safety. It seems to me that is a massive issue for police. I have tried to take it up in a
couple of places. Interestingly, the media has twice cut that part out of my
interventions into public debate; for example by editing my recent letter to the Sydney
Morning Herald concerning the police campaign to “Reinforce the Force.” They do
not want to know about occupational health and safety. They do not want to analyse
the structural causes of the stresses the police are under. So I have a great deal of
sympathy, as a trade unionist, for police generally. In particular I have a great deal of
sympathy for the rank and file front line police person who is under that kind of stress.
It seems to me, however, that it is rather regrettable, and I would argue irresponsible in
view of the TV campaign put on by the N.S.W. Police Association, that the police
should simply ask for more police. I would argue they ought to be having a firm look
at the way in which their work is being degraded because of the sorts of things I was
talking about, what we might call the “Taylorisation” or proletarization of their work.
It seems to me they ought to be looking at the direction in which their bureaucracy is
taking them because it seems to me more police, in the same sort of organisation, with
the same kind of work, isjust going to mean more alienated police, more police under
stress and dissatisfied with their day to day routine. It seems to me in dealing with
police numbers and police stress, that the reorganisation, the re-structuring of the
police organisation is terribly important.
I would again argue with Grant Wardlaw about accountability and local
community involvement. I am not so much worried as he is about local or parochial or
political inputs. It seems to me that you are not going to get what we really need in this
State, and in this country: a public debate about the police which is ongoing and really
significant. I am suggesting, and here 1 take a leaf out of John Avery’s little book,
Police Force or Service? John Avery, the Police Commissioner in this State now,
published his book five years ago, and John Alderson, a top policeman from the UK,
wrote in his book Policing Freedom along similar lines. They both emphasised the
need for community involvement, the need for community participation, democratic
participation through local councils. This was a suggestion I will be interested to see
how far John Avery takes now that he is Commissioner. The idea of local community
debate around policing is democratically, philosophically, politically, pragmatically,
fundamental if we are to avoid adrift into what Stewart Hall has called a “law-and-
order society". It is not as if one is asking for, reaching for, the sky.
It seems to me that the experience is limited, difficult, complicated, not entirely
successful, but the experience of local authority councils in the United Kingdom does
represent a possible way forward which we should not overlook. Of course, there are
differences in political structure and culture and so forth, but we have to begin to think
about at least discussing these matters. It is not good enough to say: “Well, wejust refer
to the law and policy and recognise police discretion.”
All of these things have to be publicly debated, but they are not. One of the
problems is that the police have the advantage because it is technological, it is‘expert, it
is efficiency, and they assume they are the ones who know and no one else does. And
the politicians in the States really defer to that line, as Mr Unsworth has indicated they
tendjust to roll over and play dead when the police say we want two or three thousand
more police. What we need to do is open it up to an array of people, to the people who
i“— - an
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are policed, to the people who know their local communities If we canIreorganise
policing, local people will once again know their police.
There are already some tendencies operating in this direction: liaison units, for
example, have been developed over the past few years; these represent recognition by
the police administration that a closer relationship has to be developed with the
= community. So [would certainly like to see in this debate the possibility raised and
discussed of developing structures whereby ordinary people, trade unionists, small
l business people, local people of all kinds — social workers, teachers, the odd academic,
l or even thejust plain academic, the people who are involved one way and another in
I the affairs ofthe community — can be given a legitimate role to play in discussing with
the police just how their community should be policed. The question that has been
raised: what is going to happen when you get two groups who want policing a different
way? It has been suggested that it is the police who are going to have to decide. Well, the
fact is the police decide already, and I would argue that the police ought to be faced
with these different groups, and those debates ought to take place out in the open.
Just one last thing: the possibility of an aroused, crisis driven citizenry. This is
beginning to happen anyway in a way it seems to me that is very dangerous and has to
be recognised. Indeed, it suggests the imperative nature of what I have just been
suggesting. I have had a student do some research on the Dubbo situation where there
was a “law-and—order”debate within the past year. I can tell you it is very worrying that
increasingly “law-and-order” is getting tied up with racism, with vigilantes, it has great
potential for vigilantism. That debate has developed in an unstructured way, fanned by
the media, whipped up by individuals representing various interests. They are doing
this already. Two thousand people went to a public forum to debate “law-and-order”
I in Dubbo, and my reading ofthe newspapers and of my student’s work suggests to me
I that such debate is a very frightening proposition when it is unstructured by some local
authority, and not related to the kinds of fundamental issues that we are raising today;
. but arises out of an unreflective backlash to so-called crisis of public order and of
I rampant crime. I believe that unless some action is taken to direct and channel and
make community concern legitimate then we will be moving in a direction where the
kind of activity becomes uncontrollable
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DISCUSSION
David Thorley, Director of Public Prosecutions Office.
I have two questions: There was extensive reference, particularly in Dr Wardlaw’s
paper, to the United Kingdom reports of waddington in particular. Were there any
lessons learned from policing of the coalminers’ strike in the United Kingdom?
Secondly, there did not appear to be any references in any of the three papers to the
situation where the Governor of a State can request the assistance of the Defence
Forces in riot control which is known as “aid to the civil power”. I would simply point
out that any special training that might be given to the Police Forces would also have to
be extended to the Defence Forces which are already trained in riot control.
Grant Wardlaw, -
As for the lessons that were learned from the miners’ strike I think that very much
depends on which side ofthe political fence you sit. As far as the police were concerned
they learned a lot of practical tactical lessons. However, the use of some tactics
obviously caused a lot of political controversy. The particular methods the police used,
and whether their use was justified in the circumstances, really depends on who you
believe started some of the particularly nasty incidents. However, I think the greatest
controversy came with police use of common law powers to stop people many, many
miles away from an incident and turn them back because there was presumed common
purpose in going to disrupt the law somewhere else. That is an issue that I do not think
has been legally resolved as yet.
I certainly did not mention the “aid to civil power” issue because I was concentrating
on what I would see as being the likely events that police will face in the near future in
Australia. I think it is most unlikely that we will in the foreseeable future have a
situation where the Defence Forces will need to be called out under that particular
heading of power — they are more likely to have to be called out in an anti—terrorist
role. I think the call-out ofthe Armed Forces at Bowral after the Hilton Hotel incident
Was widely regarded as an over—reaction, and it is unlikely to occur even in those
circumstances again. Who knows? -
Mark Findlay,
Just'one very brief comment about a lesson to be learned from the policing ofthe
miners’ strike. When John Alderson was out here recently giving seminars to people
interested to discuss just those issues, he mentioned a very important point, (Gill
Boehringer raised it in the matters that he spoke of earlier). It has been traditional in
British police practice that policing is based on a notion oflocality so that most Police
Forces, as various as they are in England and Wales, are set up with some control on a
municipal or a regional basis. Prior to the miners’ strike legislation was passed which
allowed the Chief Constables from various regions to transfer forces from one area to
another and therefore to supplement forces in particular regions where problems may
have necessitated this. In fact, what they did during the miners’ strike was to use that
power very liberally, so that if police officers, say, in Yorkshire or in Newcastle or in
Wales had sympathies with the miners and felt that their position was a difficult one,
police would be transferred from another region. Placed in that situation these
transferees would carry out their control function without the same feeling ofcommunity
responsibility that the local police may have. They would withdraw after the Conﬂict
and the local police would be left to clean up the mess. Alderson gave an interesting
example of how this caused real conflicts between certain regions. As you will know
some of the municipalities, particularly the major cities in the west, are controlled by
quite radical labor councils and they would resist through their policing committees
the attempts to draw their men away from a particular region and put them into
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conﬂict against trade unionists outside their own region. Alderson made the point that,
in fact, one Chief Constable from a conservative based constituency called upon the
mounted police from another region to be shipped into his area. The Chief Constable
in that area where they were to be shipped from agreed, but the local council would not
agree to that transfer. The Chief Constable said “The deployment of my men is a
matter'for me to determine. It is within my discretion. You have no control over me”.
So the local council committe said “Alright, you can ship the men but you cannot ship
the horses because we pay for their feed, we bought them, they are staying here”. So the
men were shipped and the horses were not.
Briefly the issue is 'that when you take from a particular community policing
region (and this is a problem with TRG policing too) the individual police who are on a
day to day basis for the policing responsibilities of that area, then the potential for
conflict and for a dissonance between community interests and police interests
becomes much greater.
Professor Christopher Hood, Department of Government & Public Administration,
The University of Sydney.
I would like to make a brief comment to‘ Dr Wardlaw’s paper. On page 65 of his
paper, he puts the case for a part time trained reserve of the police to deal with riot
situations. I think that that is a proposal that needs to be thought about very carefully.
Many references have been made in the papers and in the discussion to the policing
model in Great Britain but not very much has been said about Ireland. There was
indeed a part-time reserve in Northern Ireland up to 1970 — the B Specials — which
were exactly a part-time reserve designed to deal with riot situations, but the problems
of racism and vigilantism that Mr Boehringer commented on earlier, were very marked
in that Force. Similar things, perhaps, could be said about the National Guard in the
United States. I think a part-time reserve solution has to be thought about quite
carefully.
I should like to follow up as another option David Thorley’s earlier comment
about the possibility of calling in military aid to the civil power. If you use military
forces to police riots when public order has broken down, and you make a decision
not to equip the general police in a militarised fashion, it could be argued (and indeed
this was at one time the doctrine in the United Kingdom) that this is an appropriate
division of powers between the ordinary constabulary and the Armed Forces. The
argument was that only by using the military to police riots could you guarantee the
impartiality ofthe police, and that when the military were brought in clearly you were
bringing in a force that was not impartial and had no pretence of being impartial
between the government and whoever the rioters might be.
I also could be argued that that kind of arrangement sets up the. right kind of
incentive structure in this area in the sense that it gives the police incentives to keep
riots down rather than to amplify them.
Grant Wardlaw
Could Ijust clear up a misunderstanding which probably results from my sloppy
use of language on page 65. When I talked about a trained reserve I meant a reserve
within the police that they can call on to bring people from a particular area to deal
with the riot, and when I say part-time I mean part-time regular policemen and not
part-timers on the outside. I believe that we should not have afulI-time police riot
squad. I do not think that that isjustified and I think that it tends to result in the use of
those people policing things in a harder manner which would in the past have been
policed in an ordinary manner. I am not talking about having an outside organisation
whichIS a part- time reserve I am talking about having a part- time riot squad made up
of full-time serving policemen or women.
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Hugh Dillon, Lawyer, Department of Youth and Community Services.
I would like to ask Frank Brennan a question. There seems to have been a number
of occasions in Queensland where the government deliberately chose to raise the level
of public disorder by talking the harshest possible measures very early on. I am
thinking of the State of Emergency in 1971, then the Street March Ban, and the 1982
Commonwealth Games. I do not know whether you will be able to answer this, but
what .I am wondering is what happens to a Police Force when it is placed under the
stress of having to act in an explicitly political way?
Frank Brennan
In 1979, when the Street Barch Ban was at its peak, the Deputy Police
Commissioner gave a speech saying that the problem with policing1n Queensland was
that decent ordinary citizens were withdrawing their support from the police, and that
they really should give it as such a time when there was a very urgent need for it. Two
days later there was a demonstration in which a young police officer saw a female
friend of his beaten by Queensland police; he went back to the central police station
and resigned. Later he gave a speech in King George Square, Brisbane, and spoke of
the problem's of police morale which had arisen because the police were being used in
such a political way. In the next Annual Police Report, his resignation was described as
a “defection”. This instance highlights that the Police Force does suffer an acute loss of
morale, it does experience itself finding less sympathy with the public in general, and it
. does find itself being used as a political tool by government in relation to policies which
might not be altogether popular. Of course, in Queensland the police have ben used in
a way which has been tied very closely to State elections, as occurred most graphically
with the by-electionS'in 1971 of Merther and Maryborough. Further politicisation of
the higher echelons of the Queensland Police Force resulted in a further loss of public
faith in the police as an institution.
ChiefSuperintendent L Boulton, NS.W Police Community Relations Bureau
I have found so far that Mr Boehringer’s remarks have attracted me more than the
main speakers, with respect. I th1nk that15 probably because the matters he touched on
represent the current strategies of policing within New South Wales. By way of
comment I would like to refer to some of those strategies because it will probably have
an effect upon this debate.
Firstly I am in favour of peaceful resolutions of confrontations. I suppose that is
natural, but there is a need, ofcourse, for TRG operations. Most of the personnel who
work in the TRG are part-time. They do their normal policing duties and are called
upon from time to time to perform the TR'G role The biggest shift in the emphasis of
police operations is occurring right now, but it started about two years ago when the
Community Relations Bureau came into operation. What we are endeavouring to do15
shift the emphasisin police operations from reacting to situations, to doing something
about preventing crime, and, ofcourse, awakening the people1n the community ofthe
need to play their part in policing the community. ThereIS an onus in common law for
people to take their part By that I do not mean that we want vigilante groups throwing
their weight around, but there15 a need for people to at least watch what15 going on and
take their role. That was the strategy behind Neighbourhood Watch, a system which15
flourishing quite well1n New South Wales
Mr Boehringer referred to Mr Avery’s book and the use of consultative
committees. That is now one of the strategies for the corporate plan of the New South
Wales police. We have already started these consultative committees and it is planned
to have them operating throughout New South Wales before the end of the year. This
means that ordinary people will play a part in policing the community.
The idea is, first of all, that there must be a tremendous wealth of ideas out there
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which we want to tap into. Secondly, we seek to put together committees which are
representative of individual communities so that we can provide a policing service to
those communities that they want, and that service is going to vary from one part of the
State to another. What happens on the North Coast at Ballina, where you have a
ﬂoating population, is going to be different to what happens at Redfern or what might
happen out in the West. The Commissioner talks about “consumer satisfaction” and
that is what it is all about. All the liaison units we have operating are designed to tap
into the ideas of the people in the community becaus we take the view that the police
are the people, and‘the people are the police, and that we should be working towards
developing the relationship that we have with the community into a partnership. That
is the way the Force in New South Wales is heading which, I would submit, seems to
overcome many ofthe criticisms that have been levelled at New South Wales police in
the past.
Jeff Sutton, Director, Bureau of Crime Statistics & Research
One of the difficulties when examining riot problems is the need for what amounts
to being a “taxonomy” of riots. Research on Bathurst has demonstrated how
particular that scene is, and how it is is so specific even when it is compared with events
of an apparently similar kind e.g. the problems in Mildura where there was a similar
bike riot or, with say, the Star Hotel disturbances in Newcastle. They all tend to be
different, and that is only within one country and trying to restrain yourself to a
paricular type of disturbance. If one looks to the soccer riots, say, in Britain, even
within that category the disturbances, say within England itself and in Brussells show
how very difficult it is to generalise. The points which are being made in the paper seem
to me to have different impacts according to the particular cases to which they are
referring, so that you might decide to distinguish between the sports riots which in
some senses have a rather purposeless quality and, say, the Brixton riots where we are
dealing with what appear to be more like civil disturbances, or, in particular, those in
Northern Ireland which have enormous and quite explicit political component
directed towards particular groups.
On the other hand you might compare those which are community based with
those which are general. In a sense the Bathurst events are not really Bathurst, theyjust
happen to be located there and a great many people come there and a great many people
come there from Queensland, Victoria and other parts of New South Wales. That
would also be a problem with respect to the discussion of the miners’ strike, and Mark
Findlay gave an example of the police being moved from place to place. There another
dimension enters: that is not just the orientation to a local community, but the
identification with a particular industry or union.
I do not believe research of this kind is being done yet. I do not see any sign of
research which has indicated this kind of complexity of the dimensions of the problem.
I do not think that we can really come to grips with some of the issues that have been
raised such as the particular discretion of individual constables versus the general
accountability, say, of a TRG; the use of high technology equipment; the assisting ofa
civil power in cases of breakdown oflaw and order; and the actual problems of a third
force which have perhaps their most vivid expression in the problems of the French
CRS, unless you first of all broaden out the concepts of riot and begin to carve it up
into its components. Look at the dimensions that are involved and then apply it to the
problems that have been expressed in the papers.
IfI were involved in police training or strategy I would be looking at a two way
dimension of taxonomy of riots: time strategies versus type; and then look at the
problems within the cells that you thereby generate with respect to particular
behaviour of individual police versus the collective police entity, however it exists, and
so on. I would like to invite comment from speakers whether that might be a strategy in
research which might be adopted in the future.
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Mark Findlay
There is one point I would like to make in response to what Jeff Sutton said. I
think it is not only important to concern oneself with the nature ofa particular riot that
you are dealing with but also to remember two other features. You are not simply
trying to define the sort of riot that you are dealing with, in terms of the parameters of
further research or whatever. We have become very clear about the speciﬁc nature of
what we are looking at in Bathurst and the difficulty in generalising from that. There
are two other things which are important to keep in mind. One is the dynamic nature of
the collective behaviour itself, as the people who have been up in Bathurst for the last
three years have experienced, (i.e. the changes of what goes on during a period of riot).
How a riot starts, what causes it, how it develops, how it slows down, how it picks up,
how it becomes more or less agressive, how the parties shift in and out of it are all
essential considerations for the specific understanding of each riot situation. It is not
like talking about murder or theft or whatever, where we have a discrete entity with
identifiable people committing a particular type of behaviour which is measurable and
clearly predefined. In a riot we are dealing with a dynamic collective behaviour, and
because of that we are facing something which is particularly difficult to deal with in
terms of the criminaljustice process. We have seen from the trials that have been going
on recently that it is very difficult to identify and punish an individual for what is, in
fact, a collective act the threat of which takes on its force because of the collective act
the threat of which takes on its force because ofthe collective nature of the behaviour.
It is almost impossible to stereotype or single out an individual and say that he is
responsible for doing this or she is responsible for doing that, but the dynamics of that
behaviour are so much more significant because he or she was involved in a riot.
What I am suggesting is that the ﬂexibility, and the fluctuation, which goes on
within that behaviour itself is important to research as well, and not only that but the
fact that too often the response to that collective behaviour is seen in simplistic terms.
So you will find, in fact, that often the police response to any type of riot is the same
type of response. They do not appreciate, or they are not able to appreciate because of
the pressures on them, that the riot itself may be uniquely different, the parties within it
are different, and the dynamic processes that go on as the riot develops are different in
each case, and their very intervention in a very simple or straightforward or generalisd
way can change the nature of a riot in a very significant sense. I agree with Jeff Sutton’s
point that one needs to look at the specificity of a riot itself but when you are looking at
that, you need to see it as a changing entity as well.
Tom Kelly, Legal Aid Commission
I was wondering if anyone had analysed any statistics if they were available on the
success in prosecuting people1n these circumstances particularly perhaps to compare
the results with juries with the results of magistrates When I was involved with
defence of all the prisoners who were charged after the riots at Bathurst gaol and
certainly when they got to thejury, and even before the magistrates who found no case
to answer, it was very comforting from the defence point of view. Last week there was a
jury that failed to agree — a substantial riot case that had been going on for some many '
weeks before arising over the Easter bike races at Bathurst the year before. Are there
any statistics available or has anyone had a chance to do any research on that?
Jeff Sutton
As far as I know there are none. It would be a matter of simply going into the cases
and counting them up. The result I think would be more illuminating ifit were referred
to particular modes of defence and the circumstances of the case, rather than simply
counting the numbers involved.
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Mark Findlay
There is within the research that we have been doing very little useful statistical
information that you can draw out in terms of the nature ofthe defended cases because
in the past there have been so few. The types of charges that have been laid until the mid
’80’s anyway have usually been the types of charge that an individual would plead to, or
simply default bail, and so it would be an almost unrealistic balance to have a look at
the defended cases and find out what success you have before the magistrate or before a
jury. But in respect ofthe new batch that is coming up Tom Kelly has pointed to a very
interesting piece of research to be done: to have a look at how the committals go and to
have a look at the results of the trials, and whether we are dealing with successful
prosecutions or not, because the charges have become so much more significant. When
the charges are beinglaid on the basis of the old common law offences of“affray”and
“riotous assembly” (which possess the potential for substantial prison sentences as a
consequence of conviction) there will be many more matters being defended. The stakes
are a hell of a lot higher, and, therefore, I think within the next 12 to 18 months that
sort of research will be very useful because, if we see a number of major trials going on
where there is either no resolution in terms of hungjuries or a very poor conviction
rate, then that may go to further emphasise the fact that the criminaljustice process in
relation to controlling or regulating collective behaviour is perhaps not as efficient as
some might like.
Frank Brennan
In Queensland during the recent SEQEB power dispute there has been a marked
discrepancy between the testament of groups‘known as the Concerned Christians and
the rest. The Concerned Christians are generally acquitted it seems on the basis that
magistrates think that Concerned Christians who stand with crosses and sing hymns
do not engage in conduct which is likely to harass SEQEB employees, whereas others
who stand and shout things like “Victory to the ETU” or “Sack Joh” are engaging in
conduct which15 likely to harass SEQEB employees. I must confess that the niceness of
that distinction still eludes me.
Unknown
A small point on policing. It is often interesting that it does not really matter what
happens at — court the very fact that the people have been arrested and dragged offis
what is important. It hardly comes in terms of a riot for those involved in the Franklin
Dam blockade where at least 1000 people were arrested. All the charges were
subsequently dropped but that did not matter they had all been dragged off, they had
all been taken 10, 20 a 100 miles away. That was effective policing. Whether the charges
were valid or not did not matterfIt would have been twelve months later-before they
were decided anyway. That was the police decision in the spot and it had the desired
effect.
Evan Whitton Journalist
Dr Wardlaw and Father Brennan, in reference to the politicisation of the police
andin connection with the nexus between political organisations and the Police Force,
has any research been done on what tends to be a view that the police mutiny in
Victoria in 1923 and the consequent social anarchy that followed from that, when the
citizens looted and pillaged in the absence of the police, has terrified most
governments? The fear ofthe social anarchy which is raised by the threat ofa mutiny or
strike leaves the two organisations in a situation where the governments very often fear
to take what actions they might take against the Police Force which is engaged in
malpractice, and so enter into a situation of confrontationin that the police have the
ultimate weapon against the government.
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